Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The record reveals that the Supreme Court weighed and considered the relevant factors under General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) in exercising its broad discretion to permit the service of a late notice of claim in this case. We discern no improvident exercise of that discretion herein, as the record establishes that the delay in serving the notice of claim was occasioned by the petitioner Judy Rouse's medically documented incapacity (see generally, Barnes v County of Onondaga, 65 N.Y.2d 664), and there is no evidence that the New York City Housing Authority will suffer any substantial prejudice as a result of the service of the late notice (see, e.g., Williams v New York City Hous. Auth., 125 A.D.2d 258; cf., Zarrello v City of New York, 61 N.Y.2d 628; Matter of Perry v City of New York, 133 A.D.2d 692). Kooper, J.P., Sullivan, Lawrence and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.