P.K. v V.O.S. & Anor (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant sought judicial review to quash the decision refusing his application for a small public service vehicle licence. The High Court, in a prior judgment delivered on 28 April 2025, granted an order of certiorari quashing the refusal decision dated 7 November 2023. The present ruling concerns the issue of costs, as the parties did not reach an agreement on this point.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Applicant is entitled to recover costs following a successful application for judicial review, despite not succeeding on all grounds advanced.
2. The extent to which the Applicant’s conduct before and during proceedings affects entitlement to costs.
3. The appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion under the Legal Service Regulation Act 2015, particularly sections 168 and 169, in awarding costs where a party is only partially successful.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Applicant contended entitlement to costs based on success in obtaining an order of certiorari.
• It was argued that full success on all grounds is not necessary to claim costs, especially in less complex proceedings.
• On conduct, the Applicant relied on case law to assert that only egregious, deliberate misconduct disentitles a successful party to costs, which was not present in this case.

Respondents' Arguments

• The Respondents disputed the Applicant’s entitlement to costs, advocating for no order as to costs due to partial success.
• They emphasized that the Applicant failed on the fundamental premise of his case, thus he was not entirely successful.
• Reliance was placed on section 168(2)(d) of the 2015 Act, allowing costs orders in favour of partially successful parties and possible set-offs.
• The Respondents also argued that the Applicant’s conduct before the Licensing Authority—criticized in the judgment—justified a departure from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that although the Applicant secured relief by obtaining an order of certiorari, he was not entirely successful because he failed on the fundamental premise of his case. This partial success allowed the court to exercise its discretion under the Legal Service Regulation Act 2015 to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The court considered the extent of the Applicant’s success on several grounds, including adequacy of pleadings, procedural fairness, and the inadequacy of the appeal remedy, which weighed in favor of awarding costs.

However, the Applicant’s conduct before the proceedings, particularly a lack of proper engagement with the Licensing Authority and pre-litigation correspondence, attracted judicial criticism and was a significant factor in reducing the costs award. The court emphasized that appropriate engagement could have avoided unnecessary litigation and that the Applicant’s failure contributed to the flawed decision-making process.

The court carefully distinguished the conduct in this case from the egregious misconduct required to deny costs entirely, as established in precedent. It also clarified that the Applicant’s erroneous legal views did not constitute improper conduct sufficient to deny costs.

Balancing these factors, the court concluded that a partial reduction in costs was appropriate to reflect the Applicant’s conduct and partial success.

Holding and Implications

The court ORDERED that the Applicant recover 50% of his costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs, to be adjudicated in default of agreement.

In addition to the prior order of certiorari, the court also ordered that the application be remitted for fresh consideration before a different decision-maker.

This decision reflects a nuanced exercise of judicial discretion in costs, acknowledging both the Applicant’s partial success and conduct deficiencies. It does not establish new legal precedent but underscores the importance of proper engagement with regulatory processes and the court’s willingness to proportionately adjust costs accordingly.