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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This action arises from an agreement between plaintiff Benjamin Center and the late Frank Silverman, in which Silverman agreed to transfer 10 of his 100 shares in defendant Hampton Affiliates, Inc. (a predecessor of defendant Hampton Sales, Inc.) to plaintiff. The shares were pledged at the time of the agreement, and delivery was contingent upon their release from the pledge. Although the shares later became available, the agreement was never completed. Instead, Silverman and his estate transferred all shares of Hampton Sales to individual and corporate defendants.

Defendants contend that, as bona fide purchasers for value without notice of plaintiff's adverse claim, they have a complete defense under the Uniform Commercial Code. The plaintiff concedes that individual defendants took delivery without notice of his rights, but disputes the corporate defendant's knowledge. The Appellate Division initially ruled on these issues, and this appeal challenges that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the corporate defendant had imputed knowledge of plaintiff's adverse claim at the time it took delivery of the shares, given its agent's (defendant Gross) knowledge of Silverman's obligation to plaintiff.
  2. Whether the "adverse interest" exception to imputed knowledge applies to defendant Gross's conduct.
  3. Whether plaintiff has standing to maintain derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation.
  4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement to transfer the shares.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • They purchased the shares for value, in good faith, and without notice of plaintiff's adverse claim, qualifying as bona fide purchasers under UCC § 8-302(a)(2).
  • The "adverse interest" exception negates imputed knowledge only if the agent totally abandoned the principal's interests; defendants argue Gross was conflicted but do not sufficiently establish total adversity.
  • Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain derivative claims on behalf of the corporation.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Corporate defendant had imputed knowledge of plaintiff's claim through its agent Gross, who was aware of Silverman's obligation.
  • Gross's alleged conflict and purported fraudulent conduct should invoke the "adverse interest" exception to imputed knowledge.
  • Plaintiff is entitled to maintain derivative claims if he establishes shareholder status.
  • Damages are inadequate, and plaintiff should be entitled to specific performance of the stock transfer agreement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Farr v Newman, 14 N.Y.2d 183, 187 Imputation of agent's knowledge to principal within agency scope. Applied to establish that corporate defendant is bound by knowledge of its agent Gross.
Henry v Allen, 151 N.Y. 1, 9-11 Duty of agent to disclose material facts; "adverse interest" exception to imputed knowledge. Referenced to explain the presumption of disclosure and the limits of the adverse interest exception.
Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 43-44 Agent's knowledge imputed to principal; adverse interest exception. Used to reinforce the principle that imputed knowledge binds the principal unless the exception applies.
People v Kirkup, 4 N.Y.2d 209, 213-214 Adverse interest exception when agent defrauds principal. Applied to assess whether Gross's alleged conflict negates imputed knowledge.
Benedict v Arnoux, 154 N.Y. 715, 729 Adverse interest exception to imputed knowledge. Supported the court's conclusion that conclusory allegations do not suffice to invoke the exception.
Business Corporation Law § 626(a) Requirements for shareholder derivative actions. Referenced regarding plaintiff's standing to maintain derivative claims.
Business Corporation Law § 906(b)(3) Effect of merger on shareholder rights and derivative actions. Considered in evaluating impact of merger on plaintiff's derivative claims.
Marco v Sachs, 201 Misc. 934, affd no opn 279 App. Div. 1085, affd no opn 304 N.Y. 912 Shareholder rights post-merger. Used to illustrate potential impact of merger on derivative claims.
Albert v Salzman, 41 A.D.2d 501 Shareholder derivative action rights. Referenced in context of derivative claims and merger effects.
Rubinstein v Catacosinos, 91 A.D.2d 445, 446-447, affd 60 N.Y.2d 890 Loss of derivative action rights after freeze-out merger. Considered to explain circumstances that might deprive plaintiff of derivative claims.
Bernstein v Polo Fashions, 55 A.D.2d 530, 531 Severance and holding of derivative claims pending individual claims. Applied to order severance of derivative claims pending outcome of individual claims.
Waddle v Cabana, 220 N.Y. 18, 26 Equity principle that specific performance may be granted when damages are inadequate. Supported plaintiff's right to prove entitlement to specific performance.
Baltimore Realty Corp. v Alman, 282 App. Div. 714, 715 Specific performance as an equitable remedy. Referenced to support plaintiff's claim for specific performance.
4 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 1402 (5th ed.) Principles governing specific performance. Used as authority for granting specific performance when damages are inadequate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recognized the general principle that knowledge acquired by an agent within the scope of agency is imputed to the principal. Defendant Gross, an attorney and director of the corporate defendant, had knowledge of Silverman's obligation to plaintiff. Therefore, the corporate defendant is presumed to have knowledge of plaintiff’s adverse claim.

