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2026 INSC 148
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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  • Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 12 of the Constitution
  • Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Limitation Act, 1963
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2026 INSC 148
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 12 of the Constitution
  • Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Limitation Act, 1963
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, the Managing Committee of Namatara Girls' High School, filed an application under Section 24B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969 before the State Education Tribunal, Bhubaneswar (G.I.A. Case No. 623 of 2011), seeking release of grant-in-aid. By order dated 30 December 2013, the Tribunal allowed the application and directed the State of Odisha and the Director of Secondary Education, Odisha to release grant-in-aid to the teaching and non-teaching staff as directed.

The State of Odisha filed an appeal before the High Court of Orissa (FAO No. 582 of 2015) on 16 October 2015. The appeal was time-barred and was also not accompanied by the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order; for about eight years, the certified copy was not filed. On 26 April 2023, the High Court dismissed the appeal for failure to file the certified copy.

The State obtained the certified copy on 13 February 2024 and filed (i) an application seeking recall of the High Court’s order dated 26 April 2023 (I.A. No. 165 of 2024), along with (ii) an application for condonation of delay of 291 days (I.A. No. 126 of 2025). On 21 February 2025, the High Court rejected condonation, observing that the appeal filed on 16 October 2015 was inherently defective and that the delay in presenting the appeal exceeded 11 years; the recall application was dismissed as time-barred.

The State challenged the High Court’s order dated 21 February 2025 in the present special leave petition. There was a delay of 123 days in filing the SLP and a further delay of 96 days in re-filing after curing defects; the State sought condonation (IA No. 34867 of 2026) citing procedural delay and approvals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State of Odisha showed “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to warrant condonation of delay in filing and re-filing the special leave petition.
  2. Consequently, whether the special leave petition could be entertained or had to be dismissed as time-barred.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (State of Odisha) Arguments

  • The delay in presenting the special leave petition was not deliberate.
  • Relying on a “long line of decisions,” counsel urged a liberal approach to condonation when the petitioner is a State/authority under Article 12 of the Constitution.
  • The Court should condone delay and direct the High Court to revive the appeal and decide the challenge to the Tribunal’s order dated 30 December 2013 on merits.

Respondent's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji (19 87) 2 SCC 107 Justice-oriented, liberal approach to “sufficient cause,” with preference for substantial justice over technicalities, particularly where the State seeks condonation. Recognized as establishing a liberal approach; the Court considered this line of authority while deciding whether to condone delay.
G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 While limitation binds all, “sufficient cause” assessment may account for governmental decision-making delays (“play at the joints”) within reasonable limits; cited Katiji’s substantial justice passage. Discussed as part of the liberal approach tradition; later read alongside Amateur Riders to emphasize limits to governmental latitude.
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited (2012) 3 SCC 563 Illustrative of a stricter approach: substantial delay (427 days) not condoned. Cited to show a discernible shift towards stricter scrutiny of delay-condonation applications in recent years.
University of Delhi v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 745 Delay (916 days) not condoned; referenced as another instance of stricter approach. Used as an example supporting the Court’s observation about stricter trends in condonation jurisprudence.
Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) (2024) 12 SCC 336 Limitation is founded on public policy to end legal remedies; merits cannot be considered at the delay-condonation stage. Relied on to reinforce that limitation serves finality and that merits are irrelevant when deciding condonation.
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India (2023) 10 SCC 531 Distinction between “explanation” and “excuse” in delay; different approach between deciding condonation in the first instance and appellate review of condonation granted by a High Court. Invoked to frame scrutiny of the State’s pleaded cause as requiring a genuine explanation rather than a mere excuse.
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603 Even for Government, there is a limit to latitude; stereotyped, bureaucratic-delay explanations may be judicially unacceptable; condonation refused and SLP dismissed as time-barred. Quoted in full and applied to emphasize that courts cannot indefinitely excuse governmental lethargy and bureaucratic indifference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the State’s condonation plea and found that “no cause, much less sufficient cause,” had been shown. Although the Court acknowledged the established principle that “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is elastic and meant to advance justice, it decided to test the State’s explanation against both the liberal and stricter lines of authority.

