Summary of Opinion — Judge Holgate
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment concerns an appeal by the Appellant against sentence following guilty pleas entered on 1 July 2024 in the Crown Court in The City before Judge Auty. At the time of pleading the Appellant was aged 50. The Appellant changed his pleas to guilty to 22 offences against three victims, referred to in the original opinion as V1, V2 and V3 (hereinafter "Victim 1", "Victim 2" and "Victim 3"). The offences included multiple counts of rape, multiple counts of assault of a child under 13 by penetration (contrary to section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003) and counts of sexual activity with a child family member (contrary to section 2 of the 2003 Act).
On 20 November 2024 before the same court the Appellant was sentenced under section 279 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to three concurrent extended sentences of 33 years on three specified counts (involving the rape of each of the three victims). Those extended sentences comprised custodial terms of 30 years with an extended licence period of three years. Other determinate sentences were imposed to run concurrently, including several special custodial sentences. The Appellant obtained leave to appeal against sentence and this appeal was heard by the court delivering the present opinion.
The offending came to light on 6 February 2023 when Victim 1 reported the abuse to a teacher, who notified the police. The police investigation elicited accounts from Victim 1, Victim 2 and Victim 3 describing prolonged and repeated sexual abuse by the Appellant while the victims were children and adolescents. The Appellant had denied the offences on arrest and in interview. The pre-sentence report recorded minimisation by the Appellant, lack of genuine remorse and a severely distorted attitude to responsibility. The victims provided victim personal statements describing profound and continuing harm.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the judge was correct to treat this case as an exceptional case meriting, at trial, a custodial sentence in excess of 30 years (and specifically the judge's assessment that the sentence after trial would have been 37½ years).
- Whether the credit given for the Appellant's guilty pleas (20%) was appropriate in light of the timing of the pleas and the Definitive Guideline on reduction in sentence for a guilty plea.
- Whether special custodial sentences imposed on certain counts were legally permissible where extended sentences had been imposed (i.e., the effect of section 278(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020).
- Whether the victim surcharge applied to this case.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Attorney Varley)
- The Appellant did not challenge the judge's decisions to treat the Appellant as dangerous, to impose extended sentences, or to impose three-year licence extensions.
- Attorney Varley submitted that, by implication of the judge's reasoning, the sentence the judge considered appropriate after trial would have been 37½ years, reduced by 20% credit for plea to 30 years. He argued that, applying the principles in R v AYO, this case was not one of the exceptional cases justifying a sentence after trial exceeding 30 years or approaching 37½ years.
- He argued that the 20% credit for plea was excessive given the timing of the guilty pleas (entered on the day the trial was listed to begin). He said the Crown had been notified a week beforehand that pleas were likely and formally notified on the Friday before trial; he maintained this mattered because it allowed victims to be told before the weekend.
- He accepted that the appeal should be considered as a whole and did not seek to compartmentalise separate sentencing elements in isolation.
Prosecution's Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Powell [2018] EWCA Crim 1074; [2018] 2 Cr.App.R (S) 34 |
Legal principle that a special custodial sentence may not be imposed in a case where the court imposes an extended sentence (relying on section 278(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020). |
The court held that the special custodial sentences were wrongly imposed as a matter of law and quashed them, substituting determinate sentences for each affected count. |
| R v AYO [2022] EWCA Crim 127; [2024] WLR 95 |
Principles governing when sentences in excess of 30 years should be imposed — emphasising that such sentences should be reserved for exceptional cases and setting out guiding paragraphs for assessing exceptionality. |
The court applied those principles, agreed that exceptional factors were present (multiple victims, very large number of offences, prolonged control and cruelty), but concluded the judge had overestimated the appropriate sentence after trial (37½ years). The court substituted a lower appropriate sentence after trial of 33 years. |
| R v Plaku [2021] EWCA Crim 568; [2021] 4 WLR 82 |
Citation concerning the sentencing guideline on reduction for guilty plea: one-third credit is appropriate if plea is entered at the first hearing at which plea or indication of plea is sought (e.g., the Magistrates' Court). |
The court relied on the guideline principles reflected by Plaku to assess the proper level of credit for the plea entered on the first day of trial, explaining why 20% credit was more than ordinarily appropriate and why a lower credit was required. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court structured its analysis around (i) whether the judge had properly identified factors to treat the case as exceptional for a sentence after trial in excess of 30 years, (ii) the correct application of the sentencing guidelines on reduction for plea, (iii) the manifest excess question in relation to the overall sentence, and (iv) the legal error in imposing special custodial sentences alongside extended sentences.
