| Director of Public Prosecutions v Marshall [1988] 3 All ER 683 | Test-purchase by police resembling ordinary customer conduct is legitimate. | Cited as an example of permissible proactive policing. |
| Nottingham City Council v Amin [2000] 1 WLR 1071 | Distinction between inciting a crime and merely offering an opportunity. | Used to illustrate acceptable undercover tactics in regulatory offences. |
| Sherman v United States (1957) 356 US 369 | U.S. substantive entrapment defence; concept of “predisposition.” | Contrasted with English rejection of entrapment as a defence. |
| Hampton v United States (1976) 425 US 484 | Predisposition defeats entrapment defence in U.S. federal law. | Quoted to show why predisposition is not the English test. |
| Sorrells v United States (1932) 287 US 435 | Permissible stratagem vs. impermissible creation of crime. | Adopted in principle when analysing inducement. |
| United States v Russell (1973) 411 US 423 | Judicial concern over an undefined “Chancellor’s foot” discretion. | Cited as criticism of overly subjective tests. |
| R v Sang [1980] AC 402 | Entrapment not a substantive defence; no exclusion merely for unfair procurement (now reversed statutorily). | Formed the starting point for later statutory and common-law developments. |
| Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.78 | Judicial discretion to exclude evidence if admission would unfairly affect proceedings. | Considered but not applied to exclude Officer A’s evidence. |
| R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Ct ex p Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 | Court may stay proceedings for serious abuse of executive power. | Foundation for stay jurisdiction in entrapment cases. |
| R v Latif [1996] 1 WLR 104 | Stay appropriate where prosecution would “affront the public conscience.” | Main modern authority for stay due to entrapment. |
| R v Smurthwaite [1994] 1 All ER 898 | Section 78 factors may include degree of police inducement. | Guided the trial judge’s discretion. |
| R v Shannon [2001] 1 WLR 51 | Separates stay applications from s.78 applications; evidential reliability focus. | Endorsed by the House. |
| Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19 | Australian discretion to exclude evidence from unlawful inducement. | McHugh J’s dictum adopted as a useful guide to limits of inducement. |
| R v Mack (1988) 44 CCC (3d) 513 | Canadian stay for entrapment; predisposition not decisive. | Quoted when rejecting a pure “predisposition” test. |
| Amato v The Queen (1982) 69 CCC (2d) 31 | Courts must avoid bringing justice into disrepute. | Supported the integrity rationale for stays. |
| Brannan v Peek [1948] 1 KB 68 | Early judicial disapproval of entrapment. | Cited historically. |
| Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 | Court, not executive, guards against abuse of process. | Reaffirmed judicial duty. |
| Teixeira de Castro v Portugal (1998) 28 EHRR 101 | Conviction following police instigation breaches article 6. | Bench held English principles consistent with this decision. |
| Lüdi v Switzerland (1992) 15 EHRR 173 | Judicial supervision of undercover operations in civil-law systems. | Contrasted with U.K. authorisation procedures. |
| Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 | Proportionality under the Convention. | Mentioned when balancing public interest and fairness. |
| Khan (Sultan) [1997] AC 558 | Section 78 discretion in surveillance cases. | Invoked when distinguishing evidential fairness from abuse of process. |
| Khan v United Kingdom (2000) 8 BHRC 310 | Compatibility of s.78 discretion with article 6. | Cited by Judge Scott as confirming adequacy of domestic remedy. |
| Williams v DPP (1994) 98 Cr App R 209 | “Decoy” technique acceptable during bona-fide investigation. | Example of legitimate proactive policing. |
| Taunton Deane BC v Brice (DC, 10 Jul 1997) | Need for bona-fide investigation; random virtue-testing disapproved. | Used to show proper purpose criterion. |
| R v Keane (1994) Cr App R 1 | Prosecution’s duty to disclose material that may assist the defence. | Referenced in discussion of disclosure vs. entrapment. |
| Brown v Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 | Strasbourg decisions are fact-specific. | Quoted to limit over-generalisation of Teixeira de Castro. |