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JAMES HALL, Plaintiff, v. CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, INC., Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

DAN AARON POLSTER, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 207) of the Court's decision to cap Plaintiff's punitive damages in accordance with the 42 U.S.C. 1981a. In the motion, Plaintiff contends that the Court should not have applied the federal statutory cap because he also raised a state law discrimination claim in his Complaint. As the Court noted in its Order Re: Post-Trial Motions (Doc. No. 200), the federal statutory cap must be applied in this case because the Court's jury instruction on punitive damages was based upon federal rather than state law.

The jury was instructed as follows on the standard for awarding punitive damages:

In this case you may award punitive damages if you find that Defendant Consolidated Freightways engaged in a discriminatory or retaliatory practice or practices with malice or reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiff Hall to be free from such intentional discrimination and/or retaliation in employment.
Malice is defined as either: (1) that state of mind in which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will, or spirit of revenge; (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of creating substantial harm.
Reckless indifference means indifference of an egregious character to the plaintiff's rights to be free of such discriminatory or retaliatory conduct. Reckless indifference raises that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.

(Doc. No. 199, pp. 33-34).

Under Ohio law, punitive damages may be awarded for a violation of Ohio Revised Code § 4112 only if there is a finding of actual malice. Rice v. Certainteed Corp., 84 Ohio St.3d 417 (1999). The Ohio Supreme Court has defined actual malice as:

(1) that state of mind under which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will, and spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has great probability of causing substantial harm.
Moscovitz v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center, 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 652 (1994). Although this definition of malice comports with the malice instruction given by the Court, it is the balance of the Court's instruction that mandates the imposition of the cap.

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a punitive damages award is warranted only if there is a finding of conscious wrongdoing. Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 335 (1987). The Court's reckless indifference instructions does not require such a finding, but instead allows for a punitive damages award to be based upon a mere presumption of conscious wrongdoing. (Doc. No. 199, p. 34). Because the jury may have awarded punitive damages based upon a finding of reckless indifference, the Court cannot now assume that the damages were awarded based upon a finding of actual malice. See, e.g., Shannon v. Waco Scaffolding Equipment, unreported, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 67406, 67604, 1995 WL 444443, *9 (July 27, 1995) (holding that reckless indifference does not amount to actual malice).

In retrospect, this issue could have been avoided had the Court provided the jury with separate instructions for punitive damages under state and federal law. But not only did Plaintiff not object to the inclusion of "reckless indifference" in the Court's instruction on punitive damages, Plaintiff objected to Defendant's request that "reckless indifference" be omitted from the instruction so that it would comport with Ohio law:

MS. WALLER: Your Honor, the defense has some objections to 16. Punitive damages, I believe it is the third — what's now I believe the third full paragraph. We object to the language that reads malice — or "reckless indifference." That our review is one that under Ohio Revised Code 4112, that's wrong, or the standard is just actual malice, not this additional reckless indifference. So it's our position, from our review, that it should just read malice instead of reckless indifference. Malice is then defined later and it goes on to say, "conscious disregard." But we think that it's incorrect the way it is listed.

MR. GILBERT: Objection.

THE COURT: Where does the reckless indifference language come from? A case or is it a case or a statute? Ohio case or federal case? We'll move on. I'll check that to make sure we have a source for it.

MR. GILBERT: I think it comes from both, your Honor —

THE COURT: Well, if there is a source for it, either in federal or state law, it comes in.

THE LAW CLERK: I believe it is in Devitt and Blackmar.

THE COURT: If it's in Devitt and Blackmar, we are going to go with it.

MR. GILBERT: It comes out right of out of there, and I cite it.

THE COURT: I'll go with it unless I can conclude that it's wrong, and I don't think I will.

MR. GILBERT: Section 104.07 out of Devitt and Blackmar.

MS. WALLER: Your Honor, I believe that's all we had on page 16.

THE COURT: Okay, 17.

MR. GILBERT: Nothing from the plaintiff, your Honor.

(Doc. No. 199, p. 34). The Court sustained Plaintiff's objection and thereby gave the federal law instruction on punitive damages which included the "reckless indifference" language. The Court cannot presume that the jury found that the defendant acted with malice.

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 207) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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HALL v. CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, (N.D.Ohio 2000)
(Oct 2, 2000)