Miah, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the Appellant against sentence following leave granted by a single judge. On 21 April 2024 the Appellant pleaded guilty at The Court and was committed for sentence under section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020 in respect of three offences: attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child (Charge 1); attempting to cause a child to watch or look at an image of sexual activity (Charge 2); and attempting to cause/incite a girl aged 13 to 15 to engage in sexual activity (Charge 3). On 17 February 2025 at The Court the Appellant received concurrent suspended custodial sentences: 12 months suspended for 2 years (Charge 1) and 20 months suspended for 2 years (Charges 2 and 3). Conditions included a programme requirement and a rehabilitation activity requirement.

The Appellant was also made subject to a sexual harm prevention order (SOPO) expressed to last for 10 years and became subject to notification requirements under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 for 10 years. The offending occurred between 30 July 2020 and 27 November 2020. The Appellant, of previous good character, believed he was communicating with a 14-year-old called Person A, who in fact was an adult decoy employed by Company A. The Appellant sent explicit images and videos, sought sexual intercourse, and encouraged sexual activity. Company A confronted the Appellant at his workplace; the Appellant admitted speaking with an underaged child and admitted sending images. He was arrested, gave no comment at interview, and digital communications were recovered. The appeal concerns the length of the SOPO.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a 10-year sexual harm prevention order was necessary and proportionate in the Appellant's case.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred by fixing the duration of the SOPO by reference to the duration of the statutory notification requirements rather than by applying the statutory test of necessity and proportionality.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Branfield)

• The 10-year duration of the SOPO was manifestly excessive.
• The sentencing judge was wrong to set the SOPO length simply because it matched the notification period rather than because it was necessary and proportionate to manage the risk of sexual harm.
• The length was disproportionate to the Appellant's risk and personal circumstances (previous good character; no further offending since arrest; cooperation and early guilty plea; remorse; circumstances of offending during the Covid-19 pandemic and relationship breakdown; compliance with conditions and suspended sentence orders).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the relevant statutory framework for SOPOs in the Sentencing Act 2020 (sections 345–346 and section 347(2)), including that SOPOs may be for a fixed period of not less than 5 years or indefinite, and that section 346 requires a SOPO only if satisfied it is necessary to protect the public or particular classes from sexual harm.

The court reiterated the legal tests of necessity and proportionality (R v Collard; R v Smith) and examined authorities addressing the relationship between SOPO duration and notification requirements (R v Hammond; R v Hemsley; R v Hanna; R v Stevens). The court concluded that SOPOs and notification requirements are distinct: while they should operate in tandem and not conflict, it is not generally required that a SOPO's duration mirror the notification period. However, fixing a SOPO's length solely because it matches the notification period is an error.

The court found that the sentencing judge had, in effect, fixed the SOPO duration to match the 10-year notification period. Whether that was because the judge treated matching as mandatory or because matching was one factor but the ultimate assessment was nevertheless excessive, the result was the same: the 10-year duration was unnecessary and disproportionate on the material before the judge.

In reaching the appropriate duration the court relied on factors identified in the appeal: the Appellant's previous good character; absence of further offending since arrest and a four-year gap since offending; full cooperation and early guilty plea; remorse; the circumstances surrounding the offending (including Covid-19 and the ending of a long-term relationship); compliance with police bail and likelihood of complying with suspended sentence conditions; the availability of monitoring via the statutory notification period and specialist police resources; and the ability to seek an extension under section 350 of the 2020 Act if risk persisted. Having applied necessity and proportionality to these facts, the court concluded that a 5-year SOPO was sufficient.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED — the 10-year sexual harm prevention order is substituted with a sexual harm prevention order of 5 years.

Direct consequences: the SOPO's duration is reduced to 5 years; all other aspects of the SOPO and the other sentences imposed by the sentencing judge remain unchanged. The court affirmed that sentencing judges must assess SOPO duration by reference to necessity and proportionality and must not fix duration merely because it matches notification requirements; the decision emphasises that the SOPO and statutory notification regimes are distinct and that monitoring under notification requirements and the availability of extension applications are relevant factors when determining an appropriate SOPO period.