LYONS v. CHILD

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff brought an action in trespass for the damage caused to his wagon when the defendant's wagon collided with it on a dark night while both parties were traveling on a highway. The plaintiff's two daughters were riding in his wagon, which was stopped to the right of the center of the road upon hearing an approaching carriage. The defendants, unaware of the plaintiff's presence due to darkness and the silence of the plaintiff's team, did not turn out sufficiently to avoid collision. The defendants' left wheel struck and broke the plaintiff's wagon. A referee found that there was no negligence or fault on either side. After the evidence was closed, the plaintiff sought to amend the declaration by adding a count in assumpsit. The court ultimately ordered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff excepted.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the defense of accident and freedom from fault is admissible under the general issue plea in a trespass action for damage caused by collision.

Whether the defendants violated the statutory law requiring travelers to turn to the right of the center of the road, thereby incurring liability despite lack of actual fault or knowledge.

Whether an amendment to the pleadings after trial is permissible without a new trial when it would not affect the result.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The defense that the collision was a mere accident without fault is not available under the general issue and should have been specially pleaded.

The defendants are liable simply because they broke the plaintiff's wagon by driving against it, entitling the plaintiff to judgment on the general issue.

The defendants violated statutory duties requiring them to turn to the right of the center of the traveled part of the road, making them liable for resulting damages.

The center of the traveled part means the center of the worked portion of the highway, not merely the usual track, and the defendants failed to comply with this statutory requirement.

The defendants' failure to seasonably turn to the right caused the collision and constituted legal negligence under the statute.

Even apart from the statute, the defendants are liable at common law unless the collision was an inevitable accident, which they have not shown.

Defendants' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the defendants' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292	Common-law rule that accident without actual fault is not a cause of action.	Supported the conclusion that absence of negligence means no liability.
Roulo v. Valcour, 58 N.H. 347	Permissibility of amending pleadings after trial without new trial if result unaffected.	Justified allowing amendment to pleadings post-trial.
Elsher v. Hughes, 60 N.H. 469	Similar to Roulo regarding amendment of pleadings.	Reinforced the court’s decision on amendment.
Brooks v. Hart, 14 N.H. 307	Legal presumption of fault from intentional driving on left side of road.	Distinguished because defendants did not intentionally drive on left side.
Gale v. Lisbon, 52 N.H. 174	Traveling on left side of road is not inherently unlawful.	Supported defendants’ lack of liability absent fault or knowledge.
Various Statutory Provisions (G. L., c. 75, ss. 11-14)	Statutory duty to turn right of the center and liability for violation.	Interpreted to require actual fault for liability; absence of knowledge negates liability.
Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442	Case of unavoidable accident.	Used to illustrate exception to liability for accidents without fault.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292

Common-law rule that accident without actual fault is not a cause of action.

Supported the conclusion that absence of negligence means no liability.

Roulo v. Valcour, 58 N.H. 347

Permissibility of amending pleadings after trial without new trial if result unaffected.

Justified allowing amendment to pleadings post-trial.

Elsher v. Hughes, 60 N.H. 469

Similar to Roulo regarding amendment of pleadings.

Reinforced the court’s decision on amendment.

Brooks v. Hart, 14 N.H. 307

Legal presumption of fault from intentional driving on left side of road.

Distinguished because defendants did not intentionally drive on left side.

Gale v. Lisbon, 52 N.H. 174

Traveling on left side of road is not inherently unlawful.

Supported defendants’ lack of liability absent fault or knowledge.

Various Statutory Provisions (G. L., c. 75, ss. 11-14)

Statutory duty to turn right of the center and liability for violation.

Interpreted to require actual fault for liability; absence of knowledge negates liability.

Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442

Case of unavoidable accident.

Used to illustrate exception to liability for accidents without fault.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reasoned that the plaintiff waived any objection to the admissibility of the defendants' defense of accident and absence of fault under the general issue by failing to present it at trial. The referee found no negligence or fault on either side, meaning both exercised due care. The court emphasized that an accident without actual fault is not actionable under common law. The defendants did not intentionally drive on the left side of the road and were unaware their left wheel was on that side; thus, their ignorance was not culpable. The court interpreted the statutory law requiring travelers to turn right of the center as not imposing liability absent actual fault or knowledge. The statute’s criminal penalties apply only when there is a willful violation, and liability for damages requires fault. The court found no legal basis to impose constructive fault on the defendants under these facts. Finally, the court held that allowing an amendment to the pleadings after trial was permissible since it would not have affected the trial’s outcome.

Holding and Implications

The court overruled the plaintiff’s exception and affirmed judgment for the defendants.

