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GEORGE S. CARP vs. KAPLAN another.

Practice, Civil, Rules of court, Requests, rulings and instructions, Verdict. Superior Court. Contract, Validity. Auction.

The adoption of Rule 44 of the Superior Court (1923) was within the power of that court under G.L.c. 213, § 3, and the rule is valid. Individual judges have no power to dispense with rules lawfully adopted for the conduct of the business of the courts. Per RUGG, C.J. At the close of the evidence at the trial of an action of contract, the defendant presented requests for rulings, among which was the following: "Upon all the evidence the plaintiff is not entitled to recover." The record stated, "The court refused to give this request." The defendant alleged an exception to the refusal to give the ruling. Held, that (1) There was no attempt on the part of the presiding judge to waive Rule 44 of the Superior Court (1923); (2) The judge was not required to take notice of the request in the form in which it was presented. At the trial of an action for damages resulting from a breach by the defendant of an agreement to sell to the plaintiff a lot of "overseas caps" at the price at which the defendant should purchase them at an auction sale conducted by the federal government, the plaintiff testified in substance that he and the defendant were both bidders at the sale; that there had been sales of several lots of caps; that the plaintiff had purchased a small lot of ten thousand caps; and that bidders then were given the privilege of buying the entire remainder of the caps in one lot of seven hundred thousand. The plaintiff testified in direct examination that he was interested in the whole lot. In cross-examination, he testified that in answer to an inquiry by the defendant, he told him that he was interested in some of them and would like one hundred thousand. There was further evidence that the defendant then proposed that he, the defendant, should purchase the entire remaining lot of caps, and that, after his purchase, he would sell to the plaintiff one hundred thousand of them at their cost to the defendant; that the plaintiff agreed to the arrangement and then "refrained from bidding, according to the agreement"; that there were many people at the sale but few bidders for the caps; that the defendant then bid in the entire lot, but refused afterwards to make any sale to the plaintiff. The defendant contended that as a matter of law the agreement was invalid. The jury found that the purpose of the agreement was not to prevent competition at the auction. Held, that (1) The testimony of the plaintiff was not in such unequivocal form that he was bound by any part of it as matter of law; (2) The finding by the jury was warranted, and it was proper to refuse to rule that upon all the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.

RUGG, C.J.

This action to recover damages for breach of contract was tried before a jury. At the close of the evidence the counsel for the defendant submitted to the judge among other requests for rulings this: "Upon all the evidence the plaintiff is not entitled to recover." This was in substance a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, and it was commingled with other requests for instructions to the jury. It is manifest that this was not in accordance with the part of Rule 44 of the Superior Court (1923) which requires that "The question whether the court should order a verdict must be raised by a motion. Such question shall not be raised by a request for instructions to the jury." That is a valid rule. It is a proper requirement that a motion for a directed verdict be a separate matter, dissociated from requests for particular instructions to the jury. Its adoption is within the power of the Superior Court under G.L.c. 213, § 3. It was binding upon the defendant.

Individual judges have no power to dispense with rules lawfully adopted for the conduct of the business of the courts. Oliver Ditson Co. v. Testa, 216 Mass. 123, 125. Everett-Morgan Co. v. Boyajian Pharmacy, 244 Mass. 460, 462. There was no attempt on the part of the presiding judge to waive the rule. He was not required to take notice of the request in the form in which it was presented.

If the question attempted to be raised be considered on its merits, there was no reversible error. The testimony of the plaintiff was somewhat conflicting. It was not in such unequivocal form that he was bound by any particular part of it as matter of law. Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Railway, 224 Mass. 405, 407. A question was presented for the decision of the jury. The main point of the case is governed by Phippen v. Stickney, 3 Met. 384, and Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592. Hopkins v. Ensign, 122 N.Y. 144.

Exceptions overruled.

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CARP v. KAPLAN
(Feb 24, 1925)