Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Shahid Khan (accused No.14), was prosecuted in Special Case No.744 of 2023 along with nineteen others for offences under Sections 153A and 120B IPC and various provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAP Act), based on a charge-sheet in Crime No.328 of 2022. Allegations include membership and leadership roles in the Popular Front of India (PFI), conspiracy to radicalise and train youth, involvement in murder of a Hindu leader, organising meetings and training camps, and fundraising. The appellant was arrested on 22.09.2022. The trial court rejected his bail application by order dated 02.05.2025, holding there were reasonable grounds and that Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act barred grant of bail. The appellant filed the present appeal under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act read with Section 25 of the UAP Act challenging the bail rejection; he also filed I.A. No.2 of 2025 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking summons of the case-diary.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the impugned order rejecting bail suffers from arbitrariness or illegality warranting interference by this Court.
- Whether absence of sanction under Section 18 of the UAP Act precludes framing of charges or continuation of proceedings against the appellant.
- Whether non-compliance with procedure under Chapter V (Section 25) of the UAP Act at the time of seizure vitiates prosecution and warrants bail.
- Whether the appellant is entitled to summon the case-diary under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for purposes of this bail appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- At the time of FIR registration, PFI was not a scheduled or unlawful association; Section 16 UAP Act does not apply.
- Allegations against appellant relate to training service teams and raising funds; offences under Sections 18, 18A, 18B attract imprisonment up to five years and do not justify denial of bail on prima facie basis.
- Insufficient material to presume commission of offences; 707 witnesses listed but charges not framed; pre-trial incarceration cannot be compensated by eventual acquittal.
- Some co-accused have been granted bail; appellant has been in custody over two years and four months; trial delay militates in favour of bail.
- No sanction was granted for prosecution under Section 18 of UAP Act; trial court erred in treating sanction as not limited to particular accused.
- Investigating Officer did not follow Section 25/Chapter V UAP Act while seizing cash; seized cash is legitimately earned — seizure irregularity weakens Section 17 allegations.
- Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to summon case-diary is necessary to assess investigation, materials, contradictions and compliance with procedure.
Respondent-State's Arguments
- Appellant's successive bail application was previously rejected on 21.02.2024; no change in law or circumstances justifying successive bail petition was shown.
- Investigation materials indicate appellant was active in PFI operations, recruitment, meetings, training camps and fundraising supporting unlawful activities and conspiracy; significant cash was recovered linking finances to conspiracy.
- There are reasonable grounds to believe accusations are prima facie true; Section 43D(5) UAP Act bars grant of bail in view of prima facie material.
- I.A. No.2 seeking case-diary is barred; appellant lacks locus to summon case-diary and it is not to be made available to the accused; only the Court may call it for reference.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Mohammad Tapseer @ Mohammed Tafseer v. State of Karnataka Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.12446 of 2025 dated 31.10.2025 |
The opinion lists this judgment as relied upon by the appellant; specific rule/principle from it is not stated in the opinion. |
Cited by appellant; not otherwise applied or discussed in the Court's reasoning in this opinion. |
| Vernon v. State of Maharashtra and another |
The opinion lists this judgment as relied upon by the appellant; specific rule/principle from it is not stated in the opinion. (Footnote: (2023) 15 SCC 56) |
Cited by appellant; not otherwise applied or discussed in the Court's reasoning in this opinion. |
| R. Dineshkumar Alias Deena v. State represented by Inspector of Police and others |
The opinion lists this judgment as relied upon by the appellant; specific rule/principle from it is not stated in the opinion. (Footnote: (2015) 7 SCC 497) |
Cited by appellant; not otherwise applied or discussed in the Court's reasoning in this opinion. |
| Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and Another |
The opinion lists this judgment as relied upon by the appellant; specific rule/principle from it is not stated in the opinion. (Footnote: (2004 ) 7 SCC 528) |
Cited by appellant; not otherwise applied or discussed in the Court's reasoning in this opinion. |
| Athar Parwez v. Union of India |
The opinion lists this judgment as relied upon by the appellant; specific rule/principle from it is not stated in the opinion. (Footnote: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762) |
Cited by appellant; not otherwise applied or discussed in the Court's reasoning in this opinion. |
| Girish Sharma and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others |
The opinion lists this judgment as relied upon by the respondent-State; specific rule/principle from it is not stated in the opinion. (Footnote: (2018) 15 SCC 192) |
Cited by respondent; not otherwise applied or discussed in the Court's reasoning in this opinion. |
| Vinod Ramnani and Another v. Station House Officer and another |
The opinion lists this judgment as relied upon by the respondent-State; specific rule/principle from it is not stated in the opinion. (Footnote: 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 1269) |
Cited by respondent; not otherwise applied or discussed in the Court's reasoning in this opinion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court identified the central question as whether the trial court's rejection of bail was arbitrary or illegal. It observed that successive bail applications are not barred per se but can be entertained only if there is a demonstrable change in circumstances since prior rejection. The appellant relied on three newly advanced grounds: (1) procedural non-compliance under Chapter V (Section 25) UAP Act during seizure, (2) absence of sanction under Section 18 UAP Act, and (3) delay in commencement of trial.
On sanction (Section 45 UAP Act), the Court analysed the statutory text and held that sanction is a pre-condition for taking cognizance of offences under specified Chapters; the bar applies to offences (not to particular accused). Therefore, absence of sanction in respect of a particular accused does not by itself preclude framing of charges or continuation of proceedings if cognizance has been taken for the offences alleged.
On alleged non-compliance with Section 25 (seizure procedure), the Court acknowledged procedural lapses but held that such failure, standing alone, does not justify grant of bail where there is material connecting the accused to the offence; procedural irregularity may be treated as irregularity but does not go to the root of the prosecution. Determination whether ingredients of Sections 17 and 18 are satisfied is a matter for trial; the Court will not conduct a mini-trial at bail stage.
On I.A. No.2 seeking the case-diary, the Court relied on Section 172(2) Cr.P.C. and held the accused has no locus to call for the case-diary; the case-diary may be called by the Court for reference but not summoned at the instance of the accused. Consequently, the application to summon the case-diary was dismissed.
Having considered the materials and noting the trial court had dealt with the material, the Court concluded there was no arbitrariness or illegality warranting interference with the rejection of bail.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED. I.A. No.2 of 2025 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are dismissed.
Implications: The trial court's order rejecting bail stands and the appellant remains subject to continued prosecution and custody as per the trial process. The Court did not announce any new legal precedent beyond applying statutory interpretation and established principles on successive bail applications; no broader doctrinal change was declared in this opinion.
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