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Revenue and Customs v. Joint Administrators of Lehman Brothers International (Europe)
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion arises out of the administration of “Company A” (formerly a major investment bank). Although the company was commercially insolvent when it entered administration on 15 September 2008, the administration generated an unprecedented surplus of approximately £7 billion. After payment in full of all provable debts, about £5 billion was earmarked for statutory interest under rule 14.23(7) of the Insolvency Rules 2016. The administrators retained sums on account of income tax and paid the balance of the interest in July 2018. The present appeal concerns whether that statutory interest is “yearly interest” within section 874 of the Income Tax Act 2007, such that the administrators (the Appellants) were obliged to deduct income tax at source before paying creditors. The lower court judgments reached conflicting conclusions, prompting the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether statutory interest paid to creditors under rule 14.23(7) of the Insolvency Rules 2016 constitutes “yearly interest” for the purposes of section 874 of the Income Tax Act 2007.
- If it does, whether the administrators were therefore required to deduct basic-rate income tax from those interest payments before distributing the surplus.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- “Yearly interest” requires (a) a source with permanence and (b) interest that accrues over a period intended or likely to last at least a year.
- Statutory interest under rule 14.23(7) does not accrue over time; it crystallises only once a surplus is ascertained and is commonly paid in a single lump-sum distribution.
- The putative “source” of the interest (the emergence of a surplus and the administrators’ decision to distribute it) lacks the durability necessary to satisfy the historic tests for yearly interest.
- Because provable debts were largely short-term, they could not generate yearly interest, and after payment they ceased to exist, removing any enduring source.
Respondent's Arguments
- Section 874 does not demand identification of a separate “source”; it only requires that a payment be “yearly interest.”
- Interest need not accrue periodically; it is enough that the amount is calculated by reference to a period exceeding one year during which creditors were kept out of their money.
- The period from commencement of administration to payment of debts (here, up to ten years) supplies the requisite durability; the creditors were effectively involuntary long-term investors in the estate.
- Historic authorities show that lump-sum, compensatory interest relating to a multi-year period qualifies as yearly interest, even where liability is contingent and the payment is made only after that period ends.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
| In re Lehman Brothers (No 6) [2016] Bus LR 17 | Statutory interest in administration is sui generis and arises only out of surplus. | Used to describe the nature of rule 14.23(7) interest. |
| In re Lehman Brothers (Nos 6 & 7) [2018] Bus LR 508 | Rule 14.23 forms a complete code for statutory interest. | Cited to confirm the code-based character of the interest right. |
| Bebb v Bunny (1854) 1 K & J 216 | Early construction of “yearly interest.” | Starting point for historic analysis of the phrase. |
| Goslings & Sharpe v Blake (1889) 23 QBD 324 | Interest is not yearly merely because calculated per annum; business reality matters. | Illustrates the “short loan” vs “yearly interest” distinction. |
| In re Cooper [1911] 2 KB 550 | Statutory judgment interest not yearly where no permanent investment. | Forms part of “investment” test lineage. |
| Gateshead Corp v Lumsden [1914] 2 KB 883 | Forbearance alone does not convert short interest into yearly interest. | Supports need for underlying permanence. |
| Garston Overseers v Carlisle [1915] 3 KB 381 | Temporary bank balances generate short, not yearly, interest. | Reinforces “investment” criterion. |
| IRC v Hay (1924) VIII TC 636 | Five “Hay tests” for yearly interest (permanence, investment, etc.). | Framework against which statutory interest was compared. |
| Corinthian Securities v Cato [1970] 1 QB 377 | Yearly interest exists where the loan is in the nature of an investment. | Cited to illustrate “investment” approach. |
| Cairns v MacDiarmid [1983] STC 178 | Caution against over-reliance on “investment” label; focus on parties’ intention. | Shows evolution of the test. |
| Barlow v IRC (1937) 21 TC 354 | Lump-sum trustee interest over six years treated as yearly interest. | Analogy for compensatory interest. |
| Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver (1942 order) | Restitutionary interest over ~6 years subject to deduction. | Supports classification of compensatory interest as yearly. |
| Riches v Westminster Bank [1947] AC 390 | Interest awarded under s.3 Law Reform Act 1934 is taxable interest; quality of recurrence derived from calculation period. | Centrally relied on to show that single lump-sum awards over multi-year periods can be yearly interest. |
| Jefford v Gee [1970] 2 QB 130 | Personal-injury interest over several years is yearly interest. | Reinforced Riches reasoning. |
| Chevron Petroleum v BP Petroleum Development [1981] STC 689 | Contingent, rolled-up interest payable after final accounting can be yearly interest. | Analogy for statutory interest contingent on surplus. |
| Target Holdings v Redferns [1996] AC 421 | Nature of equitable discretion in awarding interest. | Used to rebut contention that beneficiaries have automatic right to interest. |
| In re Lehman Brothers (No 4) [2018] AC 465 | Potential consequences of subsequent liquidation on surplus. | Illustrates contingencies affecting statutory interest. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
“Judge Briggs,” delivering the opinion for a unanimous panel, adopted a historical and doctrinal approach:
- Historic jurisprudence divides interest cases into (a) interest accruing over time and (b) compensatory lump-sum interest awarded after the event. The present payments fall within the second category.
- Authorities such as Riches, Jefford and Chevron establish that lump-sum, compensatory interest calculated over a multi-year period possesses the “recurrence” necessary for classification as yearly interest, even if liability is contingent and payment is made once.
- The appropriate period for assessing durability is the period in respect of which the interest is calculated. Here, that spans up to ten years—well beyond the annual threshold.
- The suggested “source” test advanced by the Appellant misconstrues section 874. Deduction at source depends only on the character of the payment, not on identifying a durable investment-type source.
- The status of each creditor as a proving creditor during administration provides sufficient permanence; creditors were, in effect, involuntary long-term investors in the estate.
- Even if an “investment” element were required, the prolonged deprivation of funds at 8 % per annum resembles a long-term investment yielding interest.
- Therefore, statutory interest under rule 14.23(7) meets the Hay tests and is “yearly interest” under section 874.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court confirms that statutory interest payable from a surplus in a distributing administration is “yearly interest” under section 874 of the Income Tax Act 2007. Administrators must deduct basic-rate income tax at source before paying such interest to creditors. The decision clarifies the taxation treatment of statutory interest in insolvency administrations but does not purport to alter broader principles beyond this context.
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