| St Kevin's Company against a Debtor | A bankruptcy summons must be dismissed where an issue requires separate litigation. | Supported the real-and-substantial-issue test. [39][40] |
| Minister for Communications v Wymes and Anor [2009] IEHC 413 | The issue must be real, substantial, arguable, and have some prospect of success. | Applied as the governing threshold. [10][39] |
| Minister for Communications v. Wood [2017] IESC 16 | Mere assertion is insufficient; factual issues require credible evidential support. | The Court adopted its summary of the bankruptcy principles. [41][42][43] |
| McGrath v. O'Driscoll [2007] 1 I.L.R.M. 203 | Evidence which, if true, would arguably establish a defence may require a full hearing. | Applied, while rejecting unsupported assertions. [44][45][46] |
| Marketspreads Ltd v. O'Neill and Rice [2014] IEHC 14 | A credible basis, rather than mere assertion, is required. | Used to align bankruptcy and summary-judgment principles. [47][48] |
| Ennis Property Finance DAC v. Carney [2019] IECA 71 | The court should not resolve genuine disputed questions summarily; alternative enforcement routes need not be exhausted. | Supported dismissal of the Debtor’s procedural objections. [41][49][36] |
| Gladney v. Tobin [2022] IESC 3 | Dismissal depends on a real and substantial issue meeting the applicable threshold. | The Debtor’s issues did not meet that threshold. [50][51][6] |
| Aer Rianta Cpt. v. Ryanair Limited [2001] 4 I.R. 607 | The court asks whether there is an arguable defence or only simple issues. | Applied to assess the credibility of the Debtor’s evidence. [52][53][54] |
| Harrisrange Limited v. Duncan [2003] 4 I.R. 1 | Summary judgment principles require a real issue and credible evidence. | Used to define the equivalent bankruptcy threshold. [52][53][55] |
| National Westminster Bank v. Daniel [1993] 1 WLR 1453 | Mere affidavit assertion does not justify leave to defend. | Supported rejection of bare assertions. [56] |
| Irish Bank Resolution Corporation v. McCaughey [2014] 1 I.R. 749 | Applied to the Debtor’s evidence. [57][58][59] |
| In the Matter of Green D Project Ireland Ltd [2023] IEHC 773 | Conflicting affidavit evidence may require cross-examination. | Distinguished because the Debtor’s assertions lacked a meaningful explanation and were contradicted by documents. [60][61][62][63] |
| RAS Medical Ltd v. The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [2019] 1 IR 63 | Material conflicts in affidavit evidence may require an oral hearing. | Accepted, but held it did not displace summary-judgment principles. [60][61] |
| First National Commercial Bank plc v. Anglin [1996] 1 IR 75 | Indisputable commercial documentation may render an alternative account untenable. | The Court considered this case closer to the present facts than Green D. [54][63] |
| Lee v Lee [2024] IEHC 127 | Separate proceedings may be relevant but are not automatically dispositive. | The existence of the Debtor’s plenary proceedings did not establish a real issue. [5][6] |
| Moohan & Bradley t/a Bradley Construction v S&R Motors (Donegal) Ltd [2008] I.R. 650 | Different considerations may apply to a counterclaim or cross-claim. | Distinguished on the facts. [64][65] |
| Bank of Scotland v. Hickey [2014] IEHC 202 | Subsequent misuse of loan funds does not alter the parties’ original contractual obligations. | Applied to reject the illegality argument based on later use of the funds. [27][32][33] |
| Salomon v Salomon & Company Ltd [1897] AC 22 | A company has separate legal personality from its members and directors. | Company A’s corporate structure was not treated as a sham. [66][67] |
| Allied Irish Bank v Aqua Fresh Fish Ltd [2018] IESC 49 | Separate corporate personality is a fundamental company-law principle. | Reinforced the refusal to treat the company as the Debtor’s alter ego. [67] |
| VTB Capital Plc v Nuritek International Corp & Ors [2013] UKSC 5 | Control of a company does not ordinarily make the controller a contracting party. | Supported the separate-personality analysis. [67] |
| Harlequin Property (SVG) Ltd v. O'Halloran [2013] IEHC 362 | The corporate veil may exceptionally be challenged where a company is deployed as a sham. | No credible evidence justified such treatment here. [68][69] |
| Flynn v. Breccia [2018] IECA 286 | Default surcharge provisions may be unenforceable penalties. | Distinguished because the facility interest was not triggered by breach. [34][70] |
| Sheehan v. Breccia [2018] IECA 273 | Penalty doctrine applies to provisions responding to breach. | Distinguished on the same basis as Flynn. [34][70] |
| Pat O'Donnell & Co Limited v. Truck & Machinery Sales Ltd [1998] 4 IR 191 | A penalty is assessed by substance and generally requires breach. | Supported the conclusion that the agreed return was not a penalty. [71][72][73] |
| Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v. New Garage and Motor Company Limited [1915] A.C. 79 | Distinguishes penalties from genuine pre-estimates of loss. | Provided the cited formulation of the penalty doctrine. [71][74] |
| McGinn v Beagan [1962] IR 364 | Bankruptcy proceedings may be restrained as an abuse of process or for an improper purpose. | The statutory discretion was treated as incorporating those principles. [75][76] |
| Re Roseann McLaughlin [2021] IEHC 296 | Collateral-purpose challenges rarely succeed absent unusual circumstances. | No comparable circumstances were established. [77][76] |
| Leonard & Woods Developments v. AA & SH [2022] IEHC 215 | A bankruptcy summons may issue without a prior judgment where the debt is undisputed. | Supported the Creditor’s entitlement to proceed without prior civil litigation. [78][79] |
| Harahill v. Cuddy | A prior judgment is not an absolute precondition to a bankruptcy summons. | Used to reject the Debtor’s contrary submission. [78][80] |
| Charles Kelly [2026] IEHC 140 | Insolvency proceedings may be inappropriate where effective alternative enforcement is available. | Distinguished because no effective alternative route was shown. [25][81][82] |
| Exp. Hardaway, in Re Lopes (1882) 6 Morr. 245 | Cited by the Debtor for the proposition that unlawful debts are not provable in bankruptcy. | The Court did not decide the ultimate consequence because no credible illegality issue was established. [83][84] |
| In Re Savundra [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1147 | Cited by the Debtor concerning debts arising from void or unlawful transactions. | Not determinative because the factual foundation for illegality failed. [85] |
| In Re Hurren [1983] 1 W.L.R. 183 | Cited by the Debtor concerning unenforceable bankruptcy claims. | Not applied because the Court found no real issue as to illegality. [85] |