Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2026 GAU-AS 8992-DB
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2026 GAU-AS 8992-DB
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Anjuman Ara Begum, was appointed as an Associate Professor at Royal School of Law and Administration, Assam Royal Global University (a private university) around 2022, completed probation, received salary revisions and was nominated as a Ph.D. Guide in March 2023. She claimed to be guiding six Ph.D. scholars (two at pre-submission stage). On request by one scholar to change guide, the University allowed the change; when the appellant protested she was asked to resign, had HR access and official email refused, and received no response to complaints to the Vice Chancellor and Chancellor. She was served a termination letter dated 17.10.2025 (served 25.10.2025) citing "insubordination" and "major misconduct". The appellant challenged her termination by a writ petition (WP(C) No.7101/2025). A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 17.03.2026 as not maintainable under Article 226, holding the termination to be a private contractual matter. The appellant appealed to the Division Bench (WA/159/2026). The Division Bench heard arguments and delivered this oral judgment on 22.06.2026, affirming the Single Judge and dismissing the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a private University regulated by UGC norms is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
  2. Whether the dispute arising from the appellant's termination is solely a contract of service (private law) or involves a public law element sufficient for constitutional writ jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The termination went beyond a simple employment dispute: it was without inquiry or show-cause and disrupted statutorily regulated Ph.D. supervision governed by binding UGC Regulations.
  • The termination adversely affected validity of many Ph.D. theses, third-party rights of research scholars, academic standards of the University and her statutory role as a recognized Ph.D. Supervisor.
  • A UGC-recognized institution is bound by UGC norms; imparting education is a public function and there is pervasive control by statutory authorities, creating a public law element amenable to writ jurisdiction.
  • Referred to authorities (including Roychan Abraham and several Supreme Court decisions) to support amenability of UGC-regulated institutions to writ jurisdiction.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The determinative test for bringing an entity within Article 12 is existence of deep and pervasive state control (funding, administration, functional autonomy); mere regulatory control or statutory recognition is insufficient.
  • Termination and retirement of an employee of a private University do not involve a public law element; the dispute is within private contractual domain.
  • Relied on Supreme Court decisions (including P.K. Biswas, Ramakrisha Mission, VST Industries, Army Welfare Education Society) to support the position that private universities are not state for Article 12 merely by regulation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Roychan Abraham -Vs- State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. :: 2019 SCC OnLine All 3935 Referred by appellant in support of the proposition that a UGC-regulated institution discharges a public function and is amenable to writ jurisdiction. Considered as part of appellant's submissions; the Court nonetheless held the termination to be contractual and dismissed the appeal.
Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust & Ors. -Vs- V.R. Rudani & Ors. :: (1989) 2 SCC 691 Referred by appellant/Supreme Court authority invoked in submissions regarding public function and amenability to writ jurisdiction. Referenced in submissions; the Court applied the legal principles on public vs private elements and concluded termination was within private contract.
Dr. Janet Jeyapaul -Vs- S.R.M. University & Ors. :: (2015) 16 SCC 530 Referred by appellant among authorities to support amenability of educational institutions to writ jurisdiction where public elements exist. Considered in submissions; the Court nevertheless found no sufficient public law element in the appellant's termination.
K. Krishnamacharyulu & Ors. -Vs- Shri Venkateshwara Hindu College of Engineering & Anr. :: (1997) 3 SCC 571 Referred by appellant as part of authorities on educational institutions and writ jurisdiction. Noted as part of appellant's reliance; Court affirmed Single Judge's conclusion that the present matter was contractual.
St. Mary's Education Society & Anr. -Vs- Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors. :: (2023) 4 SCC 498 Summarised by the Court (quoting paras) to state the test for maintainability under Article 226: writ maintainable against bodies discharging public duties/functions; but act complained must have direct nexus with discharge of public duty; individual contractual disputes lacking public element are not maintainable. The Court reproduced and applied the principles from this decision as central to its analysis, holding the appellant's termination lacked the required public law element and was governed by contract; judgment of the Single Judge was affirmed.
P.K. Biswas -Vs- Indian Institute of Chemical Biology :: (2002) 5 SCC 111 Referred by respondent to support the proposition that Article 12 characterization requires deep and pervasive state control; mere regulatory control insufficient. Cited in respondent's submissions; the Court's conclusion aligned with the view that regulatory recognition under UGC does not automatically convert the University into a State for Article 12 purposes, and termination remained contractual.
Ramakrisha Mission & Anr. -Vs- Kago Kunya & Ors. :: (2019) 16 SCC 303 Referred by respondent as authority on limits of writ jurisdiction and state-character analysis under Article 12. Considered in respondent's submissions; Court found the termination did not attract public law intervention and affirmed dismissal.
VST Industries Limited -Vs- Workers' Union :: (2001) 1 SCC 298 Referred by respondent in support of the position that private entities subject to regulation do not ipso facto become State actors for constitutional writs. Included among authorities relied upon by respondent; Court applied the private-contract analysis to the facts and dismissed the appeal.
Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi -Vs- Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors :: (2024) 16 SCC 598 Referred by respondent to illustrate limits of writ jurisdiction where deep and pervasive state control is absent. Noted in respondent's submissions; Court concluded that the facts did not disclose a public law element and upheld the Single Judge's order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226. It examined whether the appellant's termination involved a public law element or was confined to private contractual relations. The Court reproduced at length the summary from St. Mary's Education Society on maintainability under Article 226 (paras 75.1–75.5), emphasizing that a writ is maintainable only where the body discharges public duties/functions and the act complained of has a direct nexus with discharge of that public duty. The Court acknowledged the thin but real distinction between public and private law remedies and held that the determination depends on the factual matrix.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court observed that the appellant was appointed under terms of appointment in a private University, and her guideship was tied to her tenure as regular faculty. The termination, therefore, was governed by the contract and the University's statute and did not fall within the public law domain or constitute discharge of a public function warranting writ relief. On this basis the Court affirmed the Single Judge's conclusion that the writ petition was not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed and the judgment of the Single Judge dated 17.03.2026 is affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the appellant's termination remains governed by her contract of service and the University's statute; no writ relief was available in this case. The Court applied existing tests (as summarised in St. Mary's) to find absence of a public law element and did not establish any new legal principle beyond the application of those authorities to the facts of this case.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    ANJUMAN ARA BEGUM v. THE ASSAM ROYAL GLOBAL UNIVERSITY

