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Wood, R. v

Smart Summary

Summary of Court Opinion (Anonymized)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a renewed application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence following refusal by a single judge. The Applicant is represented on the renewed application by Attorney D'Souza on a pro bono basis.

After a two-week trial before Judge Leeming and a jury at The Crown Court, the Applicant was convicted of the murder of the Victim on 2 January 2024 and sentenced on 2 February 2024 to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 18 years (less 616 days on remand), expressed as 16 years and 114 days.

The factual matrix at trial was that on 6 May 2022 the Applicant and the Victim attended a social function in The City, consumed alcohol, and later returned home to an address described in the opinion as [Number] Main Street. CCTV footage recorded a series of vehicle manoeuvres in a small parking area adjacent to The Takeaway and The Road. The Applicant's car became trapped behind the Victim's car; there was an initial collision with roadside objects and a first contact with the Victim. Seconds later the Applicant drove forward and the car struck the Victim a second time, fatally dragging the Victim beneath the car for a significant distance. Toxicology showed the Applicant to be over the legal alcohol limit. The Applicant's account was that the second collision was accidental and explicable by panic, intoxication and perception/response limitations; the prosecution alleged deliberate driving intended to kill or cause really serious bodily harm.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an extension of time should be granted for the renewed application for leave to appeal.
  2. Whether leave should be granted to appeal against conviction on the grounds that:
    1. The trial judge erred in allowing re-examination of the prosecution expert (Expert Thompson) on the applicability of Perception Response Time (PRT), thereby admitting inadmissible/opinion evidence usurping the jury's role;
    2. The judge erred in rejecting a submission of no case to answer (i.e. whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict under the Galbraith test); and
    3. Trial counsel erred in tactical decisions by not adducing historic medical records of the Victim (proposed new Ground 3) and whether those fresh records should be admitted under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
  3. Whether leave should be granted to appeal the sentence on the basis that:
    1. The sentencing judge erred in finding intention to kill rather than intention to cause serious harm;
    2. The judge erred in treating the use of a vehicle as a weapon equivalent; and
    3. The minimum term imposed was manifestly excessive, including alleged over-weighting of aggravating factors and under-weighting of mitigating factors.
  4. Whether fresh evidence and an additional proposed ground should be admitted to vary the grounds of appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The re-examination of Expert Thompson on PRT introduced inadmissible opinion that invaded the jury's fact-finding role and amounted to a personal view on the ultimate issue, rendering the conviction unsafe.
  • The trial judge should have acceded to a submission of no case to answer because the evidence of intent was circumstantial and equivocal; the jury could not properly exclude plausible accident hypotheses.
  • Trial counsel failed to adduce medical records showing the Victim's prior mental ill-health and alleged propensity to move into traffic; this omission was said to be an error of judgment that could have materially affected the jury's assessment of causation and safety of the conviction (proposed Ground 3).
  • As to sentence, the Applicant contends the judge wrongly found intention to kill rather than intention to cause serious harm, treated the vehicle as equivalent to a weapon without justification, and imposed a manifestly excessive minimum term.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Respondent resisted the applications, submitting that the case was straightforward and captured on clear CCTV footage showing deliberate manoeuvres and driving; efforts to elevate expert evidence or historic background material risked obscuring a simple tragic case.
  • On sentencing, the Respondent relied on the judge's fact-based findings, the applicability of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, and the proper assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors supporting the minimum term imposed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039 The test for whether a judge should withdraw a case from the jury on a submission of no case to answer (i.e. whether, taken at its highest, the prosecution evidence could properly be left to a reasonable jury). The court applied Galbraith to conclude that the evidence (including CCTV, admissions and expert evidence) was sufficient to leave murder to the jury and that the judge correctly rejected the no-case submission.
R v James [2018] EWCA Crim 285; [2018] 1 WLR 2749 Principle that fresh grounds advanced by fresh counsel after initial leave refusal must be "particularly cogent" — high hurdle for varying grounds of appeal. The court applied James in assessing the proposed new Ground 3 and concluded the proposed fresh ground lacked the requisite cogency to justify amendment; leave to add the ground was refused.
McCook (principles) Guidance that appellate courts will be slow to criticise tactical decisions by trial counsel unless they fall outside the range of reasonable professional judgment. The court relied on McCook principles to uphold trial counsel's tactical decision not to admit historic medical records of the Victim, finding the decision within reasonable professional judgment and not rendering the conviction unsafe.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed delay and granted the necessary extension of time, noting the relatively short 49-day delay, the Applicant's lack of responsibility for delay, and the gravity of the consequences.

