Summary of Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted after a High Court trial held on 15 October 2024 and, on 9 September 2025, the presiding judge imposed an order for lifelong restriction. Leave to appeal was limited to the contention that the judge gave insufficient directions on mutual corroboration. The appeal against conviction was refused on 3 June 2026; reasons for that refusal are given in this opinion delivered by Judge Beckett. The Appellant originally faced eight charges; four were withdrawn or resulted in acquittal at the close of the Crown case. The Appellant was convicted on the remaining charges in the terms set out in the indictment. Verdicts on two charges were unanimous and on one charge were by majority. The indictment also contained a docket giving notice of further evidence from three witnesses relating to earlier, previously convicted offending. The earlier convictions included sentences imposed in 1989 and a later conviction for stalking resulting in a community-based order. The evidence at trial included multiple complainers and docket witnesses describing sexual offending on occasions between the late 1980s and 2018. The Appellant disputed most of the allegations concerning incidents when the complainers were children, accepted a consensual sexual relationship with one adult complainer but denied the non-consensual elements, and gave evidence in denial of much Crown evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge's directions on mutual corroboration were sufficient, given a long time interval (approximately 23 years) between earlier offences involving children and a later charge involving an adult.
2. Whether, as a matter of law or direction, a lengthy interval requires the judge to instruct the jury that stronger or special similarities are necessary before they can infer a single course of conduct for the purposes of mutual corroboration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant submitted there was no case to answer on the later charge (charge 8) because the long interval (about 23 years) precluded the necessary connection in time, character and circumstances to found mutual corroboration.
• Counsel for the Appellant argued the judge should have given a specific direction that, given such a long interval, stronger or special similarities were required for the jury to find mutual corroboration, citing authorities they considered supportive.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent submitted the judge gave appropriate directions on mutual corroboration, that no further specific direction was required, and that the question was one of fact and degree for the jury to decide.
• The Respondent relied on authorities demonstrating that a significant interval does not necessarily preclude a finding of mutual corroboration and that the jury should evaluate the evidence in context.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the law on mutual corroboration, noting its development since Moorov and the trajectory of authority culminating in Duthie. The court quoted and relied on Duthie, which explained that remarks suggesting a requirement of "special, compelling or extraordinary circumstances" in lengthy time-gap cases are not to be elevated into a rule of law. Instead, the settled legal requirement is that there be similarities in time, character and circumstances demonstrating component parts of one course of conduct persistently pursued by the accused; ordinarily conventional directions to the jury on those matters suffice. The court observed that a judge may, in a particular case, elect to explain the effect of a long time-gap and that similarities may need to be stronger, but that such a direction is not essential and is a matter of judicial discretion. The court applied those principles to the evidence: it was open to the jury to find common features (vulnerability of victims and grooming) spanning the incidents, and evidence of conduct in 2016–2017 could be viewed by the jury as the beginning of a further campaign of grooming. The court noted the trial judge had reminded the jury of the 23-year gap and had directed them to consider the defence's points; she cautioned the jury to be careful before finding mutual corroboration. The court concluded the judge exercised her discretion appropriately and that no further mandatory direction was required or omitted such as to occasion a miscarriage of justice.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — the appeal against conviction is refused.

Implications: The court held that the trial judge's directions on mutual corroboration were not erroneous or insufficient. The decision reinforces the position that, following Duthie, lengthy intervals between alleged incidents do not, as a matter of law, require a specific mandatory direction that "special" or "compelling" features exist; instead, similarities in time, character and circumstances remain the essential test and the extent of direction about gaps is a matter of judicial discretion. No new legal principle was established; the direct effect is that the Appellant's conviction stands and there was no miscarriage of justice on the ground argued. The Appellant's separate appeal against sentence will be heard in due course.