Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by

TIMOTHY E. BROWN, Plaintiff, vs. PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION and CAROL WHITE, Defendants.

ORDER

JOHN A. JARVEY, Magistrate Judge.

This matter comes before the court pursuant to defendant's May 15, 2000, motion for summary judgment (docket number 13). For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion is granted.

Background

The plaintiff, Timothy Earl Brown, born March 16, 1966, began work as a hydraulic hose assembler at Parker-Hannifin Corp., in Marion, Iowa, on September 19, 1995. On January 24, 1996, in an accident unrelated to work, Brown fell and injured his neck. He was out of work from January 24, 1996, through May 14, 1996, and returned to work after neck surgery. On September 11, 1996, the plaintiff suffered a hernia which was a work-related injury, and continued to work "light duty" until he underwent surgery on September 23, 1996. The plaintiff returned to work October 15, 1996. The plaintiff was unable to work due to the hernia from October 19, 1996, through November 3, 1996; December 26, 1996, through January 1, 1997; and on January 9, 1997.

On October 19, 1996, the plaintiff had completed one year of service to Parker-Hannifin, and had worked 1,250 hours during the previous year qualifying him for protection under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The plaintiff, a 1984 graduate of Washington High School in Cedar Rapids, is married and has four children. In 1996, the plaintiff earned $17,900 working for Parker-Hannifin Corp.; in 1997, he earned $15,000. On April 22, 1997, the plaintiff informed his supervisor, Carol White, that he was experiencing problems related to his previous neck injury. He presented a work restriction from his doctor which allowed the plaintiff to lift only 5 pounds, with no overhead lifting, no heavy equipment, and no repetitive neck bending. Because there was no light duty work available for the plaintiff, he was told he would need to start medical leave, and a FMLA request form was provided for him. The plaintiff completed the paperwork on April 30, 1997, and it was approved on May 1, 1997, by Catherine M. Justice, the plant manager. Ms. White told the plaintiff that his job was not in jeopardy as long as he returned to work within 26 weeks, the period during which he would receive some disability benefits.

If the injury was not work-related, the court does not understand why he would receive disability benefits.

On June 3, 1997, the plaintiff had a spinal fusion (neck surgery) at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. He was hospitalized until June 6, 1997, and, at that time, was planning to return to work September 1, 1997. However, on June 12, 1997, Parker-Hannifin wrote to the plaintiff explaining that his FMLA leave expired on June 20, 1997, and if he did not return to work on or before June 23, 1997, he would be terminated. The plaintiff did not return to work by June 23, 1997, and was fired. He continued to receive disability payments until mid-September 1997.

The plaintiff claims: (1) his discharge violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) because the defendant failed to give proper notice to the plaintiff that time-off would be counted against his FMLA entitlement; (2) the defendant committed fraud when it fired the plaintiff by failing to disclose material facts about his FMLA leave, and after giving the plaintiff assurances that his job was not in jeopardy; (3) he suffered severe emotional distress; and (4) that he was wrongfully discharged.

Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if, after examining all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kegel v. Runnels, 793 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1986). Once the movant has properly supported its motion, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the nonmovant must show that, on an element essential to [its] case and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial, there are genuine issues of material fact." Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1014 (1988) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Although "direct proof is not required to create a jury question, . . . to avoid summary judgment, `the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.'" Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986) (quoting Impro Prod., Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984)). In applying these standards, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Krause v. Perryman, 827 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1987). Summary judgment should only be used sparingly in employment discrimination cases._Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262 (8th Cir. 1995); Smith v. St. Louis University, 109 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.

1994) (Because discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.)

Analysis Family and Medical Leave Act

The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) became effective August 5, 1993, for most employers, and on February 5, 1994, for employers with a collective bargaining agreement in force. FMLA entitles employees to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave per year if the employee is unable to work because of a serious medical condition or because of the need to care for a sick parent, spouse or child. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Also, an employee is entitled to be restored to his former job if he can still perform the essential functions of the job after his FMLA leave ends. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b). The FMLA is a balancing act, an attempt to provide employees with some leave, "a reasonable leave," without completely ignoring the legitimate demands of the workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 2601. The employee is not required to specifically assert his rights under the FMLA; the employee is only required to state that a leave is needed. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303.

In this case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff was eligible for FMLA leave when he gave notice to his supervisor on April 22, 1997, that he was having trouble with his neck and could face more surgery. The plaintiff had worked 1,250 hours in the previous 12 months, and was eligible for FMLA leave on October 19, 1996.

