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Croghan and Ors v Collins and Ors (Approved)
Smart Summary
Summary of Costs Ruling — High Court (Costs Ruling)
Factual and Procedural Background
The present ruling, delivered by Judge Holland, determines costs following the court's prior substantive decisions: (i) refusal of interlocutory injunctions (October 2024); (ii) declaration that substantial parts of the case were moot and declining to hear them further (18 July 2025); and (iii) final ex tempore ruling striking out all proceedings (14 November 2025). The proceedings were plenary challenges brought by three private litigants (collectively "the Plaintiffs") seeking to prevent the proposed development of international-protection accommodation at a former factory site (the "Site"). The first three defendants (the intending developers) are referred to below as Company A; a set of State bodies and ministers are referred to collectively as "the State"; and the local authority is referred to as "the Council". Parties had previously exchanged written submissions and the court heard argument on costs on 12 January 2026.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether costs of the failed interlocutory injunction application should follow the event and be awarded against the Plaintiffs.
- Whether statutory costs-protection provisions (Planning and Development Act / Environment (Misc. Provisions) Act 2011) apply to immunise the Plaintiffs from costs.
- How to apply ss.168–169 Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and Order 99 r.2 RSC to interlocutory costs.
- What costs orders (if any) should be made in respect of Company A, the State and the Council arising from the interlocutory injunction application.
- Whether any party (notably one Plaintiff) is entitled to costs of the proceedings generally where the case became moot, applying the authorities on costs of moot proceedings (principally Hughes and PT).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Positions
- Plaintiff 1: Opposed any order for costs against him; seeks no costs; contends impecuniosity and recent serious illness; permitted to withdraw from active participation but retained for costs determination.
- Plaintiff 2: Opposed orders for costs against her; seeks no costs; claims poverty, health issues and that she acted in good faith in the public interest.
- Plaintiff 3: Seeks costs of the entire proceedings; asserts injunction and broader litigation were meritorious, claims the works did not proceed because of the Plaintiffs' interventions (e.g. asbestos concerns), and alleges other misconduct by Company A.
Defendants' Positions
- The State: Seeks costs of the failed interlocutory injunction application; contends statutory costs-protection provisions do not apply; submits its later decision not to proceed with the project was independent but relies minimally on that point in admissible sworn evidence.
- The Council: Seeks costs of the failed interlocutory injunction application (initially sought limited additional costs but later abandoned that separate request).
- Company A: Seeks interlocutory costs (won the injunction application). Company A maintained it did not cause the interlocutory outcome and that some issues (e.g. roof/asbestos) were not pleaded at that interlocutory stage; however, the court found Company A had provided inaccurate information about the nature/extent of roof works.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Re Irish Life and Permanent Plc, Dowling v Minister for Finance |
Scope of costs recoverable by lay litigants (limits to expenses and outlay). |
Cited to explain that any costs order in favour of a lay litigant will be limited to expenses/outlay rather than remuneration for personal time/expertise. |
| Dawson v Irish Brokers Association |
Further authority on limits of lay litigant costs. |
Used with other authorities to set expectation that a successful lay litigant's recoverable costs are limited. |
| Tracey v District Judge McCarthy |
Authority on lay litigant costs / procedural context. |
Included among authorities establishing limitations on lay litigant recoverable costs. |
| Tracey v McDowell |
Authority on lay litigant costs / related principles. |
Referenced as part of the body of law limiting recoverable costs for lay litigants. |
| Gilroy v O'Leary & Google |
Recent authority on lay litigant costs. |
Cited to reinforce the position that lay litigant cost recovery is limited to expenses/outlays. |
| Pembroke Equity Partners v Corrigan |
Interlocutory costs: costs follow the event; s.169 applies to interlocutory matters. |
Applied to establish the presumption that a party entirely successful in an interlocutory application is entitled to costs unless the court orders otherwise. |
| Godsil v. Ireland |
General principle that costs follow the event. |
Used to support the starting point that costs follow the event when considering interlocutory costs. |
| Daly v Ardstone Capital |
Costs follow the event; leaning towards awarding costs to successful party. |
Cited to support the approach that, where a party is entirely successful, courts should lean to ordering costs to follow the event. |
| Smith v Cisco Systems |
Application of s.168–169 to interlocutory costs; starting point that costs follow the event. |
Relied upon to confirm that s.169 governs interlocutory costs and that the successful party is presumptively entitled to costs. |
| Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners |
Principles governing costs when proceedings become moot (three-part framework); focus on cause of mootness (independent event vs unilateral act). |
Primary authority for deciding costs of moot proceedings; court applied its three propositions and discretionary framework to decide whether State's unilateral decision caused moot and whether costs should follow. |
| PT v Wicklow County Council |
Authority referenced in Hughes on costs of moot proceedings. |
Used as part of the doctrinal foundation for the three propositions about moot costs applied in Hughes. |
| Cunningham v President of the Circuit Court |
Unilateral action by respondent rendering proceedings moot usually leads to costs against that respondent absent evidence to the contrary. |
Analogous authority: where State's unilateral act rendered the case moot without clear reasons, costs were awarded to applicant; court used it to explain the onus on the unilateral actor to prove external reasons. |
| Simpson v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison |
Court's discretion to adjust costs where party misconduct occurred; need for proportionate response. |
Applied when considering Company A's misstatements to court: court reduced Company A's costs recovery to 60% to mark disapproval while recognising the misconduct was less grave than in Simpson. |
| Shelly Morris v Bus Átha Cliath |
Principle that pleadings are imputed to the party who issues them. |
Used to support the view that each Plaintiff is responsible for the content of pleadings and affidavits in their name. |
| McFadden v Muckno Hotels |
Impecuniosity alone does not ordinarily preclude an order for costs against an unsuccessful party. |
Cited via Smith v Cisco to reject impecuniosity as a sole reason to avoid a costs order. |
| James v Watters |
Limits of a plea of poverty/hardship in resisting costs orders. |
Applied to reject poverty as decisive in avoiding an adverse costs order; court accepted impecuniosity but held it did not alone prevent an award of costs. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in stages.
