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Scottow v. Crown Prosecution Service

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the conviction of the Appellant, aged 39, following a trial in the Magistrates' Court at The City, where she was found guilty of one offence of improper use of a public communications network contrary to section 127(2)(c) of the Communications Act 2003. The conviction stemmed from complaints by the Appellee about social media messages posted by the Appellant. The Appellee is a public figure and activist, and the Appellant holds opposing views.

The prosecution relied on 17 messages posted on social media platforms Twitter and Mumsnet, spanning two periods: seven messages in 2018 and ten in 2019. The 2018 messages involved various tweets and a Mumsnet post, some breaching a settlement agreement and an interim injunction obtained by the Appellee. The 2019 messages were posted from a different Twitter account and related to public discourse about the injunction and the Appellee's public statements.

The Appellant was arrested and interviewed in December 2018 and again re-interviewed concerning the 2019 messages. The charge was initially laid under section 127(2)(a) but later amended to section 127(2)(c). The trial took place over two days in February 2020, during which the defence applied for dismissal or stay of proceedings on grounds including abuse of process, duplicity of charge, time-bar, and legal insufficiency of the charge. The District Judge dismissed these applications and convicted the Appellant.

The Appellant now appeals by way of case stated, raising five questions concerning procedural and substantive legal issues, including abuse of process, duplicity, time limits, proper interpretation of the offence in light of human rights, and sufficiency of evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the case should have been stayed as an abuse of process on grounds argued in the defence skeleton argument.
  2. Whether the case should have been stayed as an abuse of process in accordance with the precedent in DPP v Ara.
  3. Whether the charge was duplicitous and whether the prosecution should have been split, with any pre-dated charges stayed as out of time or abuse.
    1. Whether the District Judge correctly interpreted and applied the law in light of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).
    2. Whether the case should have been stopped on a submission of no case to answer.
  4. Whether it was proper in law to convict on the facts as alleged, including whether there was evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The prosecution constituted an abuse of process and the charge was duplicitous and partly time-barred.
  • The messages within time could not be described as "persistent" under the statute.
  • The proper interpretation of section 127(2)(c) did not disclose a case to answer on the facts alleged.
  • The conviction infringed the Appellant's right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR and section 3 HRA.

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The messages constituted a persistent use of a public electronic network for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety to the Appellee.
  • The offence under section 127(2)(c) was a "harassment-lite" offence with a lower threshold than harassment under other statutes.
  • The purpose of the communications was proven by the context and content of the messages, and it was unnecessary to prove actual effect on the recipient.
  • The case was not an abuse of process, and the charge was properly framed as a single continuing course of conduct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin) Definition and characteristics of Twitter as a public electronic communications network. Accepted that Twitter is a public electronic communications network for purposes of section 127 offences.
Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB) Explanation of how Twitter operates in the context of legal proceedings. Used to understand the nature of social media communications.
DPP v Ara [2002] 1 WLR 815 Principles on abuse of process in criminal proceedings. Considered but ultimately not necessary to decide due to other findings.
Hayden v Dickenson [2020] EWHC 3291 (QB) Summary of harassment law, including the necessity of conduct being oppressive and unacceptable, and the balancing of Article 8 and Article 10 rights. Guided the Court’s analysis of harassment and freedom of expression issues.
Hipgrave v Jones [2004] EWHC 2901 (QB) Requirement of a linked course of conduct for harassment. Applied to reject the single course of conduct theory in this case.
R v Hills (Gavin Spencer) [2001] 1 FLR 580 Two isolated incidents separated by time cannot constitute harassment. Supported the conclusion that 2018 and 2019 messages were separate courses of conduct.
Sube v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 1125 (QB) Distinction between separate sets of publications for harassment claims. Used to reinforce the need for linkage in a course of conduct.
Poruba v Russia, 8237/03 [2009] ECHR 1477 Public figures are subject to greater scrutiny and must tolerate more robust criticism. Influenced the assessment of the Appellee's status and tolerance threshold.
Trimingham v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 1296 (QB) Domestic authority on public figure status and tolerance to criticism. Supported the principle that public figures must tolerate more robust comment.
ZXC v Bloomberg LP [2020] EWCA Civ 611 In privacy claims, the importance of contribution to a debate of general interest in balancing Article 8 and Article 10 rights. Clarified that the "debate" criterion does not apply to this case.
Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins [2006] UKHL 40 Legislative history and object of section 127 offences. Used to interpret the scope and purpose of section 127(2)(c).
Connolly v Director of Public Prosecutions [2007] EWHC 237 (Admin) Interpretation of malicious communications offences in light of Article 10 ECHR; necessity of justification for interference with free expression. Guided the Court’s human rights analysis and requirement for proportionality.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court identified two main categories of issues: procedural errors and substantive legal questions relating to the interpretation and application of section 127(2)(c) of the Communications Act 2003.

Procedurally, the Court found the prosecution had failed to establish a linked single course of conduct encompassing both the 2018 and 2019 messages. The messages were separated by several months and differed in subject matter, thus constituting at least two separate courses of conduct. The District Judge’s acceptance of a single continuing course was unsupported by adequate reasoning and contrary to established principles requiring linkage in harassment-related offences.

Substantively, the Court scrutinised the statutory offence under section 127(2)(c), which criminalises persistent use of a public electronic communications network for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety. The Court emphasised that the offence targets the misuse of public networks through persistent conduct with the sole or predominant purpose of causing such effects, rather than the content of the communications per se.

The Court contrasted this with other offences under the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which have different thresholds and focus on content or harassment respectively. It held that the prosecution and District Judge had wrongly treated section 127(2)(c) as a "harassment-lite" offence, thereby lowering the threshold improperly.

Freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR and section 3 of the HRA was central to the Court’s analysis. The Court found that the prosecution and trial judge failed to properly apply the necessary proportionality and justification test required when restricting free speech. The District Judge’s approach was unstructured and failed to recognise that freedom of expression includes the right to offend and abuse within limits.

Specifically, the Court found the District Judge erred in:

  • Failing to determine whether causing annoyance was the sole or predominant purpose of the messages.
  • Ignoring the relevance of the Appellant’s blocking and tagging behaviour to the question of purpose.
  • Considering the Appellee’s subjective reaction as relevant to purpose, which it is not.
  • Failing to specify which prohibited purpose was found proven.
  • Considering the messages collectively rather than individually regarding purpose.

Regarding the 2019 messages in isolation, the Court found they did not constitute persistent use of the network; they were part of a public discourse on matters of legitimate public interest, involving a public figure and public authority. The messages were not offensive or objectionable until the Appellee identified the sender, at which point the concern was about breach of an injunction, not criminal conduct.

The Court concluded that the prosecution of the 2019 messages could not be justified as necessary in a democratic society, as the interference with freedom of expression was disproportionate and unjustified.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed and the conviction quashed. Consequently, all orders made on conviction are also quashed.

The Court held that the conviction was vitiated by errors of law, including misinterpretation of the offence, failure to properly assess the linked nature of conduct, and inadequate consideration of freedom of expression rights. The prosecution was flawed both procedurally and substantively.

As a direct consequence, the stay on the related civil proceedings will end, and the interim injunction against the Appellant requires review due to its unprecedented breadth and content.

No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the correct application of section 127(2)(c) in the context of social media communications and the necessary balancing with Article 10 rights.

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Scottow v Crown Prosecution Service

Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.

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Scottow v Crown Prosecution Service
(Dec 16, 2020)