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Doyle v An Coimisiun Pleanala (Approved)

Smart Summary

Summary of Judgment — High Court (Planning & Environment)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff sought judicial review of a decision by the Defendant dated 28 May 2024 which granted planning permission for a monopole telecommunications support structure proposed to be erected in the curtilage of a protected structure at the Railway Station in The Town, County Meath. The proposed development documentation described a 21m monopole (reduced on appeal from 24m), associated antennas and cabinets and related works.

Company B (the local planning authority) validated and processed the application, requested a Natura impact screening report as further information, and the notice party, Company A, lodged revised drawings and materials reducing the height of the mast to 21m. An appeal against the planning authority decision was lodged by Group A (a third party). A planning inspector prepared a report recommending permission and the Defendant held a meeting and issued an order granting permission subject to conditions on 28 May 2024.

The Plaintiff commenced proceedings on 19 July 2024. Leave to apply for judicial review was granted in September 2024. The case formed part of a group of similar cases identified by the Defendant to be heard as test cases and was listed for hearing on 19 November 2025. There were contested interlocutory issues about late “replying” affidavits served shortly before the hearing; the Court permitted filing but reserved the parties' rights, and ultimately addressed admissibility at the hearing. A draft of the judgment was circulated to the parties on 4 December 2025. Judgment was delivered by Judge Humphreys on 17 December 2025.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Defendant's decision was invalid because the planning application plans and elevations failed to comply with Article 23 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 (i.e. whether the application was invalid for insufficiency of plans).
  2. Whether the Defendant's decision was invalid because adequate public notice was not given in accordance with Articles 17/19 of the 2001 Regulations.
  3. Whether the Defendant misinterpreted or failed to apply the Telecommunications Antennae and Support Structures Guidelines (the "Antenna Guidelines") and related development-plan policy (including the 'last resort' principle) such that the decision was unlawful.
  4. Whether the Defendant erred in screening for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) by determining that the proposed mast did not fall within the category of "urban development" in Annex II of the EIA Directive (as transposed in Schedule 5 Part 2 of the 2001 Regulations) and therefore that no EIA was required.
  5. Procedural: the admissibility of late replying affidavits and related evidential questions arising from the parties' compliance with court directions (manifesting as a preliminary procedural complaint in the hearing).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The planning application was invalid because the drawings did not comply with Article 23(1) PDR: site plans allegedly failed to show features on, adjoining or in the vicinity; elevations and plans failed to show levels relative to Ordnance Survey datum; and elevations did not show main features of contiguous/curtilage buildings (including in relation to the protected structure).
  • Inadequate public notice: site notices were not erected at all main entrances as required by Article 19(1), impeding public participation.
  • The Defendant misinterpreted or misapplied the Antenna Guidelines and the development plan policy (including INF POL 56), failed to treat the 'last resort' test properly, and thereby erred in law and/or failed to give adequate reasons.
  • The Defendant erred by screening out EIA on the basis that the mast did not constitute "urban development" and so did not carry out screening in accordance with Annex II of the EIA Directive and Schedule 5 Part 2.
  • The Plaintiff sought to rely on late replying affidavits (including expert material) to respond to points raised in opposition and to support the environmental/visual/health aspects of the challenge.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The Defendant adopted the planning inspector’s report and made an independent lawful decision concluding the project did not fall within any class of Schedule 5 Part 1 or Part 2 requiring EIA; the decision and reasons are adequate and lawful.
  • Article 23 compliance: the application drawings and documentation were adequate for validation, for assessment by the planning authority and for the appeal process; any minor defects did not materially impede understanding or participation.
  • Public notice: the validation and the publicity, together with participation at appeal, showed no prejudice arising from the alleged site-notice placement; any complaint did not warrant quashing the decision.
  • The Antenna Guidelines and development-plan policies were applied; the inspector and the Defendant considered alternatives and technical justification, and properly exercised evaluative planning judgment regarding location, the 'last resort' analysis, and health matters.
  • On EIA, the Defendant argued that a single monopole is not the type of urban-development project envisaged by Annex II(10)(b) and that the matter is evaluative with a wide margin for the decision-taker. There was no basis for a preliminary reference to the CJEU.
  • The late affidavits filed by the Plaintiff were, in substance, not proper replying affidavits, introduced new material late in the process and should be disregarded or accorded no weight.

