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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In August 2006, then-20-month-old Mollie Frances Bone cut her eye on the end of a clothing rack protruding into an aisle while shopping at a Children's Place store. Michelle Bone, individually and as Mollie's natural guardian, sued Children's Place for premises liability, alleging (1) the placement of a clothing rack with an uncovered, protruding edge at a child's eye level constituted a dangerous condition; (2) Children's Place had actual or constructive knowledge of this dangerous condition superior to Bone's; and (3) Children's Place had knowledge of similar injuries from store fixtures placed hazardously to young children.

On November 14, 2007, Children's Place moved for summary judgment relying exclusively on Bone's deposition testimony, but did not file the deposition with the court; counsel mailed the original sealed deposition to the trial judge. Bone's response was due December 14, 2007; counsel for Children's Place orally agreed to an extension to January 3, 2008, but no stipulation or consent order was filed. Bone filed her response on January 4, 2008, with an affidavit from a former Children's Place employee stating others had snagged clothing on the fixture. Children's Place moved that afternoon to strike Bone's response as untimely. On March 3, 2008, without a hearing, the trial court granted Children's Place's motion to strike and granted summary judgment, noting the record contained no deposition testimony. The deposition was filed the next day; Bone appealed on March 5, 2008. The trial court later denied a motion to supplement the record with the deposition but allowed the original deposition to be part of the appellate record under OCGA § 5-6-41(h).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Children's Place met its burden on summary judgment to show there was no evidence of its superior knowledge of the hazard when the deposition it relied upon was not part of the record at the time of the grant.
  2. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment after striking Bone's response and without considering the deposition as part of the record.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Bone) Arguments

  • Bone opposed summary judgment and submitted an affidavit from a former Children's Place employee indicating Children's Place knew the fixture protruded and had caused others to snag clothing, supporting constructive or actual knowledge.

Appellee's (Children's Place) Arguments

  • Children's Place moved for summary judgment relying exclusively on Bone's deposition testimony (asserting Bone admitted she was unaware of evidence reflecting Children's Place's knowledge) but did not file the deposition with the court at the time of the motion.
  • Children's Place argued Bone's response was untimely and moved to strike it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smith v. Atlantic Mut. Cos. Standard of review on appeal from grant of summary judgment (de novo review; view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party). Used to state the appellate standard of review applied to the summary judgment grant.
Robinson v. Kroger Co. Fundamental basis for owner/occupier liability is the party's superior knowledge of the hazard encountered by the plaintiff. Cited to explain the essential basis for premises liability and the element at issue (superior knowledge).
Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores To recover on premises liability plaintiff must show (1) defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard and (2) plaintiff lacked knowledge despite exercise of ordinary care due to actions/conditions within defendant's control. Applied to articulate the elements Bone needed to prove to succeed on her claim.
Kmart Corp. v. McCollum Movant meets its burden on summary judgment by showing the record's documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence reveal no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element. Invoked to describe the movant's burden and that the trial court found no evidence of defendant's superior knowledge.
Parker v. Silviano A brief's citation to deposition testimony is not proper evidence for summary judgment. Used to conclude Children's Place's brief relying on Bone's deposition (not in the record) was not proper evidence to support summary judgment.
Patellis v. 100 Galleria Parkway Assoc. Assertions of fact contained in the briefs do not, standing alone, constitute competent evidence for resolution of a summary judgment issue. Applied to emphasize that the movant could not rely on assertions in its brief as competent evidence.
Parker v. Food Giant As movant for summary judgment, defendant cannot rely on mere assertion that superior knowledge cannot be shown; must come forward with evidence negating such knowledge. Invoked to state Children's Place had to produce evidence negating its superior knowledge before burden shifted to Bone.
Ware County v. Medlock Movant must come forward with evidence tending to negate the existence of the plaintiff's claimed fact before plaintiff must present proof. Applied to support the principle that Children's Place bore the initial burden to negate superior knowledge.
Hamner v. Emory Univ. Until the moving party makes a showing negating the plaintiff's allegations, the allegations are not pierced and plaintiff is under no duty to produce evidence regarding defendant's knowledge. Used to explain that Bone's pleadings remained unpierced because Children's Place had not produced proper evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and viewed the undisputed facts in the light most favorable to Bone. The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis that no evidence of Children's Place's superior knowledge existed, relying solely on an asserted admission in Bone's deposition. However, at the time the trial court granted summary judgment it expressly acknowledged that the record contained no deposition testimony because Children's Place had not filed the deposition but mailed the original to the judge. Consequently, the court determined Children's Place failed to pierce the allegations of Bone's pleadings because it did not present admissible evidence in the record (documents, affidavits, depositions) negating an essential element (superior knowledge). The court explained that assertions in briefs are not competent evidence and that the movant must produce evidence negating the plaintiff's claim before the burden shifts to the plaintiff. The court further held that striking Bone's untimely response did not relieve Children's Place of its initial burden to come forward with proper evidence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to The Children's Place Retail Stores, Inc.