- Statutory and procedural framework: The court identified ss.168–169 Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and Order 99 r.2 RSC as governing costs in civil and interlocutory matters. Section 169 creates a presumption that an entirely successful party is entitled to costs unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to conduct and circumstances.
- Scope of lay-litigant costs: Citing the authorities listed above, the court observed that any costs recoverable by a lay litigant are limited to expenses and outlays (not remuneration for personal time/expertise), which bears on any award in favour of Plaintiff 3.
- Costs protection: The court considered statutory protections (s.50 Planning and Development Act 2000; Part 2 Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011) and concluded neither applied: the proceedings were not judicial review for s.50 and did not fall within the specific statutory definition of costs-protected "environmental proceedings" under the 2011 Act.
- Interlocutory costs (injunction): The interlocutory event was the Plaintiffs' loss on the injunction application. Applying s.169 and the authorities (Pembroke; Smith v Cisco), the court treated the defendants as presumptively entitled to interlocutory costs unless exception justified. The court emphasised that the Plaintiffs' injunction case was unstateable and the Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence contained seriously improper material; that conduct weighed heavily against departing from the presumption that costs follow the event.
- Individual Plaintiff considerations: Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 pleaded impecuniosity and personal hardship. The court accepted their factual impecuniosity and personal circumstances but, relying on authority (Smith v Cisco; McFadden; James), held that impecuniosity alone does not automatically preclude an adverse costs order and, given the unstateable nature of the injunction application and the Plaintiffs' conduct, awarded costs against them.
- Plaintiff 3's contentions: Plaintiff 3 sought costs of the entire proceedings and argued works did not proceed because of the Plaintiffs' interventions (e.g. asbestos). The court found that (a) Plaintiff 3 had lost the interlocutory application; (b) asbestos concerns were not pleaded at the interlocutory stage; and (c) there was no admissible evidence proving the State abandoned the project because of the proceedings. Consequently Plaintiff 3's interlocutory and general costs applications were refused.
- Company A's interlocutory costs: Company A had won the interlocutory application, but the court found Company A had misled the court about the extent of intended external roof works (the roof removal/asbestos issue). The court distinguished the misconduct here from the more serious perjury scenarios but concluded reduction of Company A's interlocutory costs recovery was warranted. Company A was awarded 60% of a single set of interlocutory costs, recoverable jointly and severally from the Plaintiffs.
- State and Council interlocutory costs: The State and the Council, having been entirely successful on the injunction application, were awarded a single set of interlocutory costs against the Plaintiffs jointly and severally.
- Costs of moot proceedings (general proceedings): Applying Hughes (and PT/Cunningham), the court assessed whether the moot resulted from an event independent of the parties or from a unilateral act. The court found the Government/Minister's unilateral decision to abandon the project made the case moot. The State did not adduce admissible sworn evidence proving that decision was wholly unconnected to the proceedings; however, the court also found it probable the Minister's decision was multifactorial and political rather than solely prompted by the litigation. On balance and exercising discretion under Hughes, the court declined to award Plaintiff 3 costs of the proceedings generally and made no order for or against Company A or the Council in respect of the costs of the moot proceedings.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The court awarded interlocutory costs as follows and refused other costs claims.
- Interlocutory injunction application: The State and the Council are each awarded a single set of interlocutory costs against the Plaintiffs jointly and severally. Recovery by any one State Defendant or the Council discharges the others to that extent.
- Company A: Awarded 60% of a single set of interlocutory costs against the Plaintiffs jointly and severally (to mark disapproval of Company A's inaccurate statements to the court).
- Plaintiff 3's costs applications: Refused (both interlocutory and costs of the proceedings generally).
- No order was made as to costs of the proceedings generally in favour of or against Company A or the Council (the moot occurred independently of their actions), and there are no other orders as to costs.
Implications: The immediate practical consequence is that the Plaintiffs are jointly and severally liable for interlocutory costs awarded to the State, the Council and 60% of Company A's interlocutory costs. Any costs potentially recoverable by a successful lay litigant (had one been awarded costs for the general proceedings) would be limited to expenses and outlays only. The decision is exercised on the court's discretionary application of established authorities (not as a novel precedent).
Judge Holland — 15 January 2026
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