Factual and Procedural Background
On 28 August 2024, at the Crown Court sitting at The City, five individuals (referred to here as Appellant 1, Appellant 2, Appellant 3, Appellant 4 and Appellant 5) were convicted after a trial before Judge Perrins and a jury of criminal damage contrary to section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. The damage was inflicted on a prominent, Grade I listed marble monument referred to in this summary as "The Memorial", situated directly in front of a royal residence in The City.
On 18 October 2024 the appellants were sentenced. The sentences included suspended terms of 18 months' imprisonment (suspended for 2 years) with unpaid work and rehabilitation requirements for four appellants and an immediate concurrent 18 month custodial term for one appellant; compensation orders were made payable to Company A. The Registrar referred applications for extensions of time and for leave to appeal against sentence to the Full Court.
The factual account at trial, as found by the jury and accepted in the opinion, was that the appellants entered the fountains surrounding The Memorial during demonstrations in central The City, poured red dye into the water (the dye having been sourced and brought to the site), dispersed the dye in the fountains and applied dyed water to the marble stonework, leaving red smears and handprints. The dye had the potential to, and did, penetrate the porous light-coloured marble; specialist cleaning was required, involving draining and cleaning the fountains over several days, taking 64 hours and costing more than £7,000. The jury rejected the appellants' defence that their actions did not amount to criminal damage and found intention or recklessness as to causing damage.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in principle.
- Whether the sentencing judge was entitled to find that (a) the offending crossed the custody threshold and (b) the offending fell into the highest categories of culpability and harm under the Criminal Damage Sentencing Guidelines.
- Whether the appellants' conscientious motivations (and the engagement of Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR) materially required a more lenient approach to culpability or sentence.
- Whether two appellants who allegedly played lesser roles could properly be distinguished from the others for sentencing purposes given the prosecution case of joint enterprise.
Arguments of the Parties
Attorney Animashaun (representing Appellant 1, Appellant 2 and Appellant 3)
- Submitted the sentences were manifestly excessive and that the judge should not have concluded the custody threshold was passed.
- Argued the judge erred in placing the offending in the top categories for harm and culpability (contending there was no significant planning nor serious social harm).
- Contended the judge failed properly to reduce the sentence to reflect the appellants' conscientious objectives and that the sentences disproportionately interfered with rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
Attorney Stockdale (representing Appellant 4 and Appellant 5)
- Adopted the submissions made by Attorney Animashaun in common.
- Additionally submitted the judge erred in failing to distinguish the roles of Appellant 4 and Appellant 5 from the other appellants, on the basis that the two were positioned on a different side of The Memorial and did not apply dyed water to the marble stonework.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Trowland [2023] EWCA Crim 919; [2024] 1 WLR 1164 |
Principles for sentencing in protest cases, including that more disproportionate or extreme protest action reduces the justification for reduced culpability and lenient sentencing. |
The judge had regard to Trowland in assessing culpability and mitigation; the court applied Trowland to uphold the judge's conclusion that conscientious motivation did not preclude a finding of high culpability and limited mitigation. |
| R v Hallam [2025] EWCA Crim 199 |
Authorities on sentencing in protest contexts and related sentencing principles. |
Cited as part of the body of authority identifying principles to be applied in protest cases; the court treated Hallam as supporting the sentencing approach taken. |
| Attorney General's Reference (No. 1 of 2022) [2023] KB 37 (CA) |
Classification that not all criminal damage committed in the context of protest falls into a single category (reference on how to view protest-related offending). |
Used to note that the present case fell within non-violent protest cases and to situate the sentencing principles to be applied. |
| R v Jones (Margaret) [2006] UKHL 16; [2007] 1 AC 136 |
Earlier authority relevant to the interaction of protest, conscientious motives and criminal liability/sentencing. |
Referred to as part of the earlier authorities from which sentencing principles in protest cases are drawn. |
| R v Roberts [2018] EWCA Crim 2739 |
Sentencing principles (referenced at specific paragraphs in the judgment) relied upon in protest-related sentencing analyses. |
Cited as an authority from which the court draws guidance on sentencing in this area; applied as part of the overall jurisprudential framework. |
| Cuadrilla Bowland Ltd v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 9; [2020] 4 WLR 29 |
Earlier authority touching on protest-related disputes and principles referenced in the context of sentencing or related judicial reasoning. |
Referred to alongside other authorities to support the court's exposition of sentencing principles in protest cases. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court emphasised that sentencing in protest cases follows normal sentencing principles and that each case turns on its facts. It reviewed relevant authorities (including Trowland and Hallam) and concluded that the judge had correctly applied those principles.
On culpability, the court accepted the judge's finding of a high degree of planning (Category A high culpability). The reasoning in support of that finding was that the appellants undertook preparatory research, sourced and purchased dye in sufficient quantities, communicated in advance using an encrypted messaging service, attended the location equipped to carry out the plan, coordinated timing and placards to maximise impact, and ensured a photographer was present to publicise the action. Those facts supported the judge's conclusion that the action was a well-planned operation.
On harm, the court agreed with the judge that the offending qualified as the highest category (Category 1 / 1A) because the conduct targeted a culturally significant, nationally important heritage asset in a prominent public location when many members of the public were present. The court noted section 63 of the Sentencing Act 2020 requires consideration of harm which the offence might foreseeably have caused; here the foreseeability of permanent staining of porous historic marble (which would have been permanent but for prompt remedial action) supported categorisation in the top harm bracket. The court observed that harm to heritage and cultural assets is an aggravating feature under the Sentencing Guidelines.
The court considered conscientious motivation and Convention rights (Articles 10 and 11). It accepted that Articles 10 and 11 were engaged but held that the fact the appellants' expression took the form of criminal damage materially weakened the weight of Convention protections. The court reiterated that conscientious motivation may be relevant to mitigation and to the assessment of culpability, but does not preclude high culpability where the action was disproportionate or extreme. The judge had taken conscientious motives into account (notably by suspending the custodial sentences), but the court found the mitigation was limited by the nature and consequences of the offending.
Regarding the contention that two appellants played lesser roles, the court observed the prosecution proceeded on a joint enterprise basis and that the judge was entitled to find the appellants were jointly responsible. The appellants were found to have encouraged and supported one another and to have associated in a common plan to put dye into the fountain and thereby cause or risk damage to the stonework; the judge's refusal to distinguish roles was upheld.
Finally, the court concluded that the custody threshold had been crossed based on the established categorisation and that the sentencing judge had not erred in principle or exceeded the available sentencing margin in imposing suspended custodial terms (and a concurrent custodial term for one appellant already serving a sentence).
Holding and Implications
ALL APPLICATIONS REFUSED
Consequences: The court refused the applications for extensions of time and for leave to appeal against sentence; the sentences imposed by Judge Perrins therefore stand as passed (including suspended custodial sentences for four appellants and a concurrent custodial sentence for one appellant, together with unpaid work, rehabilitation requirements and compensation orders payable to Company A). The court indicated no change to the sentencing approach in protest cases and did not treat this decision as establishing a new principle beyond applying existing authorities; the decision's direct effect is to uphold the sentencing conclusions reached by the trial judge in this factual context.