Company A (Notice Party)'s Arguments

  • The application drawings substantially complied with statutory requirements; the site layout and elevations clearly identified spot levels annotated 'ASL' which the planning professionals treated as Ordnance Datum, and photomontages and drawings made the relationship to nearby buildings clear.
  • The 'last resort' test was addressed by the technical justification and alternative-site analysis submitted by Company A; the inspector and Defendant rightly concluded a sufficient technical justification existed.
  • Health concerns were addressed by compliance with ICNIRP and by the relevant telecommunications regulatory regime; the planning process is not the forum to duplicate technical regulatory assessments of health and safety.
  • On EIA, a single mast does not have the urbanising character typical of Annex II(10)(b) projects; aggregating a national network into a single project was not pleaded and is not lawfully advanced in these proceedings.
  • Late affidavits were procedural opportunism and should be excluded or given no weight.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Reilly v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 659 Sets out an eight‑fold cumulative path/tests for granting judicial review relief in planning cases. The Court applied the eight‑fold framework from Reilly as the organising structure for analysis (jurisdiction, workability, pleading, standing, material before decision‑maker, onus of proof, harmless error, discretion).
Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 Judicial review concerns legality rather than correctness; not an appeal on merits. Cited to reinforce that the Court must focus on legality and not re‑decide planning merits.
State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642 Administrative decisions are not to be substituted by the court on merits. Used to support the proposition that the court should not substitute its view for the decision‑taker's planning judgment.
Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3 Limits and principles governing judicial review and standard of review. Cited for the general proposition about the scope and limits of judicial review.
R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 Judicial review should not dress up appeals on merits as legal points. Applied to caution against treating merits disputes as points of law in judicial review.
Stapleton v. An Bord Pleanála & Savona [2025] IEHC 178 Illustrates limits of judicial review in planning contexts. Referenced to show recent domestic planning review principles.
Moran v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 510 Discussion of evaluative planning judgments and deference. Cited to support principle that evaluative judgments are for the decision‑maker and are reviewed on irrationality threshold.
Tesco Stores Ltd v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 Weight to be given to considerations is for decision‑maker. Used to reinforce that evaluative assessments (weighting evidence) are for the planner, not the court.
Baby O v. Minister for Justice [2002] IESC 44 Deference to administrative evaluative judgments. Applied by analogy to planning evaluative judgments.
M.E. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2008] IEHC 192 On evaluation of evidence and weight given by decision‑maker. Used to support the deference principle.
Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52 Standards for judicial review of evaluative planning decisions. Cited in support of deference to planning judgments.
Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 Evaluative planning judgments reviewed on irrationality standard. Applied to indicate that planning evaluative decisions are not easily overturned.
Graymount House Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 327 Illustrates leave to appeal and deference in planning cases. Referenced in discussion of evaluative judgments and review standards.
O'Sullivan v. HSE [2023] IESC 11 Draft judgments procedure and restrictions on circulation. Cited when the Court described rules on draft judgment circulation and parties' permitted responses.
O'Sullivan v. Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75 Warning against approaching judicial review as political decision‑making. Used to emphasise separation of powers and limits on judicial intervention.
R (Hoareau and Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 221 "Judicial review is not politics by another means." Used to underline the non‑political function of judicial review.
Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 63 Separation of powers and policy choices for other branches. Referred to in relation to courts respecting policy choices.
T.D. v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 101 Similar principle on separation of powers. Referenced for the same purpose.
B. v. Child & Family Agency & Ors. [2025] IESC 2 Judicial caution in policy‑laden matters. Cited in support of separating policy choices from judicial review.
M.R. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41 Decision read in a way that makes sense; avoid most erroneous reading. Applied as authority that decisions should be read to preserve validity where reasonable.
Rostas v. DPP [2021] IEHC 60 Principle against parsing decisions in the most erroneous way. Used similarly to M.R. (Bangladesh).
St. Margaret's Recycling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 94 Decision should be read in the round and given a valid construction where possible. Applied in support of purposive reading of administrative decisions.
Mulloy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 86 Read decisions reasonably where valid reading available. Referenced to caution against over‑parsing decisions.
