Summarised and Anonymised Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant pleaded guilty on 15 May 2024 in the Crown Court at The City to 14 counts of sexual activity with a child. The offending occurred between 23 February 2021 and 10 February 2023 at the complainant's home address where the Appellant had lived since the complainant was a child. The complainant was aged between 17 and 19 at the time of the offending. The complainant reported repeated incidents of sexual touching, digital penetration and intercourse occurring a couple of times a week, typically when the complainant was alone or the complainant's mother was out. The Appellant was the principal financial supporter of the household and the complainant reported being afraid to resist.

At sentence on 22 November 2024, Judge Weekes imposed an extended determinate sentence of 12 years: a custodial term of 7½ years and an extended licence period of 4½ years. The Appellant sought leave to appeal the sentence on two grounds: (1) the custodial term was manifestly excessive due to alleged sentencing errors including insufficient allowance for mitigation; and (2) the judge erred in finding that the Appellant met the criteria for an extended sentence. A single judge refused leave on ground (1) but granted leave on ground (2). The Appellant renewed the application for leave to appeal on ground (1) before the court in this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the custodial term of 7½ years imposed by the sentencing judge was manifestly excessive, given the judge's assessment of mitigation and application of the sentencing guidelines.
2. Whether the judge was correct to find that the Appellant met the statutory test for being "dangerous" and therefore whether an extended determinate sentence was properly imposed under s.280 Sentencing Act 2020 (as considered alongside the guidance in Precedent A).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant contended that the custodial term was manifestly excessive because the sentencing judge erred in principle, including by failing to make adequate allowance for mitigation and taking too high a notional sentence prior to plea discount.
• The Appellant also argued (the ground on which leave was originally granted) that the sentencing judge was wrong to find the Appellant met the criteria for an extended sentence because the evidence did not support a finding of dangerousness; in particular, the Appellant had no previous convictions, there was no pattern of offending beyond the present single victim, and there was limited or no evidence of sexual attraction to teenage girls beyond the index offending.
• In submissions to this court, Attorney Barker emphasised the absence of prior convictions, the lack of corroborating evidence (such as material on devices or problematic associates), and pointed to positive features of the Appellant's conduct after arrest and his otherwise unblemished history as factors militating against a finding of dangerousness.

Prosecution's / Court Records

• The sentencing material included a Crown sentencing note, a victim personal statement and a pre-sentence report. The Crown's sentencing note did not address dangerousness or the extended sentence. The prosecution did not invite the judge to consider a Sexual Harm Prevention Order and did not specifically pursue dangerousness at sentence, despite the judge asking whether such an order was sought. The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any distinct appellate submissions advanced on behalf of the Crown in response to the Appellant's renewed application to appeal the custodial term.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two parts corresponding to the two grounds of appeal.

First, on the renewed application challenging the custodial term as manifestly excessive, the court considered the single judge's reasoning (which had refused leave on that ground). The sentencing judge had:

• Identified the lead offence (final count) and assessed it within the sentencing guidelines as Category 1A with a starting point of six years and a range of four to ten years.
• Taken account of the multiplicity and prolonged nature of the offending to increase the notional sentence beyond guideline range, arriving at a notional sentence of 11 years before mitigation/aggravation.
• Allowed a one-year reduction for mitigation (including some weight for plea and limited credit for good character) and applied 25% reduction for guilty plea, yielding a custodial term of 7½ years.

The appellate court agreed with the single judge's assessment: the sentencing judge appropriately assessed totality, applied the guideline categorisation, considered mitigation, and explained reductions. The Appellant's renewed claim was essentially that the sentencing judge should have given more weight to mitigation, which the court held did not amount to a real prospect of success on appeal. Accordingly, the application to challenge the custodial term was refused: 7½ years was not manifestly excessive on the material available.

Second, on the ground for which leave had been granted (whether the Appellant was "dangerous" and whether an extended sentence was justified), the court scrutinised the sentencing judge's dangerousness determination.

Key elements of the court's analysis on dangerousness:

• The court recalled the Precedent A guidance (set out in the opinion) for assessing risk of further offending, emphasising a structured consideration of the nature of the offence, offender's history, patterns, social/economic factors and the offender's attitude and insight.
• The Appellant had no previous convictions and the offending involved a single identified victim; beyond the index offending there was no pattern of similar offending, and there was no independent evidence (for example from devices or associates) of a sexual attraction to teenage girls.
• While the Appellant's attitude (denial of sexual attraction to children, some victim-blaming and limited insight) was a concern, the court held that this alone did not demonstrate a significant risk of serious harm by further specified offences.
• The sentencing judge had relied substantially on the pre-sentence report author's view that the Appellant was at high risk of serious harm. The appellate court found that the report's conclusions on dangerousness were not adequately reasoned: the report assessed re-offending risk as low via structured tools but then offered the author's unreasoned opinion that risk was greater, primarily relying on denial and victim-blaming without identifying other supporting evidence.
• The appellate court found it problematic that the sentencing judge stated he "could not see" anything in Precedent A that would prevent his determination; the court observed this could amount to reversing the burden of proof. The statutory test requires the court itself to be satisfied, on the evidence, that the Appellant presents a significant risk of serious harm justifying an extended sentence.
• The court noted the prosecution had not sought a Sexual Harm Prevention Order and the sentencing judge did not expressly consider whether such an order or other controls might adequately manage the risk instead of an extended sentence.

Having considered the totality of the evidence, the appellate court concluded that the material before the sentencing judge was insufficient to support a finding that the Appellant presented a significant risk of serious harm by committing further sexual offences against children, and that the conditions for imposing an extended sentence were not met. Therefore the dangerousness assessment was flawed and the extended sentence could not stand.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed in part. The court quashed the extended determinate sentence and substituted a determinate sentence of 7½ years' imprisonment.

Implications:

• The immediate effect is that the extended element of the sentence (the extended period of licence of 4½ years) is removed; the Appellant serves a determinate custodial sentence of 7½ years. The opinion does not impose any alternate extended licence period.
• The court's decision turned on the insufficiency of evidence to satisfy the statutory dangerousness test and on deficiencies in the reasoning in the pre-sentence report as adopted by the sentencing judge. The opinion emphasises the need for sentencing judges to be satisfied, on cogent evidence, that the statutory threshold for an extended sentence is met and to consider whether other protective measures (for example a Sexual Harm Prevention Order) could adequately manage risk.
• The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent; it applies existing guidance (Precedent A) and clarifies proper evidential and analytical foundations required when imposing extended sentences for dangerousness under the statutory scheme.

Note: All individuals and location names in this summary have been anonymised in accordance with the instruction to remove personally identifiable information. References such as "Author of the pre-sentence report", "Attorney Barker", "Judge Weekes", "The City", "The Crown" and "Appellant"/"Complainant" correspond to the anonymised parties and actors described in the provided opinion.