Factual and Procedural Background
The Applicant ("Plaintiff") is a long-time advocate for cycling in the city of The City and is a leading figure behind a local cycling campaign. The Plaintiff seeks certiorari to quash a decision made by the Board on 27 September 2024, published on 16 October 2024, approving under s.51 of the Roads Act 1993, The City Council's proposed road development scheme ("the Scheme"). The Plaintiff contends that the Scheme is legally deficient regarding its provision for cycling.
The substantive question is whether the Plaintiff should have leave to seek judicial review and certiorari quashing the Galway Transport Strategy 2016 ("the GTS"), a non-statutory strategic transport management programme adopted in 2016 by the Notice Parties and The County Council. The Plaintiff has long considered the GTS flawed in its approach to cycling infrastructure and its consistency with other policies.
The proceedings commenced on 20 November 2024 by application for leave to seek judicial review. Initially, the Statement of Grounds mentioned the GTS only briefly and sought no relief against it. On 9 December 2024, the Court permitted an amended Statement of Grounds, which included more detailed criticism of the GTS but did not seek to quash it or join relevant parties as respondents.
On 15 December 2024, the Plaintiff proposed a further amended Statement of Grounds, for the first time seeking certiorari of the GTS, filed on 27 January 2025 by consent and order. Leave to seek judicial review was unopposed except for the challenge to the GTS, which the Notice Parties contested. The Court was tasked with ruling on the contested application to challenge the GTS.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the challenge to the Galway Transport Strategy 2016 (GTS) is out of time.
- If the challenge is out of time, whether an extension of time should be granted.
- Whether the challenge to the GTS constitutes an impermissible collateral challenge to the County Development Plan 2022-2028 and the City Development Plan 2023-2029.
- Whether the grounds of challenge disclose an arguable or substantial basis for leave to be granted.
- Whether the grounds of challenge are adequately particularised.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff contends that the GTS is ultra vires and unlawful due to supervening illegality, specifically that it conflicts with the European TEN-T regulations (2013 and 2024 versions) applicable to The State as a member of the EU.
- The Plaintiff asserts that the GTS conflicts with the 2023 European Declaration on Cycling, though this point was not pursued seriously.
- The Plaintiff argues that the Scheme and the GTS fail adequately to provide for cycling infrastructure and multimodal transport connectivity, particularly as The City is designated an urban node under the TEN-T regulations.
- The Plaintiff acknowledges the GTS is a non-statutory but justiciable document and seeks to quash it as a preliminary step to challenging the impugned Roads Act approval.
- The Plaintiff admits delay in seeking judicial review of the GTS but explains this as due to the complexity of the Scheme, the need to reflect relevant facts and climate action plans accurately, and the timing of the 2024 TEN-T regulations on which the challenge is based.
Respondents' and Notice Parties' Arguments
- The Notice Parties and The City Council argue the challenge to the GTS is out of time, as the GTS was adopted in 2016 and the relevant time limits for judicial review have passed.
- They contend that the GTS is a non-statutory strategic plan incorporated into various development plans and Regional Spatial and Economic Strategies (RSES), and that numerous projects have been implemented or funded on its basis, including expenditure of approximately €44 million.
- The parties argue that allowing the challenge now would cause significant disruption, delay, and financial cost to ongoing and planned projects.
- They submit that the TEN-T regulations do not render the GTS unlawful, as the GTS is not a sustainable urban mobility plan (SUMP), which the TEN-T regulations require member states to adopt by 31 December 2027, and the Scheme is not itself a project of common interest under the regulations.
