ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
An evaluation of what constitutes reasonable counsel fees is a matter that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Pena v. Pena, 255 A.D.2d 498; Matter of Bailey, Marshall Hoeniger v. Merzon, 210 A.D.2d 474), which is often in the best position to judge those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees (see, Pauk v. Pauk, 232 A.D.2d 386; O'Neil v. O'Neil, 193 A.D.2d 16, 20; Levine v. Levine, 179 A.D.2d 625, 626). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding an attorney's fee in this case.