Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs, that branch of the cross motion which was to vacate the order dated December 1, 1998, is granted, the order dated December 1, 1998, is vacated, and the motion to vacate the foreclosure sale is denied.
The plaintiff purchased the subject property at a foreclosure sale, and conveyed it to the appellants, whose deed to the property was recorded. Thereafter, the mortgagor, the defendant Alfred Versace, moved to vacate the foreclosure sale pursuant to RPAPL 231(6). Although his motion papers acknowledged that the plaintiff had sold the property to a new owner, he did not name or serve the appellants. Versace's motion was granted upon the plaintiff's default in opposing the motion. At the time of Versace's motion, the one-year Statute of Limitations for moving to vacate the foreclosure sale had expired (see, RPAPL 231).
The motion to vacate the foreclosure sale should have been denied for failure to name and serve the appellants, who were the fee owners of the subject property and therefore indispensable parties at the time the motion was made ( see, Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. New York Fin. Mtge. Co., 222 A.D.2d 647; Vanderbilt Realty Corp. v. Gordon, 134 A.D.2d 586). In any event, since the applicable one-year Statute of Limitations ( see, RPAPL 231), had expired, the motion to vacate the foreclosure sale should also have been denied for that reason ( see, Nixon v. Barrow, 239 A.D.2d 326; see also, Matter of O'Connell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 267 A.D.2d 742).