Factual and Procedural Background
Judge Norton delivered this opinion. On 29 April 2025 at the Court at The City the Appellant pleaded guilty to one offence of fraud contrary to section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006 and one offence of transferring criminal property contrary to section 327(1)(d) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; two further counts of possession of an identity document with improper intention were ordered to lie on the file. On 21 August 2025 the Appellant was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for the fraud offence and 18 months' imprisonment concurrent for the transfer offence. The Appellant appealed his sentence with leave of the single judge.
The underlying conduct involved a sustained refund fraud against Company A (Amazon) between February 2020 and March 2022. The Appellant used multiple Company A accounts to obtain refunds after receiving goods, returning low‑value items or not returning goods, and then used or sold the items via online resale platforms including Company B (eBay) and Company C (CeX). The Appellant created numerous online accounts and over 22 bank accounts, moved funds frequently between them, and obtained in excess of 1,000 refunds totalling over £128,000. The Appellant published step‑by‑step instructions online under the username "Titchy" facilitating the fraud. Large transfers were made into the Appellant's accounts from two third parties referred to here as Individual A and Individual B; an investigation showed Individual B also engaged in similar refund fraud. The Appellant admitted the fraud in interview and stated the proceeds funded a gambling addiction. A financial investigation and property searches recovered numerous items intended for sale. The Appellant was 37, of previous good character, married with a newborn, and had documented mental health issues and gambling addiction; mitigation included full admissions, cooperation, remorse and steps taken to address addiction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentencing judge adopted an unduly high starting point and thereby imposed a sentence that was manifestly excessive.
- Whether, given the value of the fraud and the mitigation, a suspended sentence would have been appropriate.
- Whether the sentencing judge applied the sentencing guideline steps in the correct order, specifically whether adjustments for aggravating/mitigating factors were applied before the reduction for guilty plea.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Barber)
- The starting point adopted by the sentencing judge was too high because it was based on a £300,000 figure rather than the Appellant's actual loss (just over £128,000); the five‑year starting point and six‑year notional sentence were excessive.
- If a lower starting point had been used that more accurately reflected the value of the fraud, then after mitigation and credit for an early guilty plea the sentence could and should have been suspended.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any contrary appellate submissions by the prosecution beyond agreement at sentence on culpability and category.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by accepting that the offending was serious, lengthy and sophisticated and therefore passed the custodial threshold. The court agreed the publication of instructions enabling the fraud and the Appellant's role in facilitating others were serious aggravating features. The sentencing judge had categorized the fraud as high culpability Category A and value Category 2 (£100,000–£500,000), adopting a five‑year starting point for a Category 2A based on £300,000 and a sentencing range of three to six years.
The court observed that adjustments for aggravating and mitigating factors must be made before any reduction for guilty pleas. It rejected the Appellant's submission that a low‑end sentence necessarily followed from the fraud's value being at the lower end of Category 2. The court noted that Category 3A (frauds £20,000–£100,000) has a three‑year starting point and that a four‑year figure would have been appropriate within the applicable range before adjustment. The court applied an upwards adjustment from that four‑year figure to reflect the serious aggravation caused by publication and facilitation of others' offending, then recognised mitigation including previous good character, time since offending, steps to address addiction, and prospects for rehabilitation. Balancing those factors, the court reached a pre‑credit sentence of 54 months. The Appellant's earliest guilty plea entitled him to one‑third reduction, reducing the sentence to 36 months (three years).
The court concluded that although the sentencing judge had adopted too high a starting point, applying the guideline steps in the correct order produced the same end point; accordingly the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed.
Direct effect: the sentence of three years' imprisonment for the fraud offence (and concurrent 18 months for the transfer offence) is affirmed. The court noted the sentencing judge's starting point was too high but found that, when the guidelines are applied in the correct sequence and the aggravating and mitigating features are balanced, the same overall sentence results. No new legal precedent was created; the decision affirms application of the guideline step order and the court's approach to balancing aggravating and mitigating factors in similar factual contexts.