Moore v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2016] IESC 70 Mere technicalities not normally a basis for relief; distinguish substance from technicality. Invoked to show technical defects are not decisive absent material prejudice.
Save Cork City Community Association CLG v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 52 Disproportionate to quash for technical procedural error in some cases. Used to support exercise of discretion against certiorari for technical defects.
Watchhouse Cross Shopping Centre v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 520 Limits on relying on third‑party rights (jus tertii) and relevance of participation. Referenced in discussing standing and prejudice arguments.
Waltham Abbey v. An Bord Pleanála; Pembroke Road Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 30 Statutory provisions should be construed to produce a workable interpretation. Applied in considering "workability" of legal obligations and reasonable interpretations.
Frescati Estates Ltd. v. Walker [1975] IR 177 Planning Acts should, where possible, avoid 'strange incongruities.' Used to support workable interpretation principle.
In re Murphy [1977] IR 243 Reject interpretations that render legislation unworkable. Applied in the context of construing statutory obligations sensibly.
100 Meter Tall Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESCDET 85 Where statutory words reasonably capable of a meaning in accord with essence, that interpretation should prevail. Invoked in the workability discussion and EU law interpretation context.
Kellystown Co. v. Hogan [1985] I.L.R.M. 200 Interpret statutory words to preserve the essence of provisions. Referenced in workability analysis.
McGowan v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 405 Discretionary power should not be construed to impose unworkable requirements. Used to caution against imposing impractical duties on decision‑makers.
An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála (Kilkenny Cheese) [2022] IESC 8 European law should not be read as imposing impossibly onerous obligations; burden of proof for AA/EIA flaws lies on applicant. Relied on in discussing evidential burden in environmental assessment challenges.
R v. Crischuk (2010) BCSC 716 (and BCCA affirmation) Onus of proof to show EIA/AA defects lies on applicant, often requiring expert evidence. Applied to reiterate that environmental assessment defects must be established by evidence.
Reid v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2021] IEHC 230 Affidavits introducing new facts outside matters before the decision‑maker are tightly circumscribed. Used to support refusal to admit late affidavits going beyond proper reply.
Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 300 Scientific/factual shortcomings in EIA/AA must be shown by admissible expert evidence. Cited in support of the evidential onus in environmental challenges.
Salmon Watch Ireland, Inland Fisheries Ireland, Sweetman & Ors. v. Aquaculture Licences Appeals Board [2024] IEHC 421 Onus of proof principles in environmental assessment litigation. Referenced on evidential burdens.
Nagle View Turbine Aware Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 603 Applicants must establish scientific/factual shortcomings in AA/EIA; onus remains on applicant. Applied to the point that applicants carry the burden of proof.
Minoa Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 704 Evidential standards for environmental assessment challenges. Referenced for onus of proof in EIA/AA contexts.
Ó Murthuile v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 498 Similar to other authorities on evidential onus in environmental law challenges. Referred to in the evidential discussion.
Joyce Kemper v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 601 Onus of proof cannot be discharged by mere assertions. Applied when considering the Plaintiff's contentions unsupported by admissible evidence.
Harrington v. An Bord Pleanála [2014] IEHC 232 Mere assertion does not create scientific doubt for AA purposes. Used to assess the Plaintiff's submissions on environmental/health doubt.
Duffy v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558 On the requirement for evidence to establish AA/EIA doubts. Referenced for evidential standards.
RAS Medical Ltd v. Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [2019] IESC 4 Where there is a conflict of admissible evidence and no cross‑examination, it is generally resolved against the party carrying the onus. Applied in resolving conflicts when Plaintiff failed to discharge onus and did not seek cross‑examination.
Koulibaly v. Minister for Justice [2004] IESC 50 Court may prefer an affidavit over oral evidence in appropriate circumstances. Referenced to show court's fact‑finding discretion in relation to evidence.
DPP v. Barnes [2006] IECCA 165 Court not constrained to accept "the only account available" and can evaluate inherent problems in evidence. Used to support critical assessment of evidence presented without cross‑examination.
Tesco Ireland Limited v. Stateline Transport Limited [2024] IECA 46 Court is not automatically obliged to accept expert evidence absent cross‑examination. Applied when considering late expert material lacking proper foundation.
Colbeam v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2025] IEHC 437 Minor or ancillary errors may be marginal and not necessarily warrant certiorari (harmless error doctrine). Invoked in discussing harmlessness and non‑material procedural defects.
Carrownagowan Concern Group v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 3) [2024] IEHC 549 Court may rely on developer evidence to assess harmlessness without remitting to decision‑maker (Altrip principle). Used to justify considering developer evidence when assessing whether an error was harmless.