The defendants argued the "adverse interest" exception to imputed knowledge, which applies if the agent is engaged in a scheme to defraud the principal and has totally abandoned the principal’s interests. The court found defendants’ allegations that Gross was conflicted and engaged in fraud to be conclusory and insufficient as a matter of law to invoke this exception.

Regarding actual knowledge, the court found no triable issue of fact that the corporate defendant had actual knowledge of plaintiff’s claim before the critical date of December 8, 1975, because disclosures occurred only after the transfer of shares was consummated.

On plaintiff’s standing to maintain derivative claims, the court concluded that this question could not be finally determined at this time. If plaintiff ultimately establishes his shareholder status by prevailing on his individual claims, he may be entitled to maintain derivative actions. The court ordered the derivative claims to be severed and held in abeyance pending resolution of the individual claims.

Finally, the court held that plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity to prove that damages are inadequate and that he is entitled to specific performance of the stock transfer agreement.

Holding and Implications

The order of the Appellate Division is modified by reinstating the plaintiff's complaint except for portions asserting claims against certain individual defendants in their individual capacities, and as so modified, the order is affirmed.

The court upheld summary judgment in favor of individual defendants who took delivery without notice of plaintiff's rights, but found triable issues of fact regarding imputed knowledge of the corporate defendant. The derivative claims are to be severed and held pending the outcome of plaintiff’s individual claims. Plaintiff is granted the opportunity to seek specific performance.

This decision directly affects the parties by allowing plaintiff’s claims to proceed in part and clarifies the application of imputed knowledge and the adverse interest exception in the context of stock transfers. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles to these facts.

BENJAMIN CENTER, Indi v. dually and as a Shareholder of Hampton Affiliates, Inc., Appellant,

MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be modified, with costs to appellant, by reinstating plaintiff's complaint except those portions of the first, second and fourth causes of action which assert claims against defendants Ingraldi, Goldman, Lakin's Appliance Stores Broadway, Inc. and Lakin's Appliance Stores, Inc. acting in their individual capacities and, as so modified, affirmed.

This action arises out of an agreement between plaintiff and the late Frank Silverman in which Silverman agreed to transfer 10 of his 100 shares in defendant Hampton Affiliates, Inc., a predecessor of defendant Hampton Sales, Inc., to plaintiff. At the time of the agreement the shares had been pledged and delivery was not to occur until they were released from the pledge. Although the shares subsequently became available, the agreement was never completed. Instead, Silverman and his estate transferred all of the shares of Sales to the individual and corporate defendants. Defendants now contend that because they purchased the shares for value, in good faith and without notice of any adverse claim that they have a complete defense, as bona fide purchasers, to plaintiff's claim (see, Uniform Commercial Code § 8-302 [a]; [2]). Plaintiff concedes that the individual defendants took delivery of their shares of stock without notice of his rights. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted as to them. There are triable issues of fact, however, on whether the corporate defendant had imputed knowledge of plaintiff's adverse claim at the time it took delivery because its agent, defendant Gross, an attorney and director of the corporation, had knowledge of Silverman's obligation to plaintiff.

The general rule is that knowledge acquired by an agent acting within the scope of his agency is imputed to his principal and the latter is bound by such knowledge although the information is never actually communicated to it (Farr v Newman, 14 N.Y.2d 183, 187; Henry v Allen, 151 N.Y. 1, 9; see, Restatement [Second] of Agency § 272, at 591). Underlying the rule is the presumption that an agent has discharged his duty to disclose to his principal "all the material facts coming to his knowledge with reference to the subject of his agency" (Henry v Allen, supra, at p 9; Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 43). Defendants do not dispute that the rule applies to the facts of this case but for the "adverse interest" exception.

