Factual and Procedural Background
During the early morning of 30 November 1984, two Respondents, both striking miners, placed a concrete block and a concrete post on the parapet of a bridge that spanned a dual-carriageway outside The City. As a convoy approached—consisting of police vehicles and a taxi that was transporting a working miner—the Respondents pushed or dropped the objects from the bridge. The concrete struck the taxi, causing it to skid and crash, resulting in the death of the taxi driver (“Victim”).
The Respondents were tried in the Crown Court at The City in May 1985. They admitted placing the objects but claimed their intention was merely to obstruct the road and frighten the miner, not to kill or cause serious bodily harm. A jury convicted them of murder after the trial judge directed the jury in terms derived from the House of Lords’ guidance in Regina v. Moloney.
On 4 November 1985 the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) quashed the murder convictions and substituted verdicts of manslaughter, holding that the trial judge’s reliance on the Moloney guidelines may have misled the jury. The Court of Appeal certified a question of general public importance concerning whether those guidelines required amplification.
The Appellant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, obtained leave to appeal to the House of Lords, seeking reinstatement of the murder convictions and confirmation that the Moloney guidelines were sound.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the model jury direction on intent set out in Regina v. Moloney requires amplification, specifically by reference to the probability of the consequence foreseen by the accused.
- Consequentially, whether the Respondents’ convictions for murder should be restored or the substituted verdicts of manslaughter should stand.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The trial judge correctly followed the two-question model from Moloney, and that model adequately guided the jury on intent.
- Because the jury found that death or serious injury was a “natural consequence” foreseen by the Respondents, the inference of intent was properly drawn, justifying murder convictions.
Respondents' Arguments
- The omission of any reference to “probability” in the Moloney questions left the jury without essential guidance on how likely the fatal consequence had to be before intent could be inferred.
- The Court of Appeal was correct that the jury direction was misleading and that the convictions should therefore be reduced to manslaughter.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Regina v. Moloney [1985] AC 905 |
Set out a two-question model direction linking foresight of “natural” consequences to intent. |
House of Lords held that the guidance, without further reference to probability, is defective and liable to mislead juries. |
| Regina v. Smith [1961] AC 290 |
Earlier treated the presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of an act as irrebuttable. |
Cited to illustrate historical confusion and the move away from irrebuttable presumptions toward evidential inferences. |
| Regina v. Hyam [1975] AC 55 |
Example of prior uncertainty over the relationship between foresight and intent. |
Used to demonstrate that high probability of a consequence may strongly support an inference of intent. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Delivering the leading opinion, Judge Scarman affirmed that:
- The mental element for murder is the specific intent to kill or cause really serious bodily harm.
- Foresight of consequences is evidential, not substantive; it is one factor from which intent may be inferred.
- Probability of the consequence is critically important: “the probability of the consequence… must be little short of overwhelming” before it can suffice to establish intent.
Judge Scarman agreed with the Court of Appeal that the Moloney model’s failure to mention probability could mislead juries into focusing solely on causal links rather than the degree of foresight. He observed that lay jurors would not automatically equate “natural” with “probable,” and that omitting probability denies them guidance on weighing the evidence.
All members of the appellate committee (Judges Keith of Kinkel, Roskill, Brightman, and Griffiths) concurred. While acknowledging that appellate courts may from time to time offer jury guidance, the House cautioned that such guidelines should be used sparingly, avoid excessive generalisation, and leave ultimate fact-finding to the jury.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The House of Lords affirmed the Court of Appeal’s substitution of manslaughter verdicts, answered the certified question in the affirmative, and ordered that both parties’ costs be paid from central funds under the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1973.
Implications: Trial judges should not rely on the Moloney two-question model without amplifying it to include the relevance of probability when directing juries on intent. The decision clarifies that foresight of consequences remains an evidential matter, and probability is a vital part of that evidence. No new substantive rule of law was created, but existing guidance for jury directions in specific-intent crimes was significantly refined.