    Page No.# 1/9

    GAHC010077082026

    2026:GAU-AS:8992-DB

    THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

    (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

    Case No. : WA/159/2026

    ANJUMAN ARA BEGUM

    D/O. LT. AYUB ALI, R/O. FLAT NO. 1B, DALIMI RESIDENCY, GHORAMARA,

    BHETAPARA, SURUJMUKHI PATH, GUWAHATI,

    KAMRUP (M), PIN-7810280.

    …… Appellant

    -VERSUS -

    THE ASSAM ROYAL GLOBAL UNIVERSITY,

    REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR ADMINISTRATION,

    BETKUCHI, NH 37, GUWAHATI-781035, ASSAM. …… Respondent

    - BEFORE - HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY

    For the Appellant : Ms. U. Chatterjee, Advocate (through Video Conferencing).

    : Mr. A.S. Choudhury, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mrs. R.S. Chowdhury, Advocate. Date of hearing : 22.06.2026.

    Date of Judgment : 22.06.2026.

    1

    J UDGMENT & O RDER ( O RAL) (Ashutosh Kumar, CJ)

    We have heard Ms. U. Chatterjee, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mrs. R.S. Chowdhury, learned Advocate for the sole respondent/Assam Royal Global University.

    2. The appellant, a Senior Academic and human rights Scholar, has preferred this appeal, assailing the judgment dated 17.03.2026 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C) No.7101/2025, dismissing the writ petition preferred by her as not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, holding that her termination from Assam Royal Global University, a private University, was only a private contractual matter between the employer and the employee and did not involve any public function, amenable to writ jurisdiction.

    3. The appellant strongly contests the afore-noted reasons for dismissal of her writ petition on the ground that her termination goes far beyond a simple employment dispute. Her termination was without any inquiry or show-cause notice, which directly disrupts statutorily regulated Ph.D. supervision processes, governed by the binding University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulations.

    The termination has also adversely affected the validity of many Ph.D. theses, third party rights of her Research Scholars, academic standards for the University and her own statutory role as a recognized Ph.D. Supervisor.

    2

    The appellant, therefore, seeks setting aside of the judgment impugned, the termination order and consequent reinstatement along with protection of her intellectual property rights in the concerned theses as also substantial compensation.

    4. The appellant was appointed as an Associate Professor at Royal School of Law and Administration, Assam Royal Global University sometimes in the year 2022. She claims to have successfully completed her probation and has received salary revisions and incentives for excellent performance. She was also nominated as a Ph.D. Guide in March, 2023. At the time of her termination, she had been guiding six Ph.D. scholars, two out of them were at the final pre-submission stage.

    5. The contention of the appellant is that on the request of one of her Scholars to change the Guide, the same was allowed by the University. When she protested, she was asked to resign and her official email and her HR access were refused. Her complaint to the Vice Chancellor and the Chancellor of the University also received no response.

    6. She was served with a termination letter on 25.10.2025, which letter was dated 17.10.2025 and it cited "insubordination" and "major misconduct" as the reasons for termination. The University hurriedly assigned her scholars to a new Supervisor, who, according to the appellant, is ineligible under the UGC Rules for being a Guide for Ph.D. scholars.

    7. The issue before the learned Single Judge was whether a

    3

    private University which is regulated by UGC norms is amenable to writ jurisdiction and whether the dispute between the appellant and the respondent involves only a contract of service.