The Court traced the liberal approach from Katiji and Ramegowda, which recognize that governmental decisions are institutional and may involve procedural delay, and that courts may allow some latitude within reasonable limits. However, it noted that later decisions reflected a stricter approach (e.g., Living Media and University of Delhi), and that Pathapati Subba Reddy reiterated limitation as public policy and clarified that merits are not to be assessed at the delay-condonation stage.

The Court emphasized the conceptual distinction (from Sheo Raj Singh) between a genuine “explanation” and a mere “excuse.” It then relied heavily on Amateur Riders, highlighting that this Court had earlier admonished bureaucratic indifference and held that there is a point beyond which courts cannot assist even governmental litigants.

On the facts, the Court found the State of Odisha “utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent” in the High Court and in the Supreme Court, noting that despite the High Court’s dismissal on limitation grounds, the State approached the Supreme Court four months after expiry of limitation. The pleaded reasons—procedural delays and approvals—were treated as a “lame excuse” rather than sufficient cause. Since condonation is discretionary and not a matter of right, the Court declined to exercise discretion in the State’s favour.

Procedurally, the Court also recorded that after initially indicating dismissal and briefly recording withdrawal, it recalled that withdrawal dismissal at counsel’s request for a reasoned order, and dismissed the SLP as time-barred based on the contents of the condonation application, with reasons subsequently provided in the order.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED: The applications for condonation of delay in filing and in re-filing the special leave petition were rejected; consequently, the special leave petition was dismissed as barred by time.

Implications: The High Court’s order dated 21 February 2025 (rejecting condonation and dismissing the recall application as time-barred) remains undisturbed. The Supreme Court did not direct revival of the High Court appeal or merits consideration of the Tribunal’s grant-in-aid order. The decision applies established limitation/condonation principles to the State’s pleaded explanation and does not indicate that any new precedent was set.

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    STATE OF ODISHA v. MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL, NAMATARA

    2026 INSC 148

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) DIARY NO. 54941/2025 STATE OF ODISHA & ORS. …PETITIONERS

    VERSUS

    MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA

    GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL …RESPONDENT

    O R D E R

    1. Respondent-Managing Committee of Namatara Girls' High School1had approached the State Education Tribunal2, Bhubaneswar, Odisha with an application3under Section 24B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969 for release of grant-in-aid.

    2. By an order dated 30thDecember, 2013, the Tribunal allowed the application by directing the State of Odisha and the Director of Secondary Education, Odisha to release grant-in-aid in favour of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school in the manner as directed.

    1 school

    2 Tribunal

    3 G.I.A. Case No.623 of 2011

    1

    2

    3. The order dated 30thDecember, 2013 was carried in appeal4by the State of Odisha before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack5on 16thOctober, 2015. The appeal was time-barred. Not only that, the appeal was not accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned order. Since presentation of the appeal, for a period of 8 years to be precise, the State of Odisha had not filed the certified copy of the impugned order. By an order dated 26thApril, 2023, the High Court dismissed the appeal citing failure to file the certified copy of the Tribunal's order as the reason.

    4. Stung by such order, the State of Odisha woke up from its slumber. It obtained the certified copy of the Tribunal's order dated 30thDecember, 2013 on 13thFebruary, 2024. A week later, the State of Odisha filed an application6seeking recall of the order dated 26thApril, 2023. Together with such application was filed an application for condonation of delay7 seeking condonation of 291 days' delay.

    5. The application for condonation of delay was taken up for consideration by the High Court on 21stFebruary, 2025. Having noted that the certified copy of the impugned order was filed only on 13thFebruary, 2024, the High Court correctly observed that the appeal filed on 16thOctober, 2015 was inherently defective and the delay in presenting the appeal is in excess of 11 years. Considering the aforesaid position, the application for

    4 FAO No. 582 of 2015

    5 High Court

    6 I.A. No.16 5 of 2024

    7 I.A. No.126 of 2025

    3

    condonation of delay was rejected resulting in the application for recall being dismissed as time-barred.

