Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns the scope of protection under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ("the Act") for persons harmed or anticipating harm from harassment aimed at someone else (the target). The Second Appellant, Mrs. Levi, suffered alarm and distress due to conduct by the First Respondent, Mr. Bates, who pursued a personal grudge against her husband, the First Appellant, Mr. Levi. The trial judge found harassment against Mr. Levi but held that, except for one instance, the conduct was not targeted at Mrs. Levi, and that single instance was insufficient to constitute harassment against her.
The underlying dispute arose from business dealings and successive ownership changes related to Leeds United Football Club, involving Mr. Levi, Mr. Bates, and others. Mr. Bates, controlling the club and related entities, used club publications and radio broadcasts to communicate grievances against Mr. Levi. The trial judge summarized various publications and actions by Mr. Bates alleged to constitute harassment, including defamatory articles, incitement of club supporters to confront the Levies at their home, and broadcast announcements seeking to serve court papers.
The judge found that Mrs. Levi experienced significant psychological harm and anxiety, particularly due to publications revealing her home address and telephone number, which caused concern for her safety. However, the judge concluded that the majority of the conduct was not targeted at her, limiting her claim. Mr. Levi had successfully obtained libel damages for some publications and was awarded damages for harassment related to later conduct.
Legal Issues Presented
- To what extent may a person who suffers harm or anticipates harm from harassment aimed at another person avail herself of civil remedies under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997?
- Whether the statutory tort of harassment requires that the claimant be the actual target of the perpetrator's conduct.
- Whether collateral victims of harassment—those foreseeably harmed though not targeted—may bring claims under the Act.
- Whether Mrs. Levi was entitled to damages and/or an injunction based on the conduct directed at her husband but causing her harm.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The statutory tort of harassment does not require the claimant to be the target of the conduct; it suffices that the claimant is foreseeably and directly harmed by conduct targeted at another.
- Mrs. Levi suffered direct alarm and distress due to incitement by Mr. Bates to club supporters to confront the Levies at their home, which was foreseeable and targeted at the household.
- Damages should be awarded to Mrs. Levi for the harm caused by the publications and conduct directed at her home.
- An injunction was sought to prevent further harassment, though the delay and nature of conduct were relevant considerations.
Respondent's Arguments
- The concept of targeting requires the conduct to be aimed at the claimant; collateral harm or distress arising from sympathy is insufficient.
- The judge correctly found that most conduct was not targeted at Mrs. Levi and that a single instance was insufficient to establish harassment against her.
- Damages should not be awarded to Mrs. Levi due to delay and lack of direct targeting.
- The refusal to grant an injunction was appropriate given the isolated nature of the conduct directed at Mrs. Levi.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Thomas v News Group Newspapers Limited [2001] EWCA Civ 1233 |
Introduced the concept that harassment is conduct "targeted at an individual". |
Used to explain the necessity of targeting in harassment; court clarified targeting relates to conduct aimed at someone, not merely causing distress. |
| Dowson & others v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2010] EWHC 2612 (QB) |
Held that conduct must be targeted at the claimant for harassment claims to succeed. |
The trial judge adopted this view; appellate court found this to be an overly restrictive interpretation. |
| Trimingham v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 1296 (QB) |
Discussed the meaning of "targeted" and its interpretation in harassment claims. |
Clarified that targeting is a restrictive concept, but left open whether secondary victims might claim harassment. |
| Majrowski v Guy's and St. Thomas's NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251; [2006] UKHL 34 |
Harassment requires oppressive and unreasonable conduct causing distress; distress alone is insufficient. |
Reinforced the requirement of oppressive conduct and objective assessment of harassment. |
| Re S (a child) [2004] UKHL 47 |
Balancing test for competing rights under Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR. |
Informed the court's approach to freedom of expression versus protection from harassment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the statutory framework of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, noting the absence of an explicit requirement that the claimant be the target of the conduct. It analyzed the judicial development of the targeting concept, originating from Lord Phillips' judgment in Thomas, which emphasized harassment as conduct aimed at an individual.
The court distinguished between conduct targeted at the claimant and collateral harm suffered by others foreseeably affected by that conduct. It rejected the trial judge's interpretation that the claimant must be the target, holding that the Act protects any person foreseeably and directly harmed by targeted conduct, not just the intended target. This interpretation aligns with the statutory language and purpose, avoiding an unduly narrow application that would exclude foreseeable victims.
The court applied this principle to the facts: Mrs. Levi was foreseeably harmed by Mr. Bates' incitement of supporters to visit and telephone the family home, conduct targeted at her husband but foreseeably affecting her. The court concluded that the two 2007 articles, (d) and (e), constituted a sufficient course of conduct amounting to harassment of Mrs. Levi. The 2010 article (i) was too temporally and substantively distinct to be aggregated.
Regarding damages, the court accepted the judge's factual findings of distress and anxiety suffered by Mrs. Levi and awarded her damages of £6,000, reflecting the harm and protective measures taken. The court declined to grant an injunction due to the delay in proceedings, the isolated nature of later conduct, and the injunction already granted to Mr. Levi providing indirect protection.
The court considered freedom of speech rights under Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights but found they did not preclude Mrs. Levi's claim, given the personal grudge nature of the conduct and incitement to hostile acts.
Holding and Implications
The court's final ruling was to ALLOW the appeal in part by awarding Mrs. Levi damages of £6,000 for harassment arising from the 2007 conduct but to DISMISS the appeal insofar as it sought an injunction.
This decision clarifies that under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, a claimant need not be the direct target of the harassing conduct to bring a claim; it suffices that the claimant is foreseeably and directly harmed by conduct targeted at another. The ruling expands the scope of potential claimants to include collateral victims foreseeably harmed by targeted harassment, while maintaining the requirement that the conduct be oppressive, unreasonable, and sufficiently connected to the claimant.
The judgment does not establish a broad or indeterminate class of claimants, as mere sympathetic distress is insufficient; there must be direct and foreseeable harm. The decision balances the protection of individuals from harassment with freedom of expression considerations, particularly in cases involving speech or published material.