The direct effect is that the defendants are not liable for the collision absent actual fault or knowledge, even if their left wheel was on the prohibited side of the road. No new precedent was established; the decision reinforces that liability in trespass for such accidents requires proof of fault. The opinion clarifies that the statutory duty to keep right does not impose strict liability without culpable knowledge or intent.

LYONS v. CHILD a.

In trespass for breaking the plaintiff's carriage by collision, the question whether the defence of accident and freedom from fault is admissible under the general issue may be waived by the plaintiff's omission to present the question at the trial.

An amendment of the pleadings, after trial, may be made without a new trial, when the result would not have been affected if the amendment had been made before trial.

The general rule of the common law of torts imposes liability for actual fault only.

The law of the road requiring travellers to turn to the right of the centre (G. L., c. 75, ss. 11, 12), does not render a traveller liable for a collision caused by his not turning to the right, if he is in no actual fault either for not knowing he is on the left side or for not knowing he is approaching a vehicle.

DOE, C. J.

If a plea of accident (absence of negligence and fault) was necessary, the plaintiff by silence waived objection at the trial when an amendment of the pleadings could have been offered. All the facts were found by the referee upon a full trial of the question of negligence, as if that question was presented by the record. From the plaintiff's silence the defendants could fairly infer, and they could fairly act upon the inference, that the admissibility of their defence under the general issue was not contested. The objection, that the evidence of the defendants' exercise of due care is irrelevant on the general issue and inadmissible without a special plea, is not seasonably taken after trial. As the trial and the referee's finding of facts would not have been affected by a special plea of accident, such a plea, if necessary, could be filed now without a new trial. Roulo v. Valcour, 58 N.H. 347; Elsher v. Hughes, 60 N.H. 469.

The referee's report, that there was no negligence or fault on either side, means that both parties exercised due care, and raises no legal question of degrees of diligence. The collision was not a common-law exception to the general common-law rule, that an accident, without actual fault in either party, is not a cause of action. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292: Strouse v. Whittlesey, 41 Conn. 559; Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442. Travelling on the left side of the road is not of itself unlawful. Gale v. Lisbon, 52 N.H. 174. In Brooks v. Hart, 14 N.H. 307, a legal presumption of fault was drawn from the fact that the defendant intentionally drove on the left side; but no opinion was given on a case of mere accident and misfortune, such as this is; — and it is not necessary to examine the soundness of a legal presumption drawn from intended presence on the left side. These defendants did not intentionally drive on the left side, and did not know their left wheel was on that side. Their ignorance was not culpable, and they are not liable, unless the presence of their left wheel on that side, without knowledge or actual fault on their part, was a violation of the statutory law of the road, and a constructive wrong.

"Whoever travelling with any vehicle meets any other person so travelling, on a highway or bridge, shall seasonably turn to the right of the centre of the travelled part of the road,. so as to enable such person to pass with his vehicle without interference." "Every person violating" this law "shall be fined not more than ten dollars, and shall be liable for the damages occasioned thereby." G. L., c. 75, ss. 11-14. Upon this statute the defendants were not liable for damages in a civil action, unless they were also finable in a criminal prosecution. A mere physical act or omission without concurrence of the will may be punishable. A degree of diligence that will prevent harm may be made a legal duty; but a universal requirement of it has not been regarded as consistent with reasonably necessary enterprise, and that degree of freedom, comfort, and prosperity which the community have a right to enjoy. An act which a man does not intend to commit, of which he is unconscious, and for which he is in fact blameless, is not ordinarily imputed to him as a penal offence by the unwritten or the written law. Matter is not capable of crime; and the criminal law does not generally accomplish its object by a conclusive presumption of mental guilt contrary to the fact.

Since the statutory revision of 1867, the law of the road requiring travellers to turn to the right, and the law of the civil liability of towns for defective roads, have been united in one chapter under the title of "Damages happening in the use of highways." Chapter 74 subjects towns to indictment and fine for neglect of their highway duty. Construed by the analogy of the common law, which generally imposes liability for actual fault only, the statute does not punish a town, in no actual fault, for having no knowledge of an obstruction in a highway. Without intellectual delinquency found as a fact and not merely presumed by law, the town is not liable, in a criminal or a civil action, for damage caused by the obstruction. And no sufficient reason is suggested for construing the latter part of chapter 75 against the analogy of the common law, and holding this collision to be a constructive fault of the defendants, who were in no actual fault either for not knowing their left wheel was on the left side of the centre of the road, or for not knowing they were approaching the plaintiff's wagon.

The insertion of a count in assumpsit in the declaration would be an amendment that justice does not seem to require.

Exception overruled.

STANLEY, J., did not sit: the others concurred.