Anonymised Summary of Court of Appeal Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment (delivered by Judge Jackson and Judge Miles) concerns an appeal arising from care proceedings in which the trial judge (Judge Oliver) stayed the proceedings and granted permission to appeal after indicating, in the course of the final hearing, that he would not make a placement (adoption) order for one of the children.

The key facts as recorded in the opinion are:

• Mother has had six children; none are in her care. The two eldest were adopted; proceedings in June 2023 related to the other four children who were taken into foster care.
• By December 2024 two of the children were made subject to special guardianship orders with a family placement in Ireland. The remaining two children at issue were identified in the judgment as Child R (older) and Child A (younger).
• Child R was placed in a residential therapeutic unit in August 2025 (age recorded as 5). Child A was, at the time of the October hearing, about 3½ and had been awaiting a decision for 27 months.
• Original care plan for both Child R and Child A included adoption; by the resumed hearing the local authority (referred to here as Company A) sought a care order for Child R and a placement (adoption) order for Child A. The Children's Guardian continued to represent the children and had originally recommended adoption but later supported Company A's revised position.
• A five-day final hearing was listed and commenced in February 2025. The hearing resumed on 6 October 2025 with an estimated three days remaining and four witnesses to be heard: the social worker, the mother, the family finder, and the Children's Guardian.
• On 6 October the trial judge indicated that he did not favour adoption for Child A. On 7 October the judge stated that he had decided he could not make a placement order for Child A, described further evidence as a "waste of time", and subsequently stayed the proceedings and granted Company A permission to appeal. The judge did so without hearing evidence from the family finder and without the Children's Guardian giving live evidence that was available.
• The staying of proceedings and grant of permission to appeal meant that the remaining day-and-a-half of hearing time was lost and no timetable was set for the filing of an Appellant's Notice.
• Company A issued an Appellant's Notice on 27 October. The Children's Guardian filed a Respondent's Notice seeking permission to appeal on additional grounds and the consolidated appeal was heard on 13 November.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge's conduct—specifically his avowed conclusion during the resumed hearing that he could not make an adoption order for Child A and his statement that further evidence would not change his mind—amounted to predetermination or a serious procedural irregularity such that the proceedings were unjust under CPR 52.21(3).
2. Whether, if such predetermination or serious procedural unfairness was established, the appropriate remedy was to allow the appeals and remit the matter for rehearing before another judge (or to take some other procedural step).

Arguments of the Parties

Company A (Local Authority) — Attorney Bain

• The transcript/electronic recording showed that the judge made a plain and obvious error by going beyond permissible signposting and effectively making a final decision mid-hearing.
• By removing adoption from consideration the judge deprived Child A of a full and holistic analysis of realistic options for her future.
• The family finder and the Children's Guardian would have provided evidence not only on timescales but also on contact and relationship issues relevant to the welfare analysis.

Children's Guardian — Attorney Ferris / Attorney Little

• The transcript demonstrated that the judge's mind had closed and that there was predetermination.
• Additional grounds: the judge failed to consider the impact of further delay on children who had already experienced extreme delay; there was insufficient specific analysis where the court departs from the Guardian's recommendation; and there was no proper welfare checklist survey in the judge's approach.
• The Guardian and her solicitor had not given oral evidence in the resumed hearing; the judge's refusal to hear from the Guardian was procedurally unfair and compounded delay for Child A.

Mother — Attorney Mir / Attorney May (trial counsel)

• The trial judge had given a robust indication rather than predetermination; he had invited the Guardian to give evidence on the Monday and had, in prior hearings, provided useful indications that led to changes in position.
• These matters suggested the judge did not have a closed mind.

Father — Attorney Sultan

• Rehearing before another judge would have real disadvantages.
• The judge's prior handling of the case had not been criticised; his indications in earlier stages had been helpful.
• The remarks on Tuesday were trenchant but did not disrupt the fairness of the hearing; the remedy, if any, was in the hands of Company A and the Guardian who could have chosen to call evidence to change the judge's mind.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded on the statutory framework in CPR 52.21(3): the appeal court will allow an appeal where the lower court's decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. The analysis then focused on whether the trial judge's intervention amounted to such a procedural irregularity—specifically, predetermination—so as to make the proceedings unjust.

The court set out the applicable authorities on predetermination and judicial indication. It explained the distinction between permissible disclosure of provisional thinking (which can assist parties and is part of judgecraft) and impermissible premature finalisation that indicates a closed mind. The court emphasised the fair-minded and informed observer test for assessing apparent bias or unfairness in ongoing proceedings.

Turning to the recorded exchanges from the resumed hearing, the court relied on the electronic recording (transcribed for the court) to assess the judge's words and demeanor. The recording showed the trial judge stating repeatedly that he "could not" make an adoption order for Child A, that it would be a "waste of time" to hear the remaining evidence, and expressing that he "had made the decision" and "could not sleep at night" if he made an adoption order. The judge twice stated that the further evidence would not change his view.

The court considered and rejected the contention that the situation could have been averted by the parties calling their remaining witnesses to attempt to persuade the judge. The court found that, given the judge's expressed certainty, it would have been unrealistic to expect the parties to proceed; the judge had not reassured the parties that his views were provisional or that he remained open to persuasion. The court therefore concluded that a fair trial had become impossible.

The court also analysed the procedural consequences of the judge's actions. By staying the proceedings and granting permission to appeal, the trial judge effectively delayed a decision that the children (particularly Child A) urgently needed. The court recorded concern at the scale of delay already experienced by the children and the potential for additional months of delay if the matter were to return to the same judge or be remade by another judge.

The court emphasised that the appeal was procedural in nature: it did not decide the substantive merits of adoption or any placement decision for the children. Rather, the court limited itself to ensuring that the decision-making process was fair and that the remaining evidence and submissions would be heard afresh by an impartial tribunal.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The court ALLOWED THE APPEALS (the appeals of Company A and the Children's Guardian) and granted permission to appeal to the Children's Guardian. The court remitted the proceedings to the Central Family Court for early determination by another judge, beginning with an urgent case management hearing.

Implications and direct effects:

• The trial judge's mid-hearing statements were held to amount to predetermination and a serious procedural irregularity rendering the proceedings unfair.
• As a remedial consequence, the matter must be reheard (or at least placed before another judge for urgent case management) so that the remaining evidence (including from the Children's Guardian and the family finder) and submissions can be heard and a fair decision reached.
• The court underlined that this decision is procedural: it expressed no view on the substantive merits of placement or care orders for Child A or Child R and did not establish a novel substantive precedent beyond applying established principles on predetermination and procedural fairness.

This summary is strictly limited to the matters and materials contained in the provided opinion and adheres to an anonymisation convention for individuals and entities as used above.