Walton v. Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 Harmless error principles in environmental law. Referred to support harmless‑error analysis.
Gemeinde Altrip and Others v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz (C‑72/12) Concept of 'procedural defect' in EU environmental law and scope of harmless error. Discussed in relation to EIA procedural defects and remedial principles.
R. (Champion) v. North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52 Harmless‑error doctrine and post‑hoc assessment by court relying on evidence. Applied to support the court's ability to find an error harmless on the material before it.
Canterbury City Council v. Secretary of State for Housing Communities and Local Government [2019] EWHC 1211 On the principle that not every error warrants quashing an approval if error is harmless. Used as comparative authority for harmless error doctrine.
R. (Hudson) v. Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council [2021] EWCA Civ 592 Harmless error and proportionality considerations in planning judicial review. Referenced in harmless‑error discussion.
West Cork Bar Association v. Courts Service [2016] IEHC 388 Considerations of whether a decision could conceivably have been different (contextual statements). Noted in harmless‑error contextual discussion.
Baile Eamoinn Teoranta v. An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 642 Case‑specific statements about possibilities of different outcomes; fact specific. Referenced as contextual authority on assessing conceivable differences.
Donegal County Council v. Planree [2024] IECA 300 Analogous authority on evidential and procedural principles in planning JR. Cited in relation to onus of proof and evidential standards.
Massey v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 206 Harmless error doctrine reaffirmed; evidential burdens discussed. Used in support of harmless‑error and evidential onus points.
Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 4 Court must itself be satisfied as to whether to grant relief; the court may exercise discretion of its own motion. Applied to emphasise the Court's independent duty to be satisfied before granting relief.
Hayes v. Environmental Protection Agency [2024] IECA 162 Affidavits may be filed outside the eight‑week limit provided proceedings were commenced in time, but new evidence is constrained by other procedural rules. Distinguished: the Court held Hayes does not permit a rolling drip‑feed of new evidence contrary to case management directions.
Fahybeg Windfarm Opposition Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 310 Procedural management and limits on late evidence. Relied on in rejecting late affidavits that introduced new material.
Four Districts Woodland Habitat Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 335 Decisions must be 'in accordance' with guidelines where applicable. Referenced in considering the duty to follow Antenna Guidelines where the plan requires it.
Ryan v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 111 Discussed in relation to EIA Annex II "urbanisation" analysis. Cited in the EIA analysis and to reject an asserted conflict with Reid.
Reid v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 687 Interpretation of Annex II EIA categories and limits of 'urban development' concept. Used to show that not all development in an urban area is 'urban development' for EIA purposes.
Condron (R.) v. Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2009] EWHC 1621 Judicial approach where statutory expression is imprecise; courts should intervene only where decision is irrational. Quoted in support of deference where statutory terms are imprecise and decision is rational.
Commission v. Spain (C‑332/04) (Commission v Spain) CJEU authority that national rules excluding all urban projects from Annex II scope were unlawful; emphasises nature/size/location criteria. Referred to in EIA discussion as authority that urban location alone does not exclude Annex II scrutiny.
WertInvest Hotelbetriebs GmbH v Magistrat der Stadt Wien (C‑575/21) Limits on Member States' power to set thresholds for Annex II projects; Article 2(1) constraints. Cited from EU guidance to caution about overly broad national thresholds exempting urban projects.
Kraaijeveld and Others (C‑72/95) Wide scope and purposive interpretation of EIA Directive categories. Referenced in EU guidance quoted in the judgment when discussing Annex II scope.
Other domestic authorities cited (selection): Reid v An Bord Pleanála (No. 7) [2024] IEHC 27; Independent Newspapers v. I.A. [2020] IECA 19; O'Connell v. Behan [2021] IECA 186; G. v. DPP [1994] 1 I.R. 374; Kenny v. Dublin City Council [2009] IESC 19; Campus Oil v. Minister for Industry and Energy (No. 2) [1983] I.R. 88; Grassridge v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669. Various principles: discretion in judicial review, pleading and leave stage discretion, importance of materiality/triviality, presumption of validity of administrative decisions, onus of proof. The Court drew on these authorities for discrete legal propositions throughout its reasoning (discretion, onus, presumption of validity, pleading rules, materiality of defects).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis by reference to the eight‑fold Reilly framework and emphasised core themes: (i) judicial review tests legality not merits; (ii) legal provisions must be given workable, sensible interpretations; (iii) the onus of proof remains on the applicant to establish error (and where an error is demonstrated the onus shifts to opposing parties to show harmlessness); (iv) the doctrine of harmless error limits relief where defects are immaterial; and (v) discretion must be exercised sensibly.

