Mott, R (on the application of ) v Environment Agency, United Kingdom Supreme Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Judges

Mr Mott�s interest

See more information ...

Click here to read the full judgment

Mott, R (on the application of ) v. Environment Agency

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Agency issued annual licences for salmon-fishing in The Estuary. The Respondent held a long-term lease, originating from an 1866 certificate, to operate a traditional “putcher rank” installation comprising 650 baskets. Before 2011 the Respondent averaged approximately 600 salmon per season, generating about £60,000 in gross income.

Legislative amendments effective 1 January 2011 empowered The Agency to impose catch limits on historic fisheries. After unsuccessful attempts to purchase or compensate out the lease, The Agency unilaterally limited the Respondent’s 2012–2014 catches to 30, 23 and 24 salmon respectively, without compensation. The Respondent brought judicial review alleging irrationality and infringement of Article 1 of Protocol 1 (A1P1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The High Court found the limitations irrational and in breach of A1P1. The Court of Appeal reversed on irrationality but upheld the A1P1 violation, declaring the conditions unlawful in the absence of compensation. Only the A1P1 issue reached the Supreme Court, which delivered the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the imposed catch-limit conditions constituted a “control of use” or a de facto deprivation of property under A1P1.
If a control of use, whether the absence of compensation nevertheless caused the Respondent to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden, violating the fair-balance requirement of A1P1.
If a de facto deprivation, whether any exceptional circumstances justified denying compensation.

Arguments of the Parties

The Agency’s Arguments

The restrictions were a lawful “control of use,” not an expropriation, citing Mellacher v Austria and the rarity of findings of de facto expropriation other than in exceptional cases such as Papamichalopoulos v Greece.
Environmental protection enjoys heightened importance; therefore a wide margin of appreciation should be afforded to domestic regulators, supported by Hamer v Belgium and EU Habitats jurisprudence.
Paying compensation would contradict the “polluter pays” principle and divert public funds to remedy private environmental harm.

Respondent’s Arguments

The catch limits eliminated at least 95 % of the lease’s economic value, amounting to de facto expropriation; alternatively, the burden was so severe that compensation was required even for a control of use.
The Agency had statutory power to compensate and had done so in earlier seasons, demonstrating that payment was feasible and contemplated by the governing Act.
The method of equalising all licences to the lowest historic catch disproportionately targeted the Respondent, whose livelihood depended on commercial fishing, unlike hobby fishers.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Back v Finland (2005) 40 EHRR 48	Three-rule structure of A1P1 and need for proportionality across all forms of interference.	Provided analytical framework; High Court assessed interference under the first rule while noting proximity to deprivation.
AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46	Domestic summary of A1P1 proportionality principles.	Cited as authoritative exposition of fair-balance test.
R (Trailer & Marina (Leven) Ltd) v Secretary of State [2005] 1 WLR 1267	Distinction between control of use and deprivation; compensation not automatic for environmental controls.	Distinguished because it concerned legislation in principle, not an individual decision of exceptional severity.
Sporrong & Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 85	Necessity to examine the “realities” to decide if interference is deprivation and to ensure fair balance.	Supported inquiry into practical impact on Respondent’s livelihood.
Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 4	Fair-balance test: avoidance of excessive and disproportionate burden on individuals.	Core authority for concluding that Respondent bore an excessive burden.
Mellacher v Austria (1990) 12 EHRR 391	Controls that reduce income significantly may still be mere “control of use.”	Invoked by The Agency to argue against expropriation classification.
Papamichalopoulos v Greece (1993) 16 EHRR 440	Example of de facto expropriation where owners lost entire use and value.	Used to contrast the present case’s facts.
Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála (Case C-258/11) [2014] PTSR 1092	Stringent obligations under EU Habitats Directive.	Reinforced The Agency’s environmental protection duties.
Hamer v Belgium (App 21861/03) [2008] ECHR 1909	Priority of environmental protection over property rights; wide margin of appreciation.	Cited by The Agency to justify strict controls without compensation.
Posti v Finland (2003) 37 EHRR 6	Fishing restrictions treated as control; compensation relevant to proportionality.	Demonstrated that compensation may tip the balance toward proportionality.
Pindstrup Mosebrug A/S v Denmark (App 34943/06) [2008] ECHR 1660	Lack of compensation permissible where impact not unduly severe.	Contrasted with the present case’s severe impact.
In re B (A Child) [2013] 1 WLR 1911	No need for appellate court to re-weigh proportionality absent error below.	Cited by Court of Appeal in affirming High Court’s proportionality findings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court accepted that the licensing conditions were best characterised as a control of property use rather than a formal or de facto deprivation. However, classification was not decisive; the critical inquiry remained whether a “fair balance” had been achieved.

Key factors in finding a breach of A1P1 were:

Severity: the conditions removed at least 95 % of the Respondent’s economic benefit, rendering the lease commercially useless.
Differential impact: the uniform catch limit disproportionately harmed the Respondent, whose larger installation supported his livelihood, in contrast to hobby fishers.
Lack of individualized assessment: The Agency failed to evaluate the personal economic consequences or to consider mitigating measures such as compensation.
Availability of compensation mechanisms within the governing statute, and The Agency’s own prior practice of making compensatory payments.

Environmental protection, while commanding significant weight, did not override the obligation to ensure that individuals do not bear an excessive and disproportionate burden without redress. The Court emphasised that compensation is not routinely required for environmental controls but may be indispensable in exceptional circumstances such as the present.

Holding and Implications

Appeal DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed that the licensing conditions, imposed without compensation, breached the Respondent’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1.

Implications: The decision underscores that regulators wielding environmental powers must appraise the individualized economic impact of severe restrictions and, where necessary, provide compensation to maintain the “fair balance.” The ruling is fact-specific and does not establish a universal right to compensation for environmental regulation, but it signals that exceptional, highly disproportionate impacts will attract judicial scrutiny.