Sharma v. Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors (Trinidad and Tobago)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, the Chief Justice of The State, faced an imminent criminal charge for attempting to pervert the course of justice. On 10 July 2006, Judge Jones granted the Appellant ex-parte leave to seek judicial review of an alleged decision by the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions (“Deputy Director”) to prosecute him and stayed all consequential steps. Similar orders were issued against the Assistant Commissioner of Police (“Assistant Commissioner”) on 13 July, and the Commissioner of Police (“Commissioner”) was added as a respondent with injunctive relief on 14 July (later varied and partly discharged).

The Deputy Director’s application to set aside leave was dismissed on 17 July. All three Respondents appealed. On 31 July 2006 the Court of Appeal set aside the leave concerning the Deputy Director, discharged the injunctions against the Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner, and granted the Appellant permission to appeal to the Judicial Committee (“the Board”). Although the Court of Appeal did not formally revoke leave against the Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner, it was accepted that its decision, if upheld, would lead to that result.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct to set aside Judge Jones’ orders granting leave for judicial review and associated injunctive relief.
2. Whether, as a matter of principle, an alleged decision to prosecute the Appellant should be scrutinised by way of judicial review or left to be tested within the ordinary criminal process.
3. Whether the evidence disclosed an arguable case that political pressure improperly influenced the prosecutorial decision.
4. Whether the exceptional threshold for permitting judicial review of a decision to prosecute was satisfied.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

• The chronology and surrounding circumstances—particularly alleged comments by the Prime Minister and Attorney General, leaks to the press, the timing of the Chief Magistrate’s complaint, and a contentious property transaction—created an arguable inference of political pressure on the Deputy Director and the police.
• The conduct of the police (e.g., search of chambers, attempted Friday-evening arrest) was “heavy-handed” and indicative of extraneous influence.
• Given these factors, the Appellant satisfied the threshold of arguability required for leave to seek judicial review.

Respondents’ Arguments

• No evidence showed that the Deputy Director surrendered independent judgment; she had no contact with political figures and acted solely on the evidential file.
• The police possessed an independent statutory power to initiate proceedings; their actions did not derive from the Deputy Director’s advice.
• The criminal process, including abuse-of-process safeguards, was the appropriate forum to ventilate any complaints; judicial review would fragment proceedings and cause delay.
• The Court of Appeal therefore rightly set aside leave and injunctive relief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Board held that judicial review of a decision to prosecute is a “highly exceptional” remedy and emphasised five policy reasons for reluctance: the breadth of prosecutorial discretion, multi-factorial decision-making, delay to any trial, availability of safeguards within criminal proceedings, and the need to avoid blurring executive and judicial roles.

Assessing Judge Jones’ grant of leave, the Board found three errors:

• She treated the Appellant’s challenge as ordinary rather than “very ambitious,” overlooking how criminal-process safeguards could address his complaints.
• She assumed the Appellant’s factual assertions to be true, effectively accepting that the Chief Magistrate’s statement was false without weighing contradictory evidence.
• She offered no clear reasons identifying which pieces of evidence rendered the claim arguable, contrary to the duty to give intelligible reasons.

The Court of Appeal was entitled to conduct its own evidential analysis. It correctly noted that even if the Prime Minister had referred the complaint, there was no evidence that the Deputy Director’s judgment was compromised: she had sworn to her independence and had no communication with political actors. The Board agreed that speculative hypotheses of bad faith cannot justify restraining a public official.

Concurring members of the Board further observed that any allegation of political interference could be raised before the criminal court, either as an abuse-of-process application or during trial, thereby providing a single, comprehensive forum for all issues.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Board affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision, which had set aside leave for judicial review and discharged all injunctions. As a result, any proposed prosecution of the Appellant may now proceed, subject to objections he may raise in the criminal court (including an application to stay for abuse of process). The judgment emphasises that granting judicial review of prosecutorial decisions remains an extraordinary measure and reinforces the principle that alleged political interference can, and ordinarily should, be examined within the criminal proceedings themselves. No new precedent was created; rather, existing doctrines on the exceptional nature of such judicial review were reaffirmed.