| [2017] IECA 296 — Plaintiff v. Defendant (BW v. RAT) |
Amendment of pleadings requires three elements: arguability, explanation and lack of irremediable prejudice. |
The court applied this tripartite test when assessing the proposed amendments and found the Applicants failed to satisfy these requirements. |
| [2023] IEHC 136 — Plaintiff v. Company A (O'Lone v. Company A) |
Court reluctance to permit extensive reprogramming of a case by amendment. |
Used as part of the general principle cautioning against extensive amendments; supported refusal to permit the new case to be introduced. |
| [2023] IEHC 26 — Plaintiff v. Company A (Sherwin v. Company A) |
Discussion of flexibility in allowing amendments and interaction with precedent (and reference to Keegan). |
Cited to explain that some flexibility exists but did not justify the extensive amendments sought here. |
| [2012] 2 IR 570 — Plaintiff v. Defendant (Keegan) |
Prejudice does not necessarily arise from an amendment that allows a new argument which may succeed. |
Used to temper strictness on amendments but the court held that the scale of the proposed amendments went beyond what Keegan permits. |
| [2007] IEHC 153 — Plaintiff v. Company A (Sweetman) |
Amendments may not be used to introduce an entirely new case. |
Relied upon to support the conclusion that the proposed amendments would amount to a new case and were therefore impermissible. |
| [2022] IECA — Plaintiff v. Company A (North Westmeath Turbine Action Group) |
Authority cited in the context of limits on permissible amendments. |
Used alongside other authorities to emphasise the court's reluctance to permit wholesale reworking of the case. |
| [2016] IECA 194 — Plaintiff v. Defendant (Hewitt v. HSE) |
Authority cited (in turn citing Farrell v. Coffey) on amendment and prejudice principles. |
Used to reinforce established principles on amendment and prejudice. |
| [2009] IEHC 537 — Plaintiff v. Defendant (Farrell v. Coffey) |
Authority on when prejudice arises in the context of amendment. |
Cited by higher authorities and relied upon as part of the body of law governing amendments. |
| [2024] IEHC 6 — Plaintiff v. Company A (King v. Company A) |
Analysis of sequencing where a CPO precedes development consent and its potential to form part of a multi-stage consent process that might trigger Habitats/EIA obligations. |
The court distinguished King on its facts: here the Part 8 consent predated the CPO, so King did not dictate the outcome; the CPO was treated as giving effect to an existing consent rather than constituting a stage of consent. |
| [2006] IESC 49; [2007] 1 IR 194 — Plaintiff v. Minister (Dunne) |
Principle that whether a decision constitutes "development consent" is not determined by a simple "but for" test; assessment of alternatives and the content of the consent are critical. |
Applied to conclude the Part 8 decision was the substantive development consent and that the later confirmation of the CPO did not amount to a re-opening of development consent issues for EIA/Habitats assessment purposes. |
| Case C-461/17 — National case (Holohan) |
Principle that availability and assessment of alternatives is important in grant of development consent. |
Referenced to support the court's approach to what constitutes the project for EIA/Habitats assessment and the importance of alternatives at the consent stage. |
| Case C-411/17 — National case (Inter‑Environnement Wallonie) |
Interpretation that "project" under Habitats Directive can be wider than under the EIA Directive; works inextricably linked to measures may require assessment if impacts are identifiable. |
The Applicants relied on this authority but the court held it did not alter the outcome because the Part 8 consent predated the CPO and environmental assessments were matters for the consent stage. |
| Case C-463/20 — National case (Namur‑Est Environnement) |
Public participation under EIA Directive need not apply to preliminary decisions provided effective participation is available early and before consent is granted. |
Used to explain timing of public participation rights and why the CPO stage was not the correct juncture to raise EIA participation complaints where consent had already been granted. |
| Case C-504/14 — Commission v. State (Commission v. Greece) |
Article 6(3) of Habitats Directive relevant when national authorities grant authorisation for a project. |
The court relied on this to support the proposition that Appropriate Assessment obligations attach at authorisation (consent) and not at the CPO stage where consent already existed. |
| [2023] IEHC 579; [2024] IECA 234 — Plaintiff group v. Company A (Carrownagowan Concern Group) |
Conditions for a remedial obligation claim for unlawful breach of EU law. |
The court held the Applicants did not meet the conditions identified in these authorities for advancing a remedial obligation remedy. |
| [2024] IESC 28 — Plaintiff residents v. Company A (Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk) |
Requirement to strictly observe procedural rules (Order 84 r. 20(3)) for pleading failure to transpose EU obligations. |
Applied to require particularity in transposition challenges; the Applicants' transposition claim was held to be generalised and inadequately pleaded. |
| [2020] IEHC 39 — Plaintiff v. Company A (Sweetman — 2020) |
Further authority on pleading requirements for transposition/challenges. |
Used to support the requirement for particularisation of transposition allegations which was not satisfied here. |
| [2020] IEHC 122 — Plaintiff v. Company A (Rushe) |
Pleading and procedural requirements in EU transposition challenges. |
Applied similarly in support of strict pleading rules for transposition claims. |
| [2024] IESC 4 — Plaintiff group v. Company A (Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group) |
Settled that a private developer may object to judicial review even where statutory bodies consent. |
Relied upon to confirm Company B's entitlement to oppose the leave application despite Company A and Company C not opposing leave on certain grounds. |
| [2005] IEHC 84 — Plaintiff v. Company A (Clinton) |
Test to be applied in assessing justification/necessity for compulsory acquisition (referred to in Inspector's Report). |
The Inspector had applied the Clinton test in assessing necessity and public interest; the court accepted the Inspector's analysis as part of the Board's reasoning. |
| [2013] 1 IR 142 — Plaintiff v. Minister (Nawaz) |
Legislative challenge procedure under section 50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 requires substantial grounds. |
The court applied the substantial grounds threshold to legislative/transposition-type challenges where relevant. |