Preliminary procedural ruling on late affidavits

The Court found that the three late affidavits served by the Plaintiff were not genuine replying affidavits but sought to introduce new evidential material at a late stage. The Court applied established authorities (including Reid and Hayes) and its case‑management role to determine that the affidavits went beyond permissible reply, were filed in breach of directions, failed to explain why the matters could not have been placed before the decision‑maker with reasonable diligence, and (in the case of one affidavit) lacked proper expert foundation. The Court upheld the respondents' objections to those affidavits and treated those materials as inadmissible or accorded them no weight.

Core Ground 1 — Plans and Article 23 (PDR)

The Plaintiff advanced that the application was invalid because the plans did not show required features or levels relative to Ordnance Survey datum. The Court accepted that any complaint about contours had been withdrawn. The Court read the plans and application material purposively and concluded that spot heights described as ASL should reasonably be read as Ordnance Datum for present purposes; photomontages and other material supplied at application and appeal stages made the relationship with the protected structure and surrounding features clear. Any technical shortcoming relating to the level of detail for the protected structure was not material given the extensive material before the planning authority, the inspector and the Defendant. The Court therefore concluded the Plaintiff had not proved that the application was invalid for non‑compliance with Article 23 in any material respect.

Core Ground 2 — Public notice (Articles 17/19)

The Plaintiff alleged site notices were not posted at all main entrances. The Court held that the Plaintiff bore the onus to prove the statutory breach and that she had not shown the relevant land adjoined a "public road" as defined; in consequence Article 19(2) (not the stricter multi‑entrance rule) applied. The Court concluded non‑compliance with the stricter requirement had not been established and that the record showed significant opportunity for participation (including submissions and appeals), such that no material prejudice was demonstrated.

