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Hallam, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for Justice
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeals were brought by two individuals (“Appellant 1” and “Appellant 2”) whose convictions were quashed by the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (“CACD”) after the emergence of fresh evidence.
- Appellant 1: Originally convicted of murder and related offences. The CACD later found that new photographs undermined essential prosecution evidence, rendering the conviction unsafe. He had spent over seven years in custody.
- Appellant 2: Originally convicted of attempted rape. Subsequent DNA testing on the victim’s clothing identified a full male profile from an “unknown male,” substantially weakening the prosecution case. He had spent 17 years in custody.
Both Appellants applied for compensation under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (“the 1988 Act”). By then, section 133 had been amended by section 175 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The new subsection (1ZA) confines compensation to cases where fresh evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence. The Secretary of State (“Respondent”) rejected both claims, stating that the new evidence did not establish innocence to that standard.
The Appellants sought a declaration that section 133(1ZA) is incompatible with Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”). The Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed their claims, holding themselves bound by earlier domestic authority. The present judgment of the Supreme Court addresses the compatibility question directly.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Article 6(2) of the Convention (presumption of innocence) applies at all to compensation decisions taken under section 133 of the 1988 Act.
- If Article 6(2) does apply, whether the statutory test introduced by section 133(1ZA)—requiring proof “beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence”—is incompatible with that Article.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Article 6(2) remains engaged after acquittal where subsequent state decisions cast doubt on innocence; section 133 decisions are sufficiently linked to the criminal proceedings.
- Requiring applicants to prove factual innocence violates the presumption of innocence and undermines their acquittals.
- The Grand Chamber decision in Allen v United Kingdom demonstrates that Article 6(2) governs such compensation schemes.
Respondent’s Arguments
- Section 133 implements Article 14(6) ICCPR and is a lex specialis, displacing Article 6(2).
- The compensation process is civil and separate from the criminal trial; therefore Article 6(2) is not engaged.
- Even if Article 6(2) applies, section 133(1ZA) does not impugn innocence generally; it merely limits a financial scheme to clear-cut cases.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|
| R (Appellants) v Secretary of State (“Adams”) |
Earlier domestic view that Article 6(2) did not apply to section 133 |
Majority reconsidered but ultimately followed core result; dissent would depart |
| Allen v United Kingdom (ECtHR, Grand Chamber) |
Article 6(2) can apply to compensation schemes; focus on “link” test |
Cited extensively by all opinions; majority distinguished; dissent relied on |
| Sekanina v Austria |
Post-acquittal proceedings must not cast suspicion on innocence |
Used in analysis of permissible language in compensation decisions |
| Ringvold v Norway; Y v Norway |
Effect of civil claims on presumption of innocence |
Illustrated limits of Article 6(2) where different parties/standards involved |
| Serious Organised Crime Agency v Gale (UKSC) |
Domestic discussion of Strasbourg “link” concept |
Revisited during assessment of whether to follow prior case-law |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Majority (Lords Mance, Hughes, Wilson, Lloyd-Jones and Lady Hale):
- Article 6(2) should not be extended beyond preventing statements that a previously acquitted person “ought to have been convicted.”
- Section 133(1ZA) merely creates an eligibility threshold for ex-gratia compensation; it does not pronounce guilt and therefore does not violate Article 6(2).
- The amended test is a legitimate parliamentary choice to confine payments to clear cases; requiring applicants to prove factual innocence for compensation does not undermine their acquittals.
- Domestic courts are not bound to apply every Strasbourg extension of Article 6(2); the Supreme Court should avoid “unworkable” expansions.
Dissent (Lords Reed and Kerr):
- Following Allen v United Kingdom, Article 6(2) is engaged because compensation decisions are a direct sequel to the criminal proceedings.
- Section 133(1ZA) inevitably requires the decision-maker to assess whether applicants are in fact innocent, thereby casting doubt on their acquittals and violating the presumption of innocence.
- The lex specialis argument (that Article 3 Protocol 7 displaces Article 6(2)) is unfounded; both provisions may operate cumulatively.
- A declaration of incompatibility should be made.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Appeals dismissed; no declaration of incompatibility granted.
Implications: The statutory requirement that successful applicants demonstrate, via fresh evidence, that they “did not commit the offence” remains in force. Compensation under section 133 of the 1988 Act is therefore confined to the narrowest category of quashed convictions. The decision re-affirms domestic courts’ discretion to diverge from Strasbourg jurisprudence where considered appropriate, though the presence of two substantial dissents signals that the issue may return to the European Court of Human Rights.
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