    8. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition solely on the ground of maintainability, as noted above, holding that the termination of the appellant was a private affair between the University and the appellant, arising out of a contract of service.

    9. Ms. U. Chatterjee, learned Advocate for the appellant has submitted that the respondent/ University cannot be allowed to terminate a Professor in the University by-passing all norms. True it is that the University in question is a private University but it is bound by UGC Regulations. A UGC recognized institution is necessarily required to follow and comply with all UGC norms and Regulations governing appointments, service conditions, research supervision, Ph.D. course and has to maintain academic standards.

    There is a pervasive control of statutory authorities on the University and, therefore, a writ petition against such University would be maintainable. The correct test is to find out the nexus between the act, against which grievance has been laid, and discharge of public duty. Since the University is imparting education which is necessarily a public function, it would be amenable to writ jurisdiction.

    10. Ms. Chatterji has referred to the judgment of the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Roychan Abraham -Vs- State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. :: 2019 SCC OnLine All 3935 and the judgments of Supreme

    4

    Court rendered in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust & Ors. -Vs- V.R. Rudani & Ors. :: (1989) 2 SCC 691; Dr. Janet Jeyapaul -Vs- S.R.M. University & Ors. :: (2015) 16 SCC 530; K. Krishnamacharyulu & Ors. -Vs- Shri Venkateshwara Hindu College of Engineering & Anr. :: (1997) 3 SCC 571 and St. Mary's Education Society & Anr. -Vs- Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors. :: (2023) 4 SCC 498.

    11. The sum and substance of the argument of the appellant is that an institution recognized under the UGC framework, indubitably discharges higher public function and therefore, is amenable to writ jurisdiction. Imparting education is a constitutional and public function and, therefore, the teachers and professors do acquire an element of public interest in the performance of their duties and that termination of a professor from service involves a significant public law element directly pertaining to the obligations of the University to adhere to the binding regulations laid down by the UGC.

    12. Counterveiling arguments have been made by Ms. R.S. Chowdhury, learned Advocate for the respondent/University, who, by referring to the various decisions of the Supreme Court has submitted that the determinitive test for bringing an entity within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is the existence of deep and pervasive state control, particularly in the matters of funding, administration and functional autonomy. Mere regulatory control; or statutory recognition; or incorporation by statute would not be sufficient to clothe a body with the character of a state as enunciated in Article 12 of the Constitution and that in cases of termination and retirement of an employee of a private

    5

    University, no public law element is involved.

    13. Ms. Chowdhury has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in P.K. Biswas -Vs- Indian Institute of Chemical Biology :: (2002) 5 SCC 111; Ramakrisha Mission & Anr. -Vs- Kago Kunya & Ors. :: (2019)

    16 SCC 303; VST Industries Limited -Vs- Workers' Union :: (2001) 1 SCC 298; Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi -Vs- Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors :: (2024) 16 SCC 598.

    14. It has thus been argued on behalf of the respondent/University that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable.

    15. It would be profitable here to reproduce the summary of the grounds with respect to maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the Supreme Court in the case of St. Mary's Education Society -Vs- Rajendra Prasad Bhargava (supra), which has been quoted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment as well.

    "75. We may sum up our final conclusions as under:-

    75.1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.

    75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the

    6

    discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of 'State' within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has a public law element.

    75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a 'public function' or 'public duty' be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.

    75.4. Even if it be perceived that imparting education by private unaided school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a non-teaching staff engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether 'A' or 'B' is employed by the school to discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of contract between a school and non-teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be Initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of non-teaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered with by the court. But such interference will be on the ground of breach of

    7

    law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of public duty.

    75.5 From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a private character."

    Emphasis provided]

    16. The learned Single Judge, with respect to the prayers made by the appellant in the writ petition, has observed that a matter which lies entirely within the private realm of affairs of a public body, may not lend itself for being dealt with under the writ jurisdiction.

    17. The Court has also held that the distinction between the public law and private law elements may be thin one but it cannot be obliterated totally. A dichotomy between the public law and private law remedies would depend upon the factual matix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field cannot be demarcated with precision.

    18. Thus, finding that the appellant had been appointed in a private University under certain terms and conditions, inhering in the order of appointment itself and her tenure of guideship being limited to the period till she remained associated as a regular faculty of the University, her termination would not fall within the realm of discharge of duty of a public function/University so as to make it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    19. We subscribe to the same view as that of the learned Single Judge which has the sanction of law and hold that the termination of the

    8

    services of the appellant was governed by the contract and the first statute of the University which cannot be said to be in the public law domain.

    20. For the afore-noted reasons, we affirm the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and dismiss this appeal.

    JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE

    Comparing Assistant

    9

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    ANJUMAN ARA BEGUM v. THE ASSAM ROYAL GLOBAL UNIVERSITY
    (Jun 22, 2026)