Boyle, Re Judicial Review

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application for judicial review by the Plaintiff challenging the decision of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to refuse compensation following the quashing of the Plaintiff's criminal convictions. The Plaintiff was originally convicted in 1977 at a city commission for possession of firearms with intent to endanger life and membership of a proscribed organisation, receiving a total sentence of 12 years imprisonment. The Plaintiff's appeals against conviction were initially dismissed, and the sentence was served. Subsequently, after an application to the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) and forensic testing of interview notes by an expert, the Court of Appeal quashed the Plaintiff's conviction in 2003 on grounds that there was a prima facie case that interview notes had been rewritten, undermining the credibility of the interviewing officers and rendering the conviction unsafe.

Following the quashing of the conviction, the Plaintiff sought compensation under Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Secretary of State's ex gratia scheme. The Secretary of State refused compensation, concluding that the grounds for quashing did not meet the statutory or ex gratia criteria. The Plaintiff then applied for judicial review of that refusal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff qualifies for compensation under Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, specifically whether the quashing of the conviction was due to a "new or newly discovered fact" showing beyond reasonable doubt a miscarriage of justice.
2. Whether the Plaintiff's case involves "serious default" or "exceptional circumstances" under the Secretary of State's ex gratia compensation scheme.
3. Whether the Secretary of State's refusal to award compensation constitutes unlawful or unreasonable discrimination in breach of the principle of equal treatment.
4. Whether the Secretary of State's decision breaches the Plaintiff's rights under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
5. The proper interpretation and application of the concept of "miscarriage of justice" as construed by the House of Lords and courts in relevant case law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Plaintiff contends that the case is comparable to other cases (e.g., the "UDR Four") where compensation was awarded following quashing based on forensic evidence of rewritten interview notes.
• The Plaintiff asserts qualification for compensation under Section 133 as he was the victim of a miscarriage of justice grounded on new forensic evidence.
• The Plaintiff argues that the forensic evidence amounts to a "new or newly discovered fact" and that the conviction was based on perjured evidence from interviewing officers.
• The Plaintiff claims entitlement to the presumption of innocence following the Court of Appeal's ruling and that the Secretary of State's refusal violates Article 6(2) ECHR and the Human Rights Act.
• The Plaintiff criticizes the Director of Public Prosecutions for refusing to prosecute the interviewing officers for perjury despite recommendations.
• The Plaintiff asserts that the conviction resulted from serious default by police officers and that exceptional circumstances exist under the ex gratia scheme.
• The Plaintiff contends that the decision denying exceptional circumstances is Wednesbury unreasonable.
• The Plaintiff further argues that there has been unequal treatment compared to similar cases where compensation was awarded.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Secretary of State contends that the Court of Appeal did not identify any new or newly discovered fact sufficient to satisfy Section 133 requirements.
• There was no finding of perjury or serious default by the police officers, and thus no basis for compensation under the ex gratia scheme.
• The Secretary of State justifies the different treatment of the Plaintiff's case compared to earlier cases by reference to evolving legal advice and jurisprudence, including the requirement to establish a miscarriage of justice involving innocence or clear failure of the trial process.
• The Secretary of State maintains that the refusal to award compensation was lawful, reasonable, and consistent with the guidance of the courts.
• The respondent argues that the issue of exceptional circumstances was not properly raised with the decision maker and that no exceptional circumstances exist.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined whether the Plaintiff satisfied the criteria under Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It found that the forensic evidence of rewritten interview notes constituted a new or newly discovered fact not known at trial or appeal, satisfying the initial requirement. The court then considered whether this fact was the principal reason for the quashing of the conviction, concluding affirmatively based on the Court of Appeal's judgment. However, the court noted that under the leading House of Lords authority, the concept of "miscarriage of justice" requires either clear innocence or that the conviction should not have occurred. The Court of Appeal's judgment indicated uncertainty whether the trial judge would have convicted had the new facts been known, meaning the Plaintiff did not meet either the wider or narrower interpretations of miscarriage of justice required for compensation.

The court further analyzed the ex gratia scheme claims. It found that although there was default by the police officers in giving evidence about the interview notes, the Court of Appeal did not conclude this amounted to perjury or serious default. Therefore, the Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the default was not serious. The court also dismissed claims of exceptional circumstances, noting that the issue of statute-barred claims was raised late and was not properly before the decision maker.

Regarding the claim of unequal treatment, the court accepted the Secretary of State’s explanation that the approach to Section 133 claims had evolved due to legal advice and jurisprudence, and that a change in approach was lawful and reasonable. The court found no unlawful discrimination or procedural unfairness.

Ultimately, the court found no basis to interfere with the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse compensation under either the statutory or ex gratia schemes.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the Plaintiff's application for judicial review.

The direct effect is that the Plaintiff remains without compensation following the quashing of his convictions. The court upheld the Secretary of State’s decision as lawful and reasonable, emphasizing the necessity of meeting the statutory criteria for compensation under Section 133 and the ex gratia scheme. No new precedent was established; rather, the decision reinforces the requirement that compensation claims must demonstrate a miscarriage of justice as narrowly or widely defined by higher courts, and that the Secretary of State’s discretion in ex gratia payments must be guided by court judgments and legal advice.