Ground 1 (re-examination of Expert Thompson on PRT): The court reviewed the evidence and trial process. Expert Thompson had initially opined that Perception Response Time (PRT) did not apply to the second strike because the Victim's presence at that moment was not "unexpected" given the earlier strike. In cross-examination Expert Thompson conceded that PRT would be relevant if the Applicant had looked away and the Victim's position changed; the prosecution sought to clarify this in re-examination. The judge allowed re-examination; Expert Thompson reaffirmed that the Victim's presence was not unexpected. The court concluded that the judge acted within discretion: re-examination arose from cross-examination, did not breach the principal rule confining re-examination to matters arising out of cross-examination, and did not usurp the jury's role. The court noted admissibility principles under common law and section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and that the jury were properly directed and remained the arbiters of fact.

Ground 2 (no case to answer): The court applied the Galbraith test. It observed that the case was not purely circumstantial because clear CCTV footage and other evidence were available. The judge had been entitled to leave the matter to the jury given the footage, the Applicant's admissions in cross-examination about deliberate driving to "scare and intimidate," post-arrest comments, and the forensic evidence of fatal dragging. The court found the judge correctly refused the submission of no case to answer.

Ground 3 (trial counsel's tactical decision and fresh evidence): The court considered whether to allow an amendment to the grounds to introduce fresh medical records of the Victim under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The medical records dated from 2019 and disclosed historical mental health difficulties and suicidal ideation including an alleged prior attempt in front of traffic. The court assessed admissibility (capable of belief), potential to affect the safety of the conviction, and the explanation for non-production at trial. The court found the records were historic, lacked evidence of contemporaneous relevance (no evidence the Victim suffered such difficulties at the time of the incident in 2022), and would have had limited probative value against the clear CCTV and other evidence. It accepted trial counsel's (Attorney Young's) explanation that the decision not to adduce the records was tactical to avoid opening the door to damaging bad-character evidence and that the decision fell within reasonable professional judgment under McCook. The court concluded the fresh ground lacked sufficient cogency; leave to amend and to admit the fresh evidence was refused.

Sentence challenge: The court reviewed the sentencing exercise under Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020. It considered the selection of a starting point (15 years rather than 25), aggravating and mitigating factors, and the judge's fact findings. The sentencing judge had delineated the phases of driving, found the first strike deliberate and the second strike to involve short-lived but established intention to kill formed after strike 1, and treated the vehicle as a weapon equivalent. Aggravators included use of the vehicle as a dangerous weapon equivalent, vulnerability of the Victim, Applicant's intoxication, repeated hostile driving and suffering caused. Mitigators included age, lack of previous convictions and post-incident conduct, but the judge gave limited weight to remorse. The appellate court concluded that the judge's factual findings and application of sentencing law were properly grounded, did not offend principle, avoided double-counting, and that an upward adjustment from 15 to 18 years was modest and within a reasonable range. The court therefore refused leave to appeal sentence.

The court also directed that the recording of the sentence be expressed as life imprisonment with a minimum term of 16 years and 114 days (i.e. 18 years less 616 days on remand), consistent with earlier guidance.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings

  • The extension of time for the renewed application was granted.
  • The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused.
  • The application to add the proposed Ground 3 and to admit the fresh medical records was refused.
  • The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
  • The sentence is to be recorded as life imprisonment with a minimum term of 16 years and 114 days (i.e. 18 years less 616 days on remand).

Implications:

  • The Applicant's conviction and sentence stand; no leave to appeal was granted on the substantive grounds advanced.
  • The court affirmed principles governing expert evidence admissibility and re-examination, the Galbraith test for no-case submissions, the high threshold for late addition of fresh grounds under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, and deference to reasonable tactical decisions by trial counsel (McCook principle).
  • The decision does not purport to establish new legal precedent. The court applied established statutory and common law principles to the facts before it and concluded that no arguable error of law or principle affecting safety of conviction or manifest excess in sentence was shown on the renewed application.
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Wood, R. v

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Wood, R. v
(Nov 26, 2025)