Reid v. Secretary of State for Scotland and Another

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent, then aged 17, was convicted of culpable homicide in 1967. Instead of a custodial sentence, the criminal court imposed a hospital order and an unlimited-time restriction order after receiving medical evidence that the Respondent suffered from mental disorder. Subsequent assessments concluded that he was not mentally handicapped but suffered from a persistent personality disorder characterised by abnormally aggressive and seriously irresponsible behaviour (“psychopathic disorder”).

In 1994 the Respondent applied to a sheriff under section 64 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 for discharge from hospital. The sheriff refused, finding a very high risk of serious re-offending. The Respondent sought judicial review. The Lord Ordinary dismissed the petition, but the Inner House allowed a reclaiming motion, quashed the sheriff’s decision and ordered the Respondent’s discharge. The Appellant (Secretary of State) appealed to the House of Lords.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether section 64(1)(a) of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 obliges a sheriff to discharge a restricted patient when the disorder is no longer “treatable,” i.e. when medical treatment is unlikely to alleviate or prevent deterioration.
2. Whether the Inner House exceeded the proper scope of judicial review by substituting its own assessment of medical evidence for that of the sheriff.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Section 64(1) stands on its own wording and does not incorporate the “treatability” qualification found in section 17(1)(a)(i); therefore, lack of treatability is not decisive.
• The Inner House erred in treating Reg. v. Canons Park Mental Health Review Tribunal, Ex parte A as binding; that decision misread analogous English provisions.
• The sheriff’s findings on ongoing medical benefit and public-safety risk were supported by evidence; the Inner House strayed into merits review.

Respondent's Arguments

• All three admission criteria in section 17(1) (appropriateness, treatability, and safety) must remain satisfied; once any fails, continued detention is unlawful.
• European Convention jurisprudence (X v. United Kingdom) requires a reviewing court to examine whether initial justifications for detention still exist, including treatability.
• The sheriff acted irrationally in rejecting unanimous or majority psychiatric opinion that the disorder was untreatable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Delivering separate but concurring speeches, Judge Lloyd (with Judges Slynn, Hope, Clyde and Hutton agreeing) allowed the appeal on two grounds:

1. Statutory construction.
   • Section 64 appears in Part VI, governing restricted patients whose detention stems from criminal conviction; it deliberately omits any explicit reference to the “treatability” language of section 17(1)(a)(i).
   • The phrase “appropriate for him to be liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment” in section 64(1)(a) is satisfied if the disorder persists and some form of medical supervision (broadly defined in section 125) remains justified; continuing therapeutic benefit need not be proved.
   • Reading section 64 as importing treatability would compel unconditional release of dangerous psychopaths and undermine public-protection purposes of restriction orders—an outcome Parliament cannot have intended.
2. Scope of judicial review.
   • The Inner House substituted its own evaluation of conflicting psychiatric opinions for that of the sheriff, contrary to the limited Wednesbury standard applicable in supervisory proceedings.
   • Evidence from the Respondent’s responsible medical officer supported the sheriff’s finding that structured hospital supervision alleviated behavioural manifestations; therefore the decision was neither irrational nor unsupported.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary dismissing the petition for judicial review is restored; the sheriff’s refusal to discharge the Respondent stands.

Implications include: (1) confirmation that treatability is not a stand-alone statutory requirement for continued detention of restricted patients; (2) overruling of English authority treating treatability as decisive, thereby affecting numerous Scottish and English cases applying Canons Park–style reasoning; (3) affirmation that supervisory courts must not re-weigh expert evidence absent legal error. No new cause of action was created, but the decision clarifies discharge criteria for restricted patients and reinforces the public-protection function of restriction orders.