Implications: The direct effect is that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Children's Place is reversed. The opinion does not announce or rely upon any new legal precedent beyond applying established principles regarding the movant's burden on summary judgment and the requirement that evidence relied upon be part of the record; no broader legal change was declared.

BONE v. THE CHILDREN'S PLACE, INC. et al.

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.

In this premises liability action, Michelle Bone appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of The Children's Place Retail Stores, Inc. ("Children's Place") on Bone's claims arising from injuries her daughter, Mollie Frances Bone, sustained while shopping with her mother at a Children's Place store. Finding that Children's Place failed to present any evidence in support of its motion, and therefore failed to pierce the allegations set forth in Bone's pleadings, we reverse.

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine if there exists a genuine issue of material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law.
Smith v. Atlantic Mut. Cos.

Smith v. Atlantic Mut. Cos., 283 Ga. App. 349, 350 ( 641 SE2d 586) (2007).

So viewed, the record shows that Bone and the then 20-month-old Mollie were shopping at a Children's Place store in August 2006 when Mollie cut her eye on the end of a clothing rack, which was protruding out into an aisle. Acting individually, and as the natural guardian of Mollie, Bone sued Children's Place on a theory of premises liability. Bone alleged, inter alia: (1) that the placement of the clothing rack, with an uncovered, protruding edge, at a child's eye level, constituted a dangerous condition; (2) that Children's Place had actual or constructive knowledge of this dangerous condition, superior to that of Bone; and (3) that Children's Place had actual or constructive knowledge of similar injuries occurring in their stores resulting from the placement of store fixtures in such a manner that they were hazardous to young children.

On November 14, 2007, Children's Place filed a motion for summary judgment as to all of Bone's claims. To support the factual assertions contained in its motion, Children's Place relied exclusively upon Bone's deposition testimony. At the time it filed its motion for summary judgment, however, Children's Place did not file either the original or a copy of Bone's deposition with the court. Instead, counsel mailed the original, sealed deposition directly to the trial judge, together with a courtesy copy of the motion for summary judgment.

Although Bone's response to the motion for summary judgment was due on December 14, 2007 (see Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3), counsel for Children's Place agreed to an extension of time, giving Bone until January 3, 2008 to file her response. Bone's attorney, however, never filed with the trial court either a proposed consent order or other stipulation reflecting that agreement; hence, the time for responding was never extended by the trial court.

Bone's counsel filed her response, together with a request for a hearing on the summary judgment motion, on the morning of January 4, 2008. Attached as an exhibit to Bone's response was the affidavit of a former Children's Place employee, who indicated that Children's Place had knowledge of the hazard at issue. Specifically, the former employee stated that other people had snagged their clothing on the fixture that injured Mollie, "because it protruded out into the aisle."

On the afternoon of January 4, 2008, Children's Place filed a motion to strike Bone's response, including the affidavit attached thereto, as untimely filed. In that motion, counsel for Children's Place acknowledged granting Bone's counsel an extension of time in which to file a response, but argued that the extension required that the response be filed "on or before January 3, 2008."

On March 3, 2008, without a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court entered an order granting both Children's Place's motion to strike Bone's response and its motion for summary judgment. In that portion of the order granting summary judgment to Children's Place, the trial court included a footnote specifically acknowledging that "[t]he record presently contains no deposition testimony." The following day, counsel for Children's Place filed a copy of Bone's deposition with the trial court. On March 5, 2008, Bone filed her notice of appeal. Approximately one week later, on March 11, 2008, Children's Place filed a motion to supplement the record for appeal with Bone's original deposition. Following a hearing on the motion to supplement the record, the trial court denied that motion, correctly noting that "matters not part of the record at the time of judgment cannot properly become part of the record on appeal."