- The Respondents and Notice Parties do not oppose leave generally but contest the challenge to the GTS.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| North Westmeath Turbine Action Group v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 126 |
Distinction between amendments raising a substantially new case and those arising naturally from existing grounds; time limits for judicial review apply to substantially new cases. |
The Court applied this principle to determine that the challenge to the GTS constituted a substantially new case requiring compliance with applicable time limits. |
| O'Lone v An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 136 |
Clarification of the approach to amendments constituting substantially new cases and the necessity of time limits. |
The Court relied on this to interpret the nature of the amendment and the applicability of time limits to the challenge against the GTS. |
| Coastal Concern Alliance v Minister for Housing [2024] IEHC 524 |
Emphasized the rationale for strict time limits in judicial review and the consequences of significant enlargement of legal challenges by amendments. |
The Court analogized this reasoning to the present case, supporting the conclusion that the amendment seeking to quash the GTS was out of time. |
| North East Pylon Pressure Campaign Ltd v An Bord Pleanála [2016] IEHC 300 |
Where a measure of general application is challenged, time limits for judicial review run from the crystallization of the measure in a particular final decision. |
The Court assumed the principle applied and held that the 8-week time limit from the impugned Roads Act approval applied to the challenge to the GTS. |
| Save The South Leinster Way v An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 577 |
Time limits for judicial review are strict; even a day late is too late. |
The Court cited this authority to emphasize the strictness of the time limit and that the Plaintiff's challenge was out of time. |
| Carrownagowan Concern Group and Ors v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IECA 234 |
Time limits for judicial review comply with EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness. |
The Court referenced this to confirm that the statutory time limits do not contravene EU law principles. |
| Kenny v Trinity College Dublin [2009] IEHC 35 |
Onus on applicant to provide good and sufficient reason for extension of time in judicial review applications. |
The Court applied this principle in assessing the Plaintiff's failure to apply in time and the absence of good reason for extension. |
| Donnelly v Financial Services & Pensions Ombudsman [2023] IEHC 228 |
Requirement for explanation and justification for delay in judicial review applications. |
The Court applied this to the Plaintiff's explanation for delay, finding it legally unsatisfactory. |
| Marshall (Dunne) & Hamwood v Kildare County Council [2023] IEHC 73 |
Factors to consider in holistic assessment of extension of time and interests of justice. |
The Court used this to evaluate the interests of justice and the merits of the Plaintiff's case in the context of extension of time. |
| Grace & Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála, ESB Wind Development & Coillte [2020] 3 IR 286 |
Participation in consultation processes confers standing in judicial review. |
The Court recognized the Plaintiff's standing based on prior participation in consultations related to the GTS. |
| De Roiste v Minister for Defence [2001] IESC 4 |
Explicable delays in judicial review are usually months, rarely years. |
The Court cited this to underscore the excessive delay by the Plaintiff in seeking to quash the GTS. |
| Jones v South Dublin County Council [2024] IEHC 301 |
Standing and time limits in judicial review of development plans. |
The Court noted the Plaintiff had standing and opportunity to challenge the City Development Plan within time but did not do so. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analysed whether the amendment seeking to quash the GTS constituted a substantially new case requiring compliance with statutory time limits. It concluded that the GTS, adopted in 2016 by parties other than the Board, was a separate administrative act distinct from the Roads Act approval of the Scheme in 2024. Accordingly, the time limit for judicial review of the GTS applied independently.
The Court considered two possible time limits: the three-month limit under Order 84 Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, and the eight-week limit under s.50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (PDA 2000). Applying the principle from North East Pylon, the Court held that the eight-week limit from the date of the impugned Roads Act decision applied to the challenge to the GTS.
The Plaintiff's delay in seeking to quash the GTS was found to be beyond the eight-week limit, which expired on 11 December 2024. The Court rejected the Plaintiff's explanation for delay as insufficient and noted that no formal application for extension of time had been made. The Court further held it had no jurisdiction to extend time under s.50(8) PDA 2000 as the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate good and sufficient reason or circumstances outside his control.
In assessing the interests of justice, the Court considered the extensive incorporation of the GTS into multiple development plans and regional strategies, the substantial public expenditure on related projects, and the potential disruption and economic cost caused by allowing a late challenge. The Court found that extending time would prejudice public authorities and the public by casting doubt on a long-standing transport strategy.
On the merits, the Court found the Plaintiff's case based on the 2024 TEN-T Regulations to be weak. The GTS is not a sustainable urban mobility plan (SUMP), which the TEN-T regulations require to be adopted by 2027, and the Scheme is not a project of common interest under the regulations. The Plaintiff’s argument that Galway’s status as an urban node imposes immediate obligations was rejected because the relevant obligations have not yet come into force.
The Court therefore concluded that there was no good and sufficient reason to extend time and that the interests of justice did not require such extension.
Holding and Implications
The Court REFUSED the Plaintiff leave to seek judicial review of the Galway Transport Strategy 2016 on the grounds that the application was out of time and no extension of time was justified.
The direct effect is that the Plaintiff cannot proceed with a judicial review challenge to the GTS in these proceedings. The decision preserves the current legal status of the GTS and supports the continued implementation of transport projects based upon it. No new precedent was established, and the ruling leaves open the possibility that the GTS may still play a role in the broader litigation concerning the impugned Roads Act approval.
The Court provisionally reserved all costs related to the leave application for determination at trial, reflecting the complexity and ongoing nature of the proceedings.