    6. The order of the High Court dated 21stFebruary, 2025 is challenged by the State of Odisha in this special leave petition.

    7. It is noted that there is a delay of 123 days in filing the special leave petition and a further delay of 96 days in re-filing the same after curing defects. In the application for condonation of delay8, the State of Odisha seeks to explain the delay by pleading as follows:

    "3. It is submitted that the Petitioner on receipt of order of the Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 26.04.2023 and order dated 21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 and in I.A. No. 126 of 2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 the petitioner considered the matter and sent it to the law department opined that it is a fit case for filing the present SLP against the impugned judgements dated 26.04.2023 and order dated 21.02.2025.

    4. That the delay in filing the appeal was on account of procedural delay in obtaining approval from the higher authority. The delay caused is not deliberate and intentional."

    8. Ms. Sanjana Saddy, learned counsel appearing for the State of Odisha, submits that the delay in presenting the special leave petition is not deliberate and having regard to the long line of decisions of this Court advocating a liberal approach when an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution is the petitioner seeking condonation of delay, she urges that the delay be condoned and this Court may direct the High Court to examine the challenge to the order dated 30thDecember, 2013 of the Tribunal on merits, upon revival of the appeal.

    8 IA No.348 67 of 2026

    4

    9. We had, upon hearing Ms. Sanjana, started dictating an order of dismissal of the special leave petition. It was then that she prayed for withdrawal of the special leave petition. We had so recorded. However, when we were about to rise for the day, Ms. Sanjana prayed for recall of the order of dismissal of the special leave petition as withdrawn; she also submitted, on instructions, that the State of Odisha would invite a detailed order with reasons in support of dismissal of the special leave petition.

    10. We recalled the order dismissing the special leave petition as withdrawn and, instead, dismissed the same as time-barred considering paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application for condonation of delay, excerpted above, with the observation that reasons would follow.

    11. We now proceed to assign our reasons.

    12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in the application for condonation of delay is such that with much ado, the proceedings could be closed.

    13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court propounding the law that the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.

    5

    14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag

    v. Mst Katiji9, a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it is not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy, mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed called for when a 'State' seeks condonation of delay as distinguished from 'a private party'.

    15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer10 had referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the following passage therefrom:

    "When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay … It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

    Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under:

    15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.

    16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its

    9 (19 87) 2 SCC 107

    10 (1988) 2 SCC 142

    6

    officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross- purposes with it.

    17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes

    "sufficient cause" for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. …

    16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly strict approach while dealing with applications for condonation of delay during the last decade and a half became discernible starting with the decision in

    Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited11, where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition was not condoned.

    University of Delhi v. Union of India12is another decision (of a three- Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was not condoned. While upholding the decision of the relevant high court under challenge refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a

    11 (2012) 3 SCC 563

    12 (2020) 13 SCC 745

    7

    deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)13 very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was also held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits of the case cannot be considered at the stage of considering the application for condonation of delay.

    17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India14 authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an 'explanation' and an 'excuse' that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a different approach has to be adopted while this Court is considering an application for condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.

    13 (2024) 12 SCC 336

    14 (2023) 10 SCC 531

    8

    18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions post

    Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in

    Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay15and admonishing officers of the "revenue" in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in

    Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:

    1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for the Revenue.

    2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out in petitioner's own words:

    "(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file.

    (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993."

    3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to

    15 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603

    9

    present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest.

    4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time.

    (emphasis ours)

    19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in

    Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible support for such optimism and the Court's patience having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government.

    20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation.

    21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a "State", we are of the clear opinion that

    10

    the cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has been set up.

    22. The applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-barred.

    ………..……………………………J.

    (DIPANKAR DATTA)

    …….……..…………………………J.

    (SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)

    NEW DELHI;

    FEBRUARY 09, 2026.

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    STATE OF ODISHA v. MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL, NAMATARA
    (Feb 9, 2026)