Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant and a Co-Defendant were jointly tried for the fatal stabbing of a mini-cab driver on 12 April 1994. The Crown alleged a joint enterprise to rob the driver; each accused blamed the other for the stabbing. Shortly after arrest, the Appellant allegedly made self-incriminating remarks to police officers. Because those interviews breached the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) Codes of Practice, the Crown did not rely on them.
At trial the Co-Defendant sought to introduce the Appellant’s police admissions to support his own defence. The trial judge refused the Appellant’s application for severance, admitted the disputed statements for the limited purpose advanced by the Co-Defendant, and directed the jury accordingly. The jury convicted the Appellant of murder and the Co-Defendant of manslaughter.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal but certified a point of law of general public importance concerning the admissibility of a co-defendant’s out-of-court confession. The present opinion is the House of Lords’ resolution of that appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in a joint trial, a voluntary confession made by Defendant A (inadmissible for the Crown owing to PACE breaches) may nevertheless be adduced by Defendant B to advance B’s defence.
- Whether admitting such a confession offends the common-law rule against hearsay.
- Whether the trial judge retains a discretion to exclude the confession on fairness grounds when it is proffered by a co-defendant rather than by the Crown.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The police interviews were obtained in breach of PACE; therefore, under sections 76(2)(b) and 78, they were inadmissible for any purpose.
- Introducing the statements through police witnesses would violate the hearsay rule because the Appellant could not cross-examine herself.
- If the Appellant testified, any use of the statements should be limited to credibility under the Criminal Procedure Act 1865, not as evidence of fact.
Co-Defendant’s Arguments
- The admissions were directly relevant to establish that the Appellant, not the Co-Defendant, wielded the knife.
- A party to proceedings may rely on a co-party’s confession; such statements fall within a recognised exception to the hearsay rule.
- Sections 76 and 78 constrain only evidence “on which the prosecution proposes to rely,” not defence evidence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Regina v. Lake (1976) 64 Cr App R 172 |
Preference for joint trials even where some evidence is inadmissible against one accused |
Cited to uphold the refusal to sever the trials |
| Regina v. Beckford & Daley [1991] Crim L.R. 833 |
Confession ruled inadmissible for prosecution cannot be adduced through police to aid co-accused |
Distinguished; held not controlling because no section 76 bar applied here |
| Regina v. Campbell & Williams [1993] Crim L.R. 448 |
Co-defendant may adduce another’s voluntary confession |
Preferred over Beckford; provides direct support for admissibility |
| Myers v. DPP [1965] AC 1001 |
Courts may not create new hearsay exceptions |
Relied on to show categories are closed, but existing confession exception sufficed |
| Regina v. Blastland [1986] AC 41 |
Third-party confessions are inadmissible hearsay |
Held not analogous because maker here was a party, not a stranger |
| Regina v. Turner (Bryan) (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 |
Hearsay inadmissible to prove third-party guilt |
Cited to contrast party vs. non-party statements |
| Tepper v. The Queen [1952] AC 480 |
Rationale for the hearsay rule |
Reaffirmed but not breached on present facts |
| Regina v. Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667 |
Defence may elicit otherwise prejudicial material if relevant |
Supports Co-Defendant’s right to deploy confession |
| Regina v. Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44 |
Relevance paramount when evidence tendered by co-accused |
Applied in finding confession relevant and admissible |
| Lowery v. The Queen [1974] AC 85 |
Accused may lead propensity evidence to show innocence |
Analogous reasoning supporting right to adduce confession |
| Regina v. Reid [1989] Crim L.R. 719 |
Permissible for co-accused to undermine another’s defence |
Cited in discussion of relevance |
| Murdoch v. Taylor [1965] AC 574 |
Statutory right of co-accused to challenge credibility |
Forms part of broader principle allowing robust defence |
| Regina v. Rowson [1986] QB 174 |
Cross-examination on prior inconsistent statement permitted |
Used by analogy to justify admitting confession through police |
| Rex v. Treacy [1944] 2 All ER 229; |
Inadmissible confession cannot be used by prosecution |
Contrasted with defence use of admissible confession |
| Regina v. Rice [1963] 1 QB 857 |
Same principle as Treacy |
Distinguished on basis of who sought to use statement |
| Lui Mei Lin v. The Queen [1989] AC 288 |
Right of co-accused to cross-examine subject to relevance only |
Endorsed as consistent with admitting confession evidence |
| Perrie v. H.M. Advocate 1992 SLT 651 |
Confession exception applies to parties, not strangers |
Cited as academic support for party-confession distinction |
| Lobban v. The Queen [1995] 1 WLR 877 |
Absolute right of accused to deploy relevant defence evidence |
Relied on to emphasise lack of discretionary exclusion |
| Regina v. O'Boyle (1990) 92 Cr App R 202 |
Jury may struggle with limiting directions |
Acknowledged but not sufficient to bar admissibility |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Relevance. The disputed statements directly addressed who stabbed the victim, a central factual issue. Relevant evidence offered by a defendant is presumptively admissible.
2. Hearsay. A voluntary confession by a party falls within an established exception to the hearsay rule. Unlike Blastland, the maker was a party, not a third-party stranger, so no new exception was required.
3. PACE Inadmissibility. Sections 76 and 78 restrict evidence “on which the prosecution proposes to rely.” They do not prevent a co-defendant from adducing the same material, provided the confession was voluntary and not obtained by oppression. Breach of the Code of Practice affected prosecutorial use but did not vitiate the confession for defence purposes.
4. Consistency with Authority. The House preferred the approach in Campbell & Williams, reconciling it with Beckford & Daley by noting that in Beckford the confession had already been ruled involuntary. Thus a co-defendant cannot rely on a confession excluded under section 76(2), but may rely on one merely withheld by the Crown for procedural breaches.
5. Jury Directions. Any prejudicial impact on the Appellant could be managed through clear directions limiting the use of the confession against her.
6. Certified Question. The House declined to answer the broad certified question, holding that its wording out-ran the facts; the appeal could be resolved on orthodox principles without formulating a general rule.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Consequently, the Appellant’s conviction stands. The House of Lords confirms that, in a joint trial, a voluntary confession inadmissible for the Crown solely because of PACE procedural breaches may be introduced by a co-defendant if it is relevant to that co-defendant’s defence. The decision reinforces defendants’ rights to present exculpatory material and clarifies the relationship between the hearsay rule and the statutory provisions on confessions, without creating a new evidentiary exception.