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City of Canton, Ohio, Plaintiff, v. H. G. Properties A, LP, et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

DAN AARON POLSTER, United States District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Remand of Proceedings to Stark County, Ohio Probate Division of the Common Pleas Court (Doc. No. 10). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.

I. FACTS

On June 23, 2000, Plaintiff City of Canton filed a Complaint for Appropriation of Property in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas Probate Division. (Doc. 1, Ex. A). In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to appropriate land currently owned by the U-Haul Corporation and H.G. Properties so that it can build a transfer station for riders of public transportation. The Complaint names the property owners as defendants, along with several other potentially interested entities, including the United States, which possesses a leasehold interest in a portion of the land owned by H.G. Properties.

After being served with the Complaint, Defendant United States filed a timely Notice of Removal with this Court seeking to remove the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). (Doc. No. 1). The Court granted Defendant's petition for removal on July 28, 2000. (Doc. No. 6). On August 23, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Remand. (Doc. No. 10). In the motion, Plaintiff contends that the Court should abstain from hearing the case and remand it to the Stark County Court of Common Pleas because the government's interest is remote and appropriation proceedings involve local issues. Id. at 5.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Plaintiff concedes that the Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), but maintains that the Court should exercise its discretion to abstain from hearing the case for public policy reasons. (Doc. 10, p. 5). The Court disagrees.

"The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959). The Supreme Court has identified only three situations in which abstention is appropriate. One basis for abstention exists when a federal court is confronted with a federal constitutional question concerning the validity of state law that "might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law." Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 1244 (1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. at 189). A second basis for abstention exists when a federal court is presented with difficult questions of state law "bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the case at bar." Id. at 1244. Finally, abstention is appropriate where federal jurisdiction has been invoked in an attempt to restrain state criminal proceedings. Id. at 1245.

None of the above situations applies in this case. Although this case involves issues of state law, there is no indication that Ohio's eminent domain law is unsettled or that a decision in this case would determine or disrupt state policy. The fact that this lawsuit is an eminent domain proceeding does not mean that the state's interest is so significant that this Court must abstain from the case. As the Supreme Court noted inCounty of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.:

[T]he fact that a case concerns a state's power of eminent domain no more justifies abstention than the fact that it involves any other issue related to sovereignty. . . . Furthermore, the federal courts have been adjudicating cases involving issues of state eminent domain law for many years, without any suggestion that there was entailed a hazard of friction in federal-state relations.
Id. at 192. Thus, the existence of local issues that typically arise in a case involving eminent domain do not in themselves warrant a federal court's abstention.

Moreover, although Plaintiff argues otherwise, the United States' interest in this action is far from remote. The United States currently leases space for a Veteran's Affairs outpatient clinic and a Social Security Administration branch office from Defendant H.G. Properties in an building located across the street from the property Plaintiff seeks to appropriate. (Doc. No. 15, p. 4). The government's lease of that space is specifically tied to the availability of 280 parking spaces located near the building. Id. Appropriation of the property in question will reduce the number of parking spaces available to the government by nearly one half. Id. This reduction in parking spaces will undoubtedly affect the government's ability to carry out its work. The government's interest is further strengthened by the fact that its lease is not scheduled to expire until March 31, 2005. Id.

Finally, there is some question as to whether it is ever appropriate to remand a case that was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) provides for the removal of any action filed in state court against the United States, its agencies, or officers to the district court in the locality where the action is pending. The underlying rationale of the statute is that "federal officers, and indeed the federal government itself, require the protection of a federal forum." Willingham v. Jarvis, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969). The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "[t]his policy should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of § 1442(a)(1)." Id. Given the statute's virtual guarantee of a federal forum to the federal government and its officers and agents, it would be inappropriate for this Court to remand the action merely because the lawsuit involves local issues. See, e.g., Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia Bar, 872 F.2d 571, 577 (1989) (holding that it was error for a court to divest itself of jurisdiction after a case had been removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Remand (Doc. No. 10).

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CITY OF CANTON, OHIO v. H. G. PROPERTIES, (N.D.Ohio 2000)
(Nov 2, 2000)