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Eviston v. D.P.P.
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff was the driver of a motor vehicle involved in a fatal road accident on 28 June 1998 near The City. Shortly after the accident the police indicated that a prosecution for dangerous driving would issue. The Plaintiff supplied a written statement and two engineer’s reports asserting that a tyre defect, not driver negligence, caused the collision.
In early December 1998 the Defendant (the Director of Public Prosecutions) decided not to prosecute and this decision was communicated to the Plaintiff through her solicitor. On 16 December 1998 a Family Member of the deceased victim wrote to the Defendant requesting a reconsideration and noting prior contact with the Minister. Without any new evidential material, the Defendant reviewed the file and on 23 December 1998 directed that a District Court summons issue against the Plaintiff.
On 22 March 1999 the High Court granted the Plaintiff leave to seek judicial review and injunctive relief restraining the prosecution. The High Court (Judge Kearns) granted the injunction on 26 January 2001. The Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which delivered three separate judgments on 31 July 2002.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Defendant may lawfully reverse an earlier, communicated decision not to prosecute when no new evidence or change of circumstance has arisen.
- Whether such a reversal, without prior warning to the putative accused, breaches the constitutional right to fair procedures and natural justice.
- The scope of judicial review applicable to prosecutorial decisions, particularly where multiple and contradictory decisions have been taken.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The Defendant’s discretion to prosecute is reviewable only on narrow grounds (mala fides, improper motive, or irrationality) as recognised in prior Supreme Court authority.
- A policy of internal review is legitimate and expressly outlined in the Defendant’s annual report; the High Court erred in treating the reversal as necessarily “arbitrary and perverse.”
- The Plaintiff suffered no legal detriment or evidential prejudice; thus doctrines of estoppel, legitimate expectation or abuse of process do not arise.
- The High Court exceeded the permitted grounds for review by relying on alleged non-compliance with internal guidelines that were never pleaded.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The decision-making process comprised three distinct decisions; reversing a final, communicated decision without new material is oppressive and infringes constitutional rights.
- Fair procedures required that the Plaintiff be warned that the “no-prosecution” decision could be revisited; failure to do so unjustly magnified stress and anxiety.
- The Constitution protects the citizen’s right to security of the person and freedom from State-induced distress; analogous situations (e.g., delays in prosecution) have led courts to restrain proceedings.
- The reversal appeared to follow political representations, raising concerns of improper influence and lack of independence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Savage & Anor v DPP [1982] ILRM 385 |
Certificates under the 1939 Act previously held non-reviewable owing to security concerns. |
Referenced as High Court authority that may require future reconsideration. |
| Judge v DPP [1984] ILRM 224 |
Same proposition as Savage. |
Cited to illustrate historic judicial reluctance to review DPP certificates. |
| In Re Article 26 – Emergency Powers Bill [1977] IR 159 |
Supreme Court left open the possibility of reviewing such certificates. |
Used to question absolute non-reviewability. |
| The State (McCormack) v Curran [1987] ILRM 225 |
DPP decisions are reviewable only for mala fides, improper motive, or where facts exclude a proper basis. |
Formed the analytical starting point for both parties and the Court. |
| H v DPP [1994] 2 IR 589 |
Confirmed limited judicial review and no general duty to give reasons. |
Distinguished because it dealt with a single non-prosecution decision, not a reversal. |
| International Fishing Vessels Ltd v Minister for the Marine [1989] IR 149 |
Where a decision is reviewable, reasons may be required. |
Used to explain why the Defendant is ordinarily not obliged to give reasons. |
| The State (O'Callaghan) v O'hUadhaigh [1977] IR 42 |
DPP subject to constitutional fairness; abuse found when charges were re-instated after a nolle prosequi. |
Key authority demonstrating that prosecutorial powers must be exercised fairly. |
| The State (Keegan) v Stardust Compensation Tribunal |
“On the materials before it, no reasonable body could decide” test. |
High Court’s reliance on this test was criticised by the Supreme Court. |
| R v DPP ex parte C [1995] 1 Cr App R 136 |
English authority on following prosecutorial guidelines. |
Cited in debate over the Defendant’s annual report. |
| In the Matter of Adams [2001] NIECA 2 |
Northern Ireland view that the DPP is not an adjudicator subject to procedural fairness. |
Relied on by the Defendant; distinguished by the Court. |
| DPP v Byrne [1994] 2 IR 236 |
Stay of prosecution for culpable delay. |
Used by Plaintiff to illustrate courts’ willingness to restrain prosecutions infringing rights. |
| DPP v Arthurs [2000] 2 ILRM 363 |
Same principle as Byrne. |
Invoked in Plaintiff’s argument. |
| McMahon v Leahy [1984] IR 525 |
Equality before the law. |
Cited by Plaintiff as analogous constitutional protection. |
| The State (Healy) v O'Donoghue [1976] IR 325 |
Right to legal representation. |
Part of Plaintiff’s suite of fairness authorities. |
| R v Looseley [2001] 4 All ER 897 |
Abuse of process doctrine. |
Relied on by Plaintiff for comparative purposes. |
| Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294 |
Constitutional right to bodily integrity and security of the person. |
Invoked by Plaintiff to frame a “peace of mind” right. |
| O'Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 IR 39 |
Standard of unreasonableness in judicial review. |
Applied in analysing whether the Defendant’s decision was “arbitrary and perverse.” |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court began by affirming that the Defendant’s prosecutorial discretion is generally insulated from review, but only within constitutional limits. It acknowledged that the Defendant may reconsider an earlier decision and is not obliged to furnish reasons. However, once a “no-prosecution” decision is unequivocally communicated, the putative accused acquires a legitimate expectation that any reversal will comply with basic fairness.
The Court found:
- The Defendant’s internal policy permits reviews even without new evidence; that policy is not improper.
- Nonetheless, the sudden reversal, absent fresh material and without alerting the Plaintiff that the earlier decision was provisional, added an unnecessary and substantial burden of anxiety.
- Although the High Court erred in describing the decision as “irrational” and in relying on un-pleaded guideline breaches, the essential conclusion—that fair procedures were denied—was correct.
- The narrow grounds identified in The State (McCormack) v Curran do not exhaust every circumstance in which the courts may intervene; fair-procedure violations justify intervention here.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The order restraining the Defendant from continuing the prosecution is affirmed.
Implications: The judgment confirms that, while the Defendant may review and reverse decisions, doing so after an unequivocal “no-prosecution” communication—without any change of circumstances and without warning—can breach the constitutional requirement of fair procedures. The case does not alter the general test for reviewing prosecutorial decisions but carves out a fairness-based limitation when multiple, contradictory decisions affect an individual.
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