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Attorney(S)
- Appellant Stephen Cobb QC Justin Gray (Instructed by Stockton-on-Tees Borough Council)
- Respondent Paul Storey QC Martin Todd (Instructed by Wollen Michelmore Solicitors)
- Respondent Pamela Scriven QC Ben Boucher-Giles (Instructed by Leigh Turton Dixon)
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J (Children), Re
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant Local Authority issued care proceedings in April 2011 concerning three children who were then living with their father (the Second Respondent) and, for a period, with their mother/step-mother (the First Respondent). The Local Authority relied exclusively on findings made in 2006 by Judge [Last Name] during earlier proceedings about a different child (now deceased). In that earlier case, the First Respondent had been placed in a “pool of possible perpetrators” responsible for the infant’s non-accidental injuries and death, although it was never established on the balance of probabilities that she had been the perpetrator.
At first instance, Judge [Last Name] held that those earlier findings were insufficient to satisfy the statutory “threshold” in s. 31(2) Children Act 1989 and dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal but granted permission for a further appeal so that the issue could be determined by the Supreme Court. Throughout the appellate stages the Local Authority expressly limited its case to one point: whether a parent’s inclusion in a previous pool of perpetrators, without more, can establish that a new child “is likely to suffer significant harm” for the purposes of s. 31(2)(a).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a prior judicial finding that a parent is within a pool of possible perpetrators of harm to another child, absent proof of actual perpetration, constitutes a fact capable of satisfying the “likely to suffer significant harm” threshold in s. 31(2)(a) Children Act 1989 in later proceedings involving different children.
- How the requirement for proven facts at the threshold stage interacts with Article 8 ECHR protections for family life.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant Local Authority’s Arguments
- The earlier court’s finding of a real possibility that the First Respondent harmed her deceased child is itself a “finding of fact” that may be relied upon in later proceedings.
- Requiring proof of actual perpetration imposes an unduly high threshold, impeding child-protection and creating inconsistency with criminal measures such as s. 5 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.
- Policy considerations favour a flexible approach that treats inclusion in a perpetrator pool as sufficient to trigger protective jurisdiction.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The statutory threshold demands proven facts; a mere possibility of past harm or perpetration does not satisfy s. 31(2)(a).
- Re-opening the issue would undermine the “bulwark” against unwarranted state interference in family life protected by Article 8 ECHR.
- The Local Authority had artificially limited its evidence; broader facts (e.g. failure-to-protect findings) were available but deliberately excluded, underscoring that the single pleaded ground was insufficient.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| In re M (A Minor) [1994] 2 AC 424 |
Interpretation of “is suffering” significant harm |
Historical context to threshold jurisprudence |
| In re H (Minors) [1996] AC 563 |
(1) Balance-of-probabilities standard
(2) “Likely” means a real possibility
(3) Need for proven facts at threshold |
Core authority reaffirmed; real possibility of past harm alone is insufficient |
| Lancashire CC v B [2000] 2 AC 147 |
Attributability where perpetrator unknown |
Distinguished; addressed s. 31(2)(b) not s. 31(2)(a) |
| In re O (Minors) [2004] 1 AC 523 |
Use of perpetrator pool at welfare stage |
Cited to show pool relevant later but not at threshold absent proven facts |
| In re B (Children) [2009] AC 11 |
Rejection of “heightened” civil standard; need for factual foundation |
Supports majority approach requiring proof, not suspicion |
| In re S-B (Children) [2010] 1 AC 678 |
Perpetrator identification & impermissibility of relying solely on “real possibility” |
Paragraph 49 treated as authoritative; followed by Supreme Court |
| Olsson v Sweden (1989) 11 EHRR 259 |
Article 8 ECHR – necessity of pressing social need |
Used to emphasise proportionality and factual basis for removal |
| In re B (Minors) (Practice) [1999] 1 WLR 238 |
Earlier dicta suggesting pool could satisfy likelihood |
Expressly disapproved as obiter and inconsistent with higher authority |
| In re F (Interim Care Order) [2011] 2 FLR 856 |
Application of Lancashire & S-B at interim stage |
Cited to illustrate Court of Appeal’s adherence to proven-facts rule |
| North Yorkshire CC v SA [2003] 2 FLR 849 |
Criteria for inclusion in pool of perpetrators |
Approved for welfare/attributability stages, not threshold |
B v Chief Constable Avon & Somerset [2001] 1 WLR 340;
R (McCann) v Manchester Crown Court [2003] 1 AC 787 |
Clarified civil standard of proof in serious allegations |
Referenced as having led to misunderstanding rectified in In re B |
Fairchild v Glenhaven [2003] 1 AC 32
and Sienkiewicz v Greif [2011] 2 AC 229 |
Special causation rules in tort |
Distinguished as compensatory, not predictive, regimes |
| R v Lane (1986) 82 Cr App R 5 |
Criminal law difficulty where perpetrator uncertain |
Contrasted with civil child-care context |
| Rochdale BC v A [1991] 2 FLR 192; Sloan v B 1991 SC 412; L, Petitioners (No 1) 1993 SLT 1310 |
Historical examples of unjustified removals |
Used illustratively to caution against unwarranted intervention |
| In re U (A Child) [2005] Fam 134 |
Re-asserted single civil standard |
Cited to explain evolution toward current approach |
| In re T (Care Proceedings: Appeal) [2010] 1 FLR 1325 |
Difficulties when judges speculate within perpetrator pools |
Referenced by Lord Wilson |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court (majority opinion by Lady Hale) confirmed the long-standing interpretive framework of s. 31(2) Children Act 1989:
- “Likely” in s. 31(2)(a) denotes a real possibility, but that possibility must be founded on facts proven to the civil standard.
- A prior court’s placement of a parent within a pool of possible perpetrators establishes only that the parent might have inflicted harm; it is not, of itself, a proven fact that the parent did so.
- Under In re H, In re B and In re S-B, suspicions or unresolved possibilities cannot satisfy the threshold. To hold otherwise would render the “is suffering” limb of s. 31(2)(a) redundant and erode the statutory protection for family life.
- While a parent’s presence in a pool may be information prompting further inquiry, it cannot alone ground a finding of future likelihood unless all possible perpetrators remain carers of the subject child.
- The doctrine safeguards Article 8 ECHR rights by ensuring state intervention is based on “relevant and sufficient” reasons.
- The Local Authority’s deliberate decision to rely on a single, unproven ground made the case a “one-point” appeal. Given the limitation, no lawful factual foundation existed to cross the threshold.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissals entered by Judge [Last Name] and the Court of Appeal. The care proceedings remain struck out; if the Local Authority wishes to protect the children on any other factual basis it must initiate fresh proceedings.
Implications: The judgment re-affirms that inclusion in a pool of perpetrators, without a proven finding of actual harm by the parent, cannot alone establish the s. 31(2)(a) “likelihood” threshold. The decision consolidates existing case-law, provides clarity for child-protection practitioners, and emphasises the constitutional importance of a robust factual foundation before long-term state intervention in family life.
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