The FMLA regulations require the employee to provide timely and adequate notice to the employer regarding the need for leave. Where the need for a leave is foreseeable, as with planned medical treatment, the employee must provide at least thirty days advance notice before the FMLA leave is to begin. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a) (1999). If thirty days notice is not practical because of a lack of knowledge of approximately when leave will begin, the employee should give notice as soon as practical. Id. In situations where the approximate timing of the need for leave is not foreseeable, the employee is to give notice "as soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (1999). Generally, this means no more than two days after learning of the need for the leave. Id. See also Ozolins v. Northwood-Kensett Community School District, 40 F. Supp.2d 1055 (N.D.Iowa 1999). Also, once the employer has knowledge that FMLA leave is being taken, the employer must, within two days, notify the employee that the leave will be counted as FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(b)(1). Notice can be oral or written. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(b)(2); oral notification must be confirmed in writing by the next payday. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(b)(2).

In this case, the plaintiff gave notice to his supervisor of his need for FMLA leave within the appropriate period of time after learning he could face a second neck surgery. When it was determined that no light-duty work was available for the plaintiff, his supervisor responded appropriately by immediately approving plaintiff's FMLA leave.

The real issue here is when the plaintiff's FMLA leave actually began — as soon as he was eligible for FMLA leave in October 1996, as the defendant contends; or sometime after April 22, 1997, when the plaintiff advised his supervisor of his medical problems. The defendant claims that once the plaintiff was eligible for FMLA leave on October 19, 1996, the plaintiff's time off for his hernia injury counted against the total of 12 weeks (60 work days) allotted yearly for FMLA leave. The defendant figured the plaintiff's FMLA time off this way:

October 19, 1996 — November 3, 1996 = 11 days

December 26, 1996 — January 1, 1997 = 5 days

January 9, 1997 = 1 day

April 22, 1997 — June 20, 1997 = 43 days

Total = 60 days

The plaintiff claims the 17 days of missed work between October 19, 1996, and January 9, 1997, should not count toward his FMLA leave because under § 825.208(c), if an employer fails to prospectively inform the employee that he is using FMLA leave, then none of the absence preceding the notice to the employee may be counted against the employee's 12-week FMLA leave entitlement. The FMLA regulations impose a burden on the employer to tell the employee when he is using FMLA leave. If an employer does not designate a leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against the employee's FMLA entitlement. § 825.700(a). However, in his deposition, the plaintiff testified that he knew he was on FMLA leave in the fall of 1996 and in 1997 when he was unable to work due to hernia-related problems (p. 90):

Q. You knew you were on FMLA leave in the fall of 1996 and in 1997. Is that a correct statement, sir?

A. Yes.

Q. You had filled out the paperwork for that leave; is that correct, sir?

A. Yes.

Exhibits 10 and 14 are clearly labeled "Family and Medical Leave Request Form," and are signed by the plaintiff.

When the plaintiff alerted Ms. White in April 1997 that he would be unable to work and may face neck surgery, Ms. White immediately told the plaintiff that his leave would be FMLA leave. Despite the fact that the paperwork was not signed immediately, the plaintiff immediately knew on April 22, 1997, that there was no light duty work available to him, and that he would need to take FMLA leave. That oral communication constitutes notice from the employer within the proper time frame that the plaintiff's time off would be covered by the FMLA. The fact that the FMLA paperwork was completed by the plaintiff on April 30, 1997, and approved in writing by the defendant on May 1, 1997, does not mean that any of the notice requirements in the FMLA were violated.

There is no dispute that the plaintiff suffered from a series of medical conditions which left him unable to work. The FMLA leave only protects a worker for 12 weeks each year. The plaintiff testified that he was aware in October 1996 that his job status was protected for 12 weeks by the FMLA for necessary and approved time off. If the plaintiff could have used all 12 weeks of FMLA leave for his neck surgery, he likely would have been able to return to work before his leave was exhausted. However, along with his neck injury, the plaintiff suffered hernia problems which also left him unable to perform his job. When the FMLA leave was exhausted on June 20, 1997, the plaintiff had been off work for 12 weeks in a one-year period. Because the plaintiff was unable to return to work on or before June 23, 1997, when his FMLA leave was exhausted, the defendant did nothing illegal when it fired the plaintiff. The defendant's motion for summary judgment on this count is granted.

