Negligence — Automobiles — Bicycles — Ordinances — Charge of trial judge — One-way streets — Posting — Act of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905, as amended June 5, 1937, P. L. 1718.
1. In an action of trespass, in which it appeared that the minor plaintiff, while riding on a one-way street in a direction contrary to that provided by ordinance collided at an intersection with defendant's bus travelling on the intersecting street, it was Held that the trial judge did not err in refusing to charge that the ordinance was of no significance in the case. [5]
2. Under section 1106 of the Act of May 1, 1929, P. L. 905, as amended June 5, 1937, P. L. 1718, the local authorities have power to prohibit other than one-way traffic of bicycles as well as other vehicles. [5-6]
3. In this case, it was Held that an ordinance providing for one-way traffic regulated bicycles. [6]
4. In this case, it was Held that a posting at the north side of each intersecting street of a south-bound one-way street was proper posting within the meaning of section 1106 of the Act of 1929, as amended. [6]
Evidence — Judicial notice — Ordinance — Schedule.
5. Under the Act of April 8, 1941, P. L. 16, the court may take judicial notice that while a schedule of an ordinance of a municipality, as originally adopted, did not include a certain street, the street was included therein prior to a specified time. [6-7]
Argued April 17, 1947.
PER CURIAM, May 26, 1947:
The judgment is affirmed upon the opinion of Judge FLOOD.