G.T. [Georgia] v The Minister For Justice (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant, a national who arrived in The State in December 2021 and who was employed by Company A from April 2022, held a Labour Market Access Permission (LMAP) and, subsequently, a general employment permit granted on 26 July 2024. The Applicant was, at all material times, an applicant for international protection and held temporary permission under the International Protection Act 2015; an IPO refusal dated 17 January 2024 remained under appeal to the appeals tribunal. On 7 August 2024 the Applicant attended the public offices of Entity A at [Number] Main Street seeking to "register" and, according to the Applicant, to "obtain" residence permission on foot of the employment permit. The Applicant contends that registration/permission was refused on the basis of his status as an international protection applicant and that no written decision was provided.

Procedurally, the Applicant sought judicial review by way of mandamus compelling the Respondent to consider an application for permission to reside (or, alternatively, certiorari to quash an alleged refusal). The Respondent denied that any application under s.4 of the Immigration Act 2004 was made and maintained that the Applicant conflated registration with an application for residence permission. The matter was decided by Judge O'Donnell on 22 May 2026, who refused relief.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Respondent erred in law, fettered discretion or breached fair procedures by failing to accept, determine or consider an application for permission to reside under s.4 of the Immigration Act 2004 (or under the Respondent's discretion) on the basis of the Applicant's general employment permit because the Applicant was an international protection applicant.
2. If the Respondent made a substantive decision, whether that decision was unlawful and/or in breach of constitutional justice, including any duty to give reasons.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Applicant held a general employment permit and attended Entity A to obtain and register the corresponding residence permission (Stamp 1); the Respondent refused to consider or register the permission because the Applicant was an international protection applicant.
• The Respondent unlawfully conflated registration with an application for permission and thereby refused to exercise s.4 powers; this amounted to fettering discretion and breach of fair procedures.
• The Applicant relied on statutory provisions (including s.16 of the 2015 Act) and submitted there was no legal bar to pursuing a parallel residence permission while remaining an international protection applicant.
• If a substantive refusal occurred, the Applicant contended reasons were not given, contrary to constitutional justice.

Respondent's Arguments

• No application under s.4 of the Immigration Act 2004 was made to the Respondent; the Applicant merely attended to register a permission and therefore there was no decision capable of being compelled by mandamus or quashed by certiorari.
• Registration officers perform documentary verification only and do not exercise discretion to grant residence permission; the Applicant conflated registration with the obtaining of residence permission.
• The Applicant already had temporary residence permission under the 2015 Act and LMAP; the temporary residence certificate is deemed to constitute registration for the purposes of the 2004 Act, so there was no extant matter requiring registration under the 2004 Act.
• The employment permit is not a residence permission (as stated in the cover letter accompanying the permit) and an employment permit holder must have separate immigration permission to enter, reside and undertake employment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge O'Donnell identified the narrow determinative question as the characterisation of the Applicant's attendance at Entity A on 7 August 2024—whether it was an application for residence permission under s.4 of the 2004 Act or an appointment to register an existing permission. The court analysed:

• The evidence (including the appointment email stating "booked an appointment to register your immigration permission for the first time" and the employment permit cover letter) showed the Applicant made an appointment to register permission rather than to make a s.4 application.
• Registration officers perform document verification and do not exercise discretion to grant residence permission; Sulaimon supports that registration requires pre-existing permission.
• The Applicant already held temporary permission under the 2015 Act and LMAP; the temporary residence certificate is deemed to constitute registration for the purposes of the 2004 Act, meaning no separate registration under the 2004 Act was necessary.
• The employment permit is explicitly not a residence permission; the Applicant did not present the necessary documentation to demonstrate a separate residence permission issued by the Respondent.
• The Applicant used inconsistent terminology in pleadings and submissions (seeking both to "obtain" and to "register" permission), and the court found this conflation undermined the claim that a s.4 application had been made to the Respondent on 7 August 2024.
• Given these findings, the court concluded there was no application before the Respondent capable of being compelled or quashed; it was unnecessary to resolve the broader statutory interaction (including provisions of the Employment Permits Act 2024) in this case.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW REFUSED.

Consequences: The Applicant's claims for mandamus and certiorari were dismissed because no application under s.4 of the Immigration Act 2004 was shown to have been made to the Respondent on 7 August 2024, and the Applicant already held temporary residence and labour-market permissions under the 2015 Act and associated regulations. The court left open the broader legal question of whether an international protection applicant may obtain and register a separate residence permission in different factual circumstances. The Respondent was indicated to be entitled to costs against the Applicant to be assessed in default of agreement. No novel binding precedent was established by the decision.