MD v The Chief International Protection Officer & Anor (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

Judge Barr delivered the decision electronically on 24 November 2025 in proceedings brought by the Applicant, a national of Country A, who arrived in The State on 5 September 2022 and immediately applied for international protection. The Applicant seeks an order of certiorari quashing a decision of the First Respondent (the Chief International Protection Officer) notified on 18 June 2024 that refused a declaration of asylum or international protection, on the basis that the decision-maker did not address a particular significant ground put forward by the Applicant. The Second Respondent (The Minister) issued a decision under s.49 of the International Protection Act 2015 on 22 May 2024; both decisions were notified on 18 June 2024.

Chronology and salient factual background (as stated in the opinion): the Applicant was born in 1988 in Region A. In 1993 the Applicant's grandmother was killed in civil unrest in Region A; the Applicant's father went missing and is presumed dead. The Applicant and her mother fled Region A in 1993 to City A, where they lived with two brothers. The Applicant attended school in City A until 2006, then worked in hospitality and later ran a retail business through a limited liability company. The Applicant married in 2009 and had a daughter in 2010. The Applicant's husband converted to the Muslim faith and later travelled to Country B to fight; he died in 2014. The Applicant reports that associates of her late husband periodically checked on her child-rearing and, after baptising her daughter in 2021, she says she was assaulted and reported the matter to police but that no further action followed.

In August 2022 the Applicant alleges that a group of men (the same individuals) forced entry to her shop, threatened her with death and the abduction of her daughter, assaulted her repeatedly, and during her escape her daughter suffered a serious injury requiring emergency surgery. The Applicant fled City A on 13 August 2022, leaving her daughter with the Applicant's mother, and arrived in The State on 5 September 2022.

Procedural history: the First Respondent's decision under s.39 of the International Protection Act 2015 was given on 15 April 2024 and the Second Respondent's decision under s.49 was given on 22 May 2024; both were notified on 18 June 2024. The statutory time limit for challenge (28 days under Section 5(1)(og)/(oi) of the Illegal Immigrant (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended)) expired on 15 July 2024. The Applicant issued judicial review proceedings on 31 July 2024 and sought an extension of time.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the First Respondent's decision failed to address a substantial and fundamental ground that the Applicant had put forward in support of her claim to refugee status or international protection (specifically, the Applicant's contention that, as an internally displaced ethnic Georgian from Region A, she faced a real risk of persecution in Region A and that internal relocation within Country A was unreasonable);
2. Whether the Applicant's judicial review proceedings were instituted out of time and, if so, whether the court should exercise its discretion to extend the statutory time limit;
3. Whether the existence of an alternative remedy (an appeal to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT), which the Applicant had initiated) affected the appropriateness of granting certiorari.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Applicant contended that the decision-maker failed to address a fundamental plank of her case, as articulated in a letter from her solicitor dated 27 March 2024: that as an internally displaced person (IDP) and ethnic Georgian from Region A she need only establish a real risk of persecution/serious harm in Region A together with the unreasonableness of relocation within the rest of Country A to obtain international protection.
• The Applicant relied on s.28 of the International Protection Act 2015, asserting a duty on the decision-maker to fully investigate all aspects of the claim and to cooperate with the applicant.
• The Applicant referred to PD v Minister for Justice and Law Reform [2015] IEHC 111 to support the proposition that a failure to investigate relevant legal or factual issues can render a decision bad in law.
• On the time issue, the Applicant submitted that a pre-litigation letter dated 8 July 2024 from her solicitor (seeking withdrawal of the decision) and the short length of delay (about 14 days beyond the statutory period) amounted to good and sufficient reason to extend time; there was no prejudice to the respondents and no delay to substantive hearing.

Respondents' Arguments

• The Respondents contended that the entirety of the Applicant's case had been considered: the application documentation, questionnaire, interview, supporting documents and written submissions made on the Applicant's behalf had been before the decision-maker.
• They characterised the gravamen of the Applicant's claim as being the risk of serious harm from associates of her deceased husband in City A (and not principally a risk in Region A), and submitted that the decision-maker had addressed the relevant questions of risk in the place whence she fled, availability of state protection, and possibility of internal relocation.
• The Respondents submitted that the decision-maker concluded the Applicant had not demonstrated a reasonable fear of serious harm if returned to City A, a conclusion open on the evidence, and that the Applicant had an adequate alternative remedy by way of appeal to the IPAT, which she had instituted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court divided its analysis into two main inquiries: (1) whether the time for bringing the proceedings should be extended; and (2) whether the First Respondent's decision failed to address a substantial ground of the Applicant's claim.

On the time issue, the court applied the multi-factorial approach set out in the authorities (GK v IPAT and IT v Minister for Justice). The court found that the Applicant's solicitor had acted reasonably in sending a pre-litigation letter dated 8 July 2024; the delay in issuing proceedings (short, approximately 14 days beyond the statutory 28-day period) did not prejudice the Respondents or affect the timetable for any substantive hearing; and those matters collectively constituted sufficient reasons to extend time. Accordingly, the court extended the time for bringing the proceedings up to and including 31 July 2024.

On the substantive complaint, the court framed the central question as whether the First Respondent had failed to deal with a substantial ground put forward by the Applicant. The Applicant argued that her IDP status and the country information provided made clear that she relied on being an ethnic Georgian from Region A and that internal relocation within Country A would be unreasonable. The Applicant asserted that the decision-maker's obligation under s.28 of the 2015 Act required full investigation of such points.

The court examined the impugned decision as a whole and concluded that it did fairly address the substance of the Applicant's case. The decision repeatedly referred to the Applicant's flight from Region A in 1993 and contained no suggestion that return to Region A was being treated as safe; thus, the question of return to Region A did not arise for direct determination. The court identified the core of the Applicant's protection claim as fear of serious harm from associates of her deceased husband in City A. The decision-maker had considered the relevant evidence, documentary material and the Applicant's accounts of assaults and threats, and had reached the conclusion (open on the evidence) that the Applicant had not demonstrated a reasonable fear of suffering serious harm at the hands of those persons if returned to City A.

The court emphasised that a decision-maker need not adopt a rigid formula in giving reasons; the essential requirement is that the substance of the applicant's case be fairly addressed. The court found that, on any reasonable reading, the First Respondent had carefully taken account of all aspects of the Applicant's case and reached a conclusion open on the evidence. The court also observed that an alleged misunderstanding by the decision-maker of an argument is, if true, typically a matter for an appellate process rather than for certiorari. Given these findings, there was no basis to quash the impugned decision.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court refused the reliefs sought by the Applicant and declined to quash the decisions under challenge. The court extended time for instituting the proceedings to 31 July 2024 but held that there were no grounds to order certiorari of the impugned decisions.

Implications:

• The direct effect is that the Applicant's judicial review challenge was dismissed and the First Respondent's and Second Respondent's decisions remain in place.
• The Applicant retains a statutory right of appeal to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT), which the Applicant had already initiated; the court noted that matters such as a claim that the decision-maker misunderstood an argument are quintessentially appellate grounds.
• The court indicated that no further relief would be granted in these proceedings and proposed to refuse the reliefs sought in the Applicant's notice of motion and statement of grounds; the judgment does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond the application of existing authorities on extension of time and the principles governing review of decision-making in international protection cases.
• Administrative matters: parties were given two weeks to furnish brief written submissions on the terms of the final order and on costs; the matter was listed for mention on 16 December 2025.