This exception provides that when an agent is engaged in a scheme to defraud his principal, either for his own benefit or that of a third person, the presumption that knowledge held by the agent was disclosed to the principal fails because he cannot be presumed to have disclosed that which would expose and defeat his fraudulent purpose (People v Kirkup, 4 N.Y.2d 209, 213-214; Benedict v Arnoux, 154 N.Y. 715, 729; Henry v Allen, supra, at pp 9-10; see, Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., supra, at pp 43-44; Restatement [Second] of Agency § 282 [1], at 611; 2 Mechem, Agency § 815, at 1399-1402 [2d ed]; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 675, at 923-925 [5th ed]). To come within the exception, the agent must have totally abandoned his principal's interests and be acting entirely for his own or another's purposes. It cannot be invoked merely because he has a conflict of interest or because he is not acting primarily for his principal (see, Farr v Newman, 14 N.Y.2d 183, 190-191, supra; Henry v Allen, supra, at p 11; Restatement [Second] of Agency § 282 [1] comment c). Defendants' moving papers contain only conclusory allegations that Gross was seriously conflicted throughout these transactions and that he and Silverman tried to defraud the corporation. These allegations do not establish sufficient adversity as a matter of law to negate imputed knowledge to the corporation at the time it took delivery of the shares.

We agree with the corporate defendant, however, that plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact on its actual knowledge of his adverse claim prior to delivery of the stock on December 8, 1975, the critical date under the Code for determining defendant Sales' status as a bona fide purchaser. Although the minutes of the December 8th board of directors meeting and testimony contained in a pretrial deposition indicate that Gross informed the other two directors of plaintiff's claim to stock of Sales, the corporate minutes make it clear that this disclosure came only after the physical acts necessary to transfer title to Silverman's 50 shares of Sales' stock had been consummated.

Defendants' contention that plaintiff lacks standing to maintain his derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation cannot be conclusively determined at this time (see, Business Corporation Law § 626 [a]). If plaintiff is ultimately successful in this action for specific performance of the agreement to transfer stock to him, he may be entitled to maintain the shareholder's derivative causes of action unless his right to do so was diminished or impaired by the merger of defendant Affiliates into defendant Sales (see, Business Corporation Law § 906 [b] [3]; Marco v Sachs, 201 Misc. 934, affd no opn 279 App. Div. 1085, affd no opn 304 N.Y. 912; Albert v Salzman, 41 A.D.2d 501). If the merger had been of the type designed to "freeze out" minority shareholders, then plaintiff, if a qualified shareholder, might well have lost his right to be a shareholder in the surviving corporation and similarly lost his right to present derivative claims (see, Rubinstein v Catacosinos, 91 A.D.2d 445, 446-447, affd 60 N.Y.2d 890). The merger plan is not contained in the record, however, and there is nothing before us to indicate that the merger was anything but a simple exchange of shares of stock of one corporation for those of another by the supposed sole shareholder, Silverman. Thus, if plaintiff is able to establish his shareholder's status at the time of the merger by prevailing in his claim to 10% of the Silverman shares, he may be entitled to continue his derivative actions on behalf of the merged corporation. Inasmuch as plaintiff's right to maintain a shareholder's derivative action depends upon his success on his individual causes of action, the derivative claims should be severed and held pending disposition of plaintiff's individual claims (see, Bernstein v Polo Fashions, 55 A.D.2d 530, 531).

Finally, plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity to prove that damages do not provide an adequate remedy and that he is entitled to specific performance of the agreement for the transfer of 10 shares of defendants' corporate stock (see, Waddle v Cabana, 220 N.Y. 18, 26; Baltimore Realty Corp. v Alman, 282 App. Div. 714, 715; 4 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 1402, at 1036-1037 [5th ed]). We have considered defendants' remaining contentions and find them without merit.

Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges JASEN, MEYER, SIMONS, KAYE and ALEXANDER concur; Judge TITONE taking no part.

Order modified, with costs to appellant, in accordance with the memorandum herein and, as so modified, affirmed.

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CENTER v. HAMPTON AFFILIATES, INC
(Oct 22, 1985)