The trial court did, however, allow Bone's original deposition to be filed and become part of the record for purposes of appeal, pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-41 (h). That statute provides, in relevant part, "[w]here any . . . paper which requires approval or sanction of the court . . . before being filed of record is disallowed . . . [the] paper may nevertheless be filed, with notation of disallowance thereon, and shall become part of the record for purposes of consideration on appeal. . . ."

We now turn to the merits of Bone's appeal. "[T]he fundamental basis for an owner or occupier's liability" for injuries resulting from an allegedly hazardous condition on their premises, is "that party's superior knowledge of the hazard encountered by the plaintiff." Robinson v. Kroger Co. Thus, "to recover on her premises liability claim, [Bone] must demonstrate both (1) that [Children's Place] had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that she lacked knowledge of the hazard, despite the exercise of ordinary care, due to actions or conditions within [the] control" of Children's Place. Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores.

Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 736 (1) ( 493 SE2d 403) (1997).

Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, 281 Ga. App. 132, 133 ( 635 SE2d 399) (2006).

"A defendant meets [its] burden [on summary judgment] by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff's case." (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Kmart Corp. v. McCollum. The trial court based its grant of summary judgment to Children's Place on its conclusion that "no evidence of record reflects [Children's Place's] superior knowledge of the hazard" posed by the clothing rack. The sole evidence on which the trial court relied to make this finding, however, was Bone's alleged admission that "she [was] unaware of any evidence reflecting [Children's Place's] knowledge of the hazard." While Children's Place's motion for summary judgment recited this admission as an undisputed material fact, its motion reflects that Bone made this admission only in her deposition. The trial court, however, explicitly acknowledged, in two separate orders, that it did not consider Bone's deposition in granting summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court had no basis for concluding that Children's Place had pierced the allegations of Bone's pleadings. Children's Place's "brief [supporting] the summary judgment motion citing [Bone's deposition] testimony [was] not proper evidence," ( Parker v. Silviano ) on which to base the grant of summary judgment, because "[a]ssertions of fact contained in the briefs of the parties do not, standing alone, constitute competent evidence for the resolution of a summary judgment issue." (Punctuation omitted.) Patellis v. 100 Galleria Parkway Assoc.

Kmart Corp. v. McCollum, 290 Ga. App. 551 ( 659 SE2d 913) (2008).

Parker v. Silviano, 284 Ga. App. 278, 281 (2) ( 643 SE2d 819) (2007).

Patellis v. 100 Galleria Parkway Assoc., 214 Ga. App. 154, 155 (3) ( 447 SE2d 113) (1994).

This result is unaffected by the trial court's decision to strike Bone's response. "As the movant for summary judgment, [Children's Place] cannot rely upon the mere assertion that its superior knowledge cannot be shown by [Bone] at trial." Parker v. Food Giant. Rather, Children's Place had to "come forward with evidence tending to negate the existence of such knowledge" before Bone was obligated to offer proof of that knowledge. (Punctuation omitted.) Ware County v. Medlock. Until Children's Place had done so, "the allegations of plaintiff's complaint [were] not pierced and plaintiff was under no duty to produce evidence in support of her allegations regarding defendant['s] knowledge. . . ." Hamner v. Emory Univ. See also Smith, supra, 283 Ga. App. at 351 (1) ("[o]nly after the moving party makes a showing of entitlement to a judgment as a matter of law does the burden shift to the respondent to come forward with rebuttal evidence") (punctuation omitted). We do not address the correctness of a grant of summary judgment based upon the Bone deposition being a part of the record at the time of the grant of same.

Parker v. Food Giant, 193 Ga. App. 337, 337 (1) ( 387 SE2d 615) (1989).

Ware County v. Medlock, 192 Ga. App. 542, 543 ( 385 SE2d 429) (1989).

Hamner v. Emory Univ., 190 Ga. App. 788, 789 ( 380 SE2d 83) (1989).

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Children's Place.

Judgment reversed. Adams and Doyle, JJ., concur.

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.

DECIDED APRIL 7, 2009.
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BONE v. CHILDREN'S PLACE
(Apr 7, 2009)