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HFD Glasgow 3 LTD against Student Loans Company LTD (Court of Session)
Smart Summary
Court Opinion — Structured and Anonymized Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
Company A owned commercial premises located in The City. Until December 2023, Company B was the tenant under a full repairing lease. The lease imposed various repairing and maintenance obligations on the tenant. On termination of the lease there arose a dispute between Company A and Company B as to the tenant's liability for breaches of those repairing and maintenance obligations and the appropriate remedies.
The contractual provision at issue was paragraph 12 of Part 4 of the Schedule to the lease. That paragraph required, on expiry or earlier determination of the lease, either the surrender of the premises in a specified state or, where the premises were not in that state, the tenant to pay a sum certified by the landlord's surveyor (or, in dispute, by a building surveyor nominated under Clause 16). Clause 16 provided for referral to a building surveyor in the event of dispute, and Clause 17 disapplied the certification remedy in cases of comprehensive redevelopment. The parties agreed Clause 16 had been disapplied for present purposes.
Company A (the landlord) raised six conclusions, all pleaded as damages for breach of the repairing/maintenance obligations. The first conclusion sought payment of a certified sum of £9,143,010.39, which Company A said was enforceable as implement of paragraph 12. The other conclusions sought various heads of loss said to be caused by the building being unlettable (loss of rent; insurance costs; rates; service charge) and legal fees said to be recoverable under Clause 32.
The matter proceeded to debate before Judge Lake in the Outer House, Court of Session. The central dispute concerned the legal effect of paragraph 12: whether payment of the certified sum was the landlord's sole remedy to the exclusion of other heads of claim arising from prior breaches, or whether paragraph 12 was an additional or alternative remedy only in respect of works to put the premises into the stipulated condition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Does paragraph 12 of Part 4 of the Schedule (the certification/proviso) make payment of the certified sum the landlord's exclusive remedy in respect of breaches of repairing and maintenance obligations that have led to the premises not being in the required condition, or does it operate only as an agreed method of quantifying the tenant's liability for works (i.e. an agreed measure of loss) while leaving other accrued liabilities intact?
- If paragraph 12 is exclusive in some respects, what scope does that exclusivity have (specifically, does it apply only to liabilities relating to the physical condition of the premises and not to liabilities that do not relate to condition, such as indemnity costs under Clause 32)?
- What practical effect should be given to the court's construction (i.e. how should the decision be applied to the pleadings and conclusions in this action)?
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments (Company B)
- Paragraph 12 makes payment of the certified sum the sole remedy for the relevant breaches; it is the exclusive mechanism, capturing and "rolling up" the other obligations so that the landlord's remedy is limited to the certified sum.
- This exclusivity is apparent from the plain meaning of the clause: the clause does not create new obligations but sets out a single remedial mechanism. That approach is commercially sensible because it provides certainty at the end of the lease and avoids piecemeal litigation.
- The time-for-payment proviso does not undermine the exclusivity; if the tenant fails to pay in time, the sum must be quantified in some other way but the remedy remains the same.
Plaintiff's Arguments (Company A)
- Paragraph 12 should be read alongside other obligations in Part 4 and the main lease. It is an additional and separate obligation over and above other clauses and is not drafted in language broad enough to exclude accrued liabilities under those other provisions.
- The final wording of paragraph 12 limits satisfaction to "the work referred to in this proviso", which indicates it is in satisfaction only of obligations to carry out specified repair works and not intended to extinguish other liabilities (for example, indemnities for enforcement costs under Clause 32).
- It would be commercially arbitrary and unintelligent to extinguish or preclude liability for other types of loss (which might be incurred during the term) merely by operation of paragraph 12 at the lease end.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 |
Cited to vouch general propositions on contractual interpretation (choice between competing constructions; commercial common sense). |
Taken into account as part of a group of authorities supporting the parties' agreed approach to interpretation; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 |
Cited to vouch general propositions on contractual interpretation (unitary and objective approach). |
Taken into account; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| @SIPP Pension Trustees v Insight Travel Services Ltd [2015] CSIH 91 |
Cited as a Scottish authority reflecting principles of contractual interpretation. |
Taken into account; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24 |
Cited in support of the stated approach to contractual construction. |
Taken into account; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| Ashtead Plant Hire Co Ltd v Granton Central Developments Ltd [2020] CSIH 2 |
Referred to as a relevant recent authority on contract construction in Scotland. |
Taken into account; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Fern Trustee 1 Ltd [2022] CSIH 32 |
Referred to in support of the interpretative propositions relied on by the parties. |
Taken into account; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| Paterson v Angelline (Scotland) Ltd [2022] CSIH 33 |
Referred to as part of the body of case law on contract interpretation. |
Taken into account; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| Lagan Construction Group Ltd v Scot Roads Partnership Project Ltd [2023] CSIH 28 |
Referred to among authorities on contractual interpretation. |
Taken into account; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| FES Limited v HFD Construction Group Ltd [2024] CSIH 37 |
Referred to as a recent example of interpretation issues at first instance. |
Taken into account; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| Glenfiddich Wind Ltd v Dorenell Windfarm Ltd [2025] CSOH 62 |
Referred to as a 2025 Outer House decision relevant to contractual construction. |
Taken into account; not reviewed in detail in the opinion. |
| PIK Facilities Ltd v Shell UK Ltd 2005 SCLR 958 |
Cited for the proposition that specific implement may not be available once a lease has ended. |
Noted by the court in discussing available forms of relief at the end of a lease (specific implement impractical once lease has terminated). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court approached the matter as one of contractual construction, applying the parties' agreed propositions: a unitary and objective process looking at the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in their documentary, factual and commercial context, reading the contract as a whole and giving effect to clear language (paras 6-7).