On exceptionality and the appropriate sentence after trial: the court referred to the principles in R v AYO and emphasised that sentences over 30 years are reserved for exceptional cases. The court agreed that sufficient factors justified treating the case as exceptional: there were three victims, guilty pleas admitted at least 53 rapes and at least 28 offences under section 6 of the 2003 Act, and the pervasive control, manipulation and cruelty that dominated the victims' childhoods. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the judge was wrong to assume a sentence after trial of 37½ years. Having regard to Part 4 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Definitive Guideline, the court determined that the appropriate sentence after trial in the particular circumstances was 33 years.
On credit for plea: the court examined the timing of the guilty pleas and the Definitive Guideline on reduction in sentence for a guilty plea. It noted the guideline provides one-third credit if a plea is entered at the first hearing at which a plea is sought (the Magistrates' Court), a maximum of 25% after that first stage, and ordinarily a maximum of 10% for a plea on the first day of trial. The judge had allowed 20% credit. The court did not accept that the judge deducted any element for remorse — the pre-sentence report showed no real remorse — and found no basis in the judge's remarks to support a deduction for remorse.
Balancing all features and assessing whether the overall sentence was manifestly excessive: the court emphasised that the appeal required looking at the end result as a whole. Considering the appropriate sentence after trial (33 years) and allowing credit for plea, the court concluded that the custodial term which should have been imposed on the three principal counts after allowing credit was 28 years (not 30 years). The court therefore quashed the extended sentences on those counts and substituted extended sentences each with a custodial term of 28 years and an extended licence period of three years, producing an overall combined extended sentence of 31 years when custodial term and licence period are combined in the manner described in the opinion.
On the special custodial sentences: the court identified a legal error. Section 278(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020 precludes the imposition of a special custodial sentence where an extended sentence is imposed. R v Powell was cited in this context. The court quashed the special custodial sentences on the listed counts and substituted determinate sentences of eight or ten years as specified in the judgment. All substituted sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the other sentences.
On the victim surcharge: the court noted the sentencing transcript recorded that the surcharge applied, but in law it did not apply because dates of some offending pre-dated the relevant legislation. The court confirmed there was no victim surcharge applicable.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: To the extent set out in the opinion, the appeal is allowed.
The court's specific orders were:
- Quash the sentences on the principal rape counts (the counts identified in the original judgment) and substitute three concurrent extended sentences on those counts, each with a custodial term of 28 years and an extended licence period of three years, giving an overall extended sentence of 31 years.
- Quash the special custodial sentences on the specified counts and substitute determinate sentences (eight or ten years as specified for each count). All sentences (the substituted determinate sentences and the extended sentences) are to run concurrently with each other and with other undisturbed sentences imposed by the Crown Court.
- Confirm that no victim surcharge is payable because some offending pre-dated the relevant legislation.
Implications: The immediate consequence for the parties is that the Appellant's overall sentence is reduced from the previously imposed custodial component of 30 years (with three-year extension) to a custodial component of 28 years with a three-year extended licence period — an overall extended sentence of 31 years as articulated by the court. The court corrected the legal error in imposing special custodial sentences alongside extended sentences by substituting appropriate determinate sentences which run concurrently. The opinion does not announce or purport to establish a general novel principle of law beyond applying established authorities (including R v AYO, R v Plaku and R v Powell) and the statutory framework; the decision applies those authorities and the sentencing guidelines to the specific facts of this case.