Fraud

The plaintiff claims his Parker-Hannifin supervisors committed fraud when they told him in April 1997 that his job was not in jeopardy as long as he returned to work within 26 weeks, before his disability benefits ran out. The plaintiff was fired on June 23, 1997, when his FMLA leave was exhausted, and he was unable to return to work. The plaintiff claims Parker-Hannifin committed fraud because it did not intend to honor its promise, and by failing to disclose material facts. The mere fact that the promise was not fulfilled does not, alone, constitute actionable fraud.Irons v. Community State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa App. 1990). To be actionable as fraud, the speaker must have had an existing intent not to perform at the time the promise was made. Id. Nonperformance alone does not prove an intention not to perform. Id. Otherwise, every breach of contract would call for a fraud remedy. Id.

Fraud can arise from a failure to disclose material facts. Sinnard v. Roach, 414 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Iowa 1987). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish fraud by a preponderance of clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Robinson v. Perpetual Services Corp., 412 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 1987); Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1987).

There is no evidence that the defendant intended to deceive or mislead the plaintiff in April 1997 when the plaintiff and his supervisor talked about his job security. Nor is there any evidence that the defendant failed to disclose material facts concerning the plaintiff's leave. In his deposition, the plaintiff testified, "There's no way I can tell whether or not [Ms. White] made a mistake or did it on purpose." There is no evidence that the plaintiff relied on the statement of his supervisor when making his plans for medical leave. Because the defendant was unable to provide the plaintiff with light-duty work, the plaintiff had no choice but to begin his FMLA leave immediately, and proceed with neck surgery. Because there was no detrimental reliance on any promises made to the plaintiff, there is no fraud. The defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In order to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Iowa, the plaintiff must show (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intentional causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate cause of emotional distress by the defendant's conduct. Thompto v. Coburn's Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1097, 1122 (N.D.Iowa 1994) (citations omitted).

In Northrup v. Farmland Indus. Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Iowa 1995), the Iowa Supreme Court quoted extensively from Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d, for a statement of the level of bad conduct necessary to be held outrageous:

It is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he had intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.

Mere insult, bad manners, or hurt feelings are insufficient. VanBaale v. City of Des Moines, 550 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Iowa 1996). Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts on an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!" In this case, the plaintiff was fired with his four children waiting in the lobby. The plaintiff was recuperating from neck surgery. He expressed feelings of low self-worth, and sought marital counseling with his priest. The defendant's conduct is not, as a matter of law, sufficiently outrageous to support the plaintiff's claim.

Wrongful Discharge

The plaintiff claims that he was fired in violation of public policy of the FMLA. In Iowa, employees are presumed to be employees "at will."Anderson v. Douglas Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 281 (Iowa 1995); Butts v. University of Osteopathic Medicine Health Sciences, 561 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Iowa 1997). An employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time, for any reason or no reason at all. Id. The exceptions to this rule recognized by Iowa courts include: (1) discharge in violation of a well-recognized and defined public policy of the state, Smuck v. National Management Corp., 540 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Iowa 1995); and (2) where a unilateral contract is created by an employee handbook or policy manual.Springer v. Weeks Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988).

Courts have recognized a cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy when termination of the employee "is in retaliation for performing an important and socially desirable act, exercising a statutory right, or refusing to commit an unlawful act." Borschel v. City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 1994). The public policy exception is based on the theory that the law should not allow employees to be fired for reasons that violate public policy. Id. Such policies may be expressed in the constitution and the statutes of the state. Id.

There are three categories of protected employee conduct:

(1) Exercising a statutory right or civil obligation. See Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Iowa 1994) (discharge in retaliation for filing partial unemployment claim); Niblo v. Parr Mfg., Inc., 445 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Iowa 1989) (employee discharged because she threatened to file a worker's compensation claim); Springer v. Weeks Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988) (cause of action exists where worker was fired for filing a worker's compensation claim);
(2) Refusing to engage in illegal activities. See Wilcox v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 458 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Iowa App. 1990) (employee's failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment); or
(3) Reporting criminal conduct to supervisors or outside agencies. See Teachout v. Forest City Community School District, 584 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 1998) (wrongful discharge of teaching assistant who tried to report child abuse).

Although Iowa has not yet identified federal law standing alone as a source of public policy in wrongful termination cases, the Iowa Supreme Court has held that it is contrary to public policy to fire an employee who has refused to break any law, state or federal. In this case, there is no evidence that the defendant fired the plaintiff in violation of public policy. The defendant allowed the plaintiff to take all the FMLA leave to which he was entitled. The record shows the plaintiff was fired when his leave was exhausted, and he was unable to return to work; there was no retaliatory firing in violation of public policy. The defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.

Upon the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED

That the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. This case is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for the defendant.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

BROWN v. PARKER-HANNIFIN CORPORATION, (N.D.Iowa 2000)
(Jul 1, 2000)