Core Ground 3 — Antenna Guidelines / Development Plan (last‑resort test and health)

The Plaintiff alleged misinterpretation of the Antenna Guidelines and failure to undertake a proper 'last‑resort' analysis, and complained that the Defendant declined to consider health matters. The Court treated much of this as a merits challenge. It held that the settlement hierarchy in the development plan placed The Town (Laytown/Bettystown/Mornington/Donacarney) above the "small town" tier relied on by the Plaintiff, so the premise of the pleaded claim failed. On the 'last‑resort' point the Court found that the inspector and the Defendant considered alternative sites and accepted technical justification provided by Company A; any wording shortcomings in the inspector's report did not amount to a material error. As to health, the Court accepted that planning decision‑makers can generally rely on industry standards (ICNIRP) and that health and safety regulation is primarily addressed by specialised regulatory regimes; accordingly, the Defendant's approach to health issues was lawful and any infelicitous phrasing was immaterial on the facts.

Core Ground 5 — EIA screening and 'urban development'

The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant erred by concluding the mast was not "urban development" within Annex II(10)(b) and Schedule 5 Part 2 such that screening for EIA was required. The Court set out the relevant EIA Directive provisions and emphasised that (a) being a "project" is insufficient — it must fall within Annex I or Annex II categories and relevant thresholds/criteria; (b) Annex II(10)(b) concerns urban development projects of an urbanising character (shopping centres and car parks being examples); and (c) the concept of "urban development" is inherently evaluative with a margin of application for decision‑makers.

Applying those principles, and having regard to authorities including Commission v Spain and domestic case‑law, the Court concluded that a single monopole mast is materially different in character and scale from the types of urbanising projects typically captured by Annex II(10)(b). The Defendant's evaluative judgment that this mast did not constitute urban development for EIA purposes fell within its margin of appraisal and was not irrational. The Court further observed that general EU guidance recognising telecoms infrastructure may in some circumstances fall within urban development did not mean every mast must be treated as such; exceptional cases remain possible but were not established on the facts.

Overarching legal and discretionary considerations

The Court repeatedly applied the core principles that (i) the onus of proof is on the applicant; (ii) courts will not quash decisions for immaterial or harmless errors; (iii) the decision must be read in the round and given a valid construction where possible; and (iv) discretion may be exercised to refuse remedies where relief would be disproportionate or where there is no material prejudice. On those bases the Court found the Plaintiff had not discharged the burden of proof on the key grounds and that any shortcomings were immaterial or within the margin of evaluative judgment entrusted to the Defendant.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court ordered that the reliefs sought be refused and the judicial review proceedings be dismissed. The core ruling may be stated as: PROCEEDINGS DISMISSED.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • The Defendant's decision of 28 May 2024 granting planning permission for the monopole was upheld and remains in effect subject to the ordinary rights of appeal (the Court listed the Plaintiff's proposed leave to appeal application to be heard subsequently).
  • The Court exercised its discretion to dismiss the proceedings and (subject to written submissions within seven days) made no order as to costs; the judgment reserved a narrow procedural margin for any written submissions on costs.
  • The Court's reasoning reiterates established principles rather than creating new precedent: the decision emphasises deference to evaluative planning judgments, the applicant's burden to prove EIA/AA defects by admissible evidence, and the application of harmless‑error and discretionary principles in environmental and planning judicial review. No novel legal principle was established beyond application of these existing doctrines to the facts of this case.

Practical note: The matter was listed for mention on 12 January 2026 and for hearing of the Plaintiff's proposed leave to appeal on 28 January 2026.

Prepared from the judgment delivered by Judge Humphreys on 17 December 2025. All parties, locations and certain entities have been anonymised in this summary consistent with the instruction governing anonymisation.

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Doyle v An Coimisiun Pleanala (Approved)

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Doyle v An Coimisiun Pleanala (Approved)
(Dec 17, 2025)