Step-by-step reasoning as presented in the opinion:
- The court examined the ordinary meaning of paragraph 12 and observed that the phrase describing the certified sum as "the only remedy" is readily understood to mean the sole means by which the landlord may obtain payment or relief (para 10).
- The court then identified the scope of that exclusivity by reference to the closing words of the paragraph, which confine it to the tenant's liability "quoad the work referred to in this proviso"—that is, the cost of "such work as is required to put the Premises in such state and condition as shall in all respects be consistent with a diligent performance by the Tenant of the obligations contained in this Lease" (paras 10 and 49-50).
- Reading paragraph 12 as a whole, the court concluded that payment of the certified sum operates in lieu of carrying out the physical works necessary to put the premises into the stipulated condition; it therefore excludes liability only insofar as that liability relates to prior breaches which have contributed to the physical condition of the premises (para 10).
- The court rejected the landlord's submission that paragraph 12 was intended to extinguish or preclude all accrued liabilities under other lease provisions. Instead, paragraph 12 was characterised as an agreed mechanism for quantifying and ascertaining the tenant's liability for works — a measure of loss — rather than an exclusionary clause that wipes out other liabilities (para 12).
- The court analysed Clause 17 (the redevelopment carve-out) and concluded that Clause 17's existence supported the narrower construction. If paragraph 12 were to be read as leaving other remedies open while denying the certification in redevelopment cases, Clause 17 would be pointless; the court therefore preferred an interpretation under which paragraph 12 operates as the single aggregate remedy in respect of the condition of the premises, with Clause 17 excluding that certification mechanism where redevelopment is to occur (paras 13 and 57).
- The court emphasised the importance of the words "in respect of the condition of the premises" (paras 58–60). Obligations and liabilities that do not relate to the physical condition (for example, indemnities under Clause 32 for enforcement costs) are not caught by the "only remedy" language and therefore remain enforceable.
- On the practical effect of the analysis, the court noted that the pleadings and conclusions raised questions as to how the decision should be applied to the parties' claims. The first conclusion, pleaded as damages, was irrelevant as damages but could be relevant if presented as implement of paragraph 12 (paras 15–16).
- Finally, the court expressed a procedural preference to put the question of practical application "out By Order" to consider the appropriate process for implementing the construction in the context of the pleadings, but indicated that if either party preferred an immediate application to the pleadings, they could apply to the court by motion (para 16).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that paragraph 12 of Part 4 of the Schedule must be read as making payment of the certified sum the sole remedy only in respect of the tenant's liability to carry out the works described in that proviso — i.e. the cost of putting the premises into the state required by the lease. It does not operate to extinguish or exclude other accrued liabilities under the lease which do not relate to the condition of the premises (for example, indemnity costs under Clause 32).
Implications and consequences (as stated in the opinion):
- The certification mechanism in paragraph 12 is an agreed method of quantifying the tenant's liability for repair works at lease end and provides an aggregate remedy in respect of obligations borne by the tenant that relate to the physical condition of the premises.
- Liabilities that do not bear upon the physical condition of the premises are not caught by the "only remedy" wording and therefore remain capable of being pursued by the landlord.
- Where a claim is framed as damages rather than as implement of paragraph 12, the first conclusion seeking the certified sum may be irrelevant as pleaded; its relevance depends on whether it is pursued as implement of the contractual remedy under paragraph 12.
- The court declined, at this stage, to make a final procedural application of the construction to the pleadings and indicated an intention to put the matter out By Order to determine the appropriate practical effect. Alternatively, the parties may seek immediate application by motion.
- The opinion does not purport to create a new general precedent outside the application of well-established principles of contractual interpretation; it applies those principles to the specific wording and factual matrix of the lease before the court.
This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and has been anonymized in accordance with the instructions supplied. No additional facts or inferences beyond those in the opinion have been introduced.
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