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Mohamed & Anor, R (on the application of) v. London Borough of Waltham Forest
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment arises from claims for judicial review concerning the mental elements of the offence of controlling or managing a house in multiple occupation ("HMO") requiring a licence but lacking one, contrary to section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 ("the 2004 Act"). The Appellants, a married couple and directors of property companies in the London Borough of Waltham Forest, faced summonses issued by the local housing authority ("the council") alleging such offences in relation to several properties they owned and managed.
Summonses were initially issued by Thames Magistrates' Court and later transferred to Wimbledon Magistrates' Court. The Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government intervened to make submissions on the relevant statutory provision. The council conducted an audit inspection revealing that one property was let as an HMO without the mandatory licence. Correspondence ensued between the parties, with the Appellants' legal representatives challenging the council's prosecution approach and asserting the Appellants’ lack of knowledge regarding the HMO status.
The council invited the Appellants to a formal interview under caution, which was challenged by the Appellants via a pre-action protocol letter threatening judicial review on grounds including the mental element of the offence. Judicial review proceedings were initiated challenging the invitation to interview and seeking clarification on the mens rea required under section 72(1). Earlier judicial review claims challenging the summonses were refused on grounds of time limits and jurisdiction.
A preliminary hearing before a District Judge considered whether the summonses were lawfully issued and in time. The judge held the summonses were lawfully issued and that the offence was continuing, thus not time-barred. The Appellants sought judicial review of this decision, and permission was granted on two grounds: the lawfulness of the summons issuance and timeliness.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether sufficient information was provided by the council to Thames Magistrates' Court to justify the issue of the summonses against the Appellants, and if not, whether the summonses should be quashed;
- The mental elements ("mens rea") required to prove the offence of managing or controlling an unlicensed HMO contrary to section 72(1) of the 2004 Act;
- Whether the informations (charges) against the Appellants were laid within the statutory time limits (in time).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The council assumed criminal liability without proper investigation, contrary to tenancy agreements;
- The offence under section 72(1) requires proof of "guilty managing," meaning knowledge that the property was an HMO requiring a licence;
- The council failed to disclose evidence supporting the summonses;
- The Appellants were experienced landlords who deliberately avoided letting properties as HMOs and were not obliged to monitor tenants’ occupation continuously;
- The council should enforce lease covenants rather than prosecute;
- The summonses were not lawfully issued and were out of time.
Council's Arguments
- Sufficient information was provided to justify the issue of summonses;
- The offence under section 72(1) does not require proof that the defendant knew the property was an HMO requiring a licence;
- The offence is a continuing offence, so the informations were laid in time;
- The prosecution's approach aligns with the statutory framework and objectives of the 2004 Act.
Secretary of State's Arguments
- Made submissions concerning the interpretation of section 72(1) of the 2004 Act, particularly regarding the mental element required for the offence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v West London Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Klahn [1979] 1 WLR 933 | Magistrate's judicial discretion in issuing summonses | Confirmed the magistrate must exercise judicial discretion when deciding to issue a summons. |
| R(DPP) v Sunderland Magistrates' Court [2014] EWHC 613 (Admin) | Necessity of reviewing information supplied to magistrates for issuing summons | Emphasised magistrates must ensure all offence elements are established before issuing summons. |
| R(Kay) v Leeds Magistrates' Court [2018] EWHC 1233 (Admin); [2018] 4 WLR 91 | Duty of candour on prosecutors and sufficiency of information for summons | Reiterated magistrates' duties to confirm offence elements, jurisdiction, and authority before issuing summons. |
| Johnson v Westminster Magistrates' Court [2019] EWHC 1709 (Admin); [2019] 1 WLR 6238 | Requirement for magistrate to consider offence elements and timeliness | Supported quashing summonses if insufficient information to establish offence elements; reinforced Kay principles. |
| Nash v Birmingham Crown Court [2005] EWHC 338 (Admin); (2005) 169 JP 157 | Effect of insufficient particulars in information on validity of proceedings | Held insufficient particulars do not nullify proceedings if sufficient information is later provided to ensure fairness. |
| R v Warner [1969] 2 AC 256 | General principles on mens rea requirement in criminal offences | Referenced regarding presumption of mens rea in statutory offences. |
| Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 | Presumption of mens rea and statutory interpretation | Guided the court's approach to interpreting mental elements in statutory offences. |
| Gammon v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1 | Presumption of mens rea and when strict liability applies | Supported the presumption of mens rea unless clearly displaced by statute. |
| R v Muhamad [2002] EWCA Crim 1856; [2003] QB 1031 | Mens rea and strict liability offences | Considered in relation to the statutory offence's mental element. |
| Thanet District Council v Grant [2015] EWHC 4290 (Admin) | Relevance of reasonable excuse defence and mens rea interpretation | Supported that absence of knowledge may be relevant to defence but not an element of the offence. |
| IR Management Services v Salford CC [2020] UKUT 81 | Interpretation of offences under the 2004 Act | Consistent with the court’s conclusion on the mental element of the offence. |
| Tesco Stores v London Borough of Harrow [2003] EWHC 2919 (Admin); (2003) 167 JP 657 | Purpose of time limits for prosecution | Referenced regarding the rationale behind statutory limitation periods. |
| Luton Borough Council v Altavon [2019] EWHC 2415 (Admin); [2020] HLR 4 | Continuing offence concept under section 72(1) | Confirmed the offence is continuing, so each day without licence constitutes a new offence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first assessed whether the council provided sufficient information to Thames Magistrates' Court to justify issuing summonses. Applying statutory provisions from the Magistrates' Court Act 1980, Magistrates' Court Rules 1981, and Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, the Court found the schedule of offences adequately described the charged offence in ordinary language, identified the relevant legislation, and gave reasonable particulars of the charge. The Court noted that although the Appellants complained about lack of evidence disclosure, subsequent proceedings provided sufficient information to ensure fairness, thus any initial insufficiency did not render proceedings a nullity.
Regarding the mental element of the offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act, the Court undertook statutory interpretation considering the Act's text, legislative context, and relevant authorities. The Court observed that:
- The definitions of "person having control" and "person managing" in section 263 focus on objective control arrangements without requiring proof of knowledge of the property's occupation status;
- The presence of the word "knowingly" in related offences under section 72(2) indicates Parliament's deliberate distinction between offences requiring mens rea and those that do not;
- The civil penalty regime under section 249A does not require mens rea, suggesting consistency with the criminal offence;
- The statutory defence of reasonable excuse in section 72(5) allows a defendant to assert lack of knowledge as a defence, reducing the need for mens rea as an element of the offence;
- The offence is regulatory and licensing in nature, where presumption of mens rea is weaker;
- Requiring mens rea would undermine the statutory objectives of ensuring proper licensing and tenant protections.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the prosecution need not prove the defendant knew the property was an HMO requiring a licence. Knowledge or lack thereof is relevant only to the defence of reasonable excuse.
Finally, on the issue of time limits, the Court accepted that the offence under section 72(1) is a continuing offence, meaning each day without a licence constitutes a new offence. Hence, the informations were laid within the six-month statutory time limit, making the summonses timely.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED the applications for judicial review.
The direct effect is that the summonses issued against the Appellants are upheld as lawfully issued and timely, and the offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act does not require proof of the defendant's knowledge that the property was an unlicensed HMO. This clarifies the mental element of the offence, reinforcing that lack of knowledge may be a defence but is not an element the prosecution must prove. No new precedent altering existing legal principles was established beyond the court’s interpretative confirmation.
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