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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2025 INSC 1282
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 156(3) of the Code, Order XLI Rule 5 read with Section 151 of the CPC
  • Section 173(8) of the Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Right to Information Act, 2005
  • Section 460 of the Code
  • Section 156(3)5 of the Code, Section 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 of the IPC, Section 173(8) Cr.P.C
  • Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 1513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'CPC')
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2025 INSC 1282
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 156(3) of the Code, Order XLI Rule 5 read with Section 151 of the CPC
  • Section 173(8) of the Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Right to Information Act, 2005
  • Section 460 of the Code
  • Section 156(3)5 of the Code, Section 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 of the IPC, Section 173(8) Cr.P.C
  • Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 1513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'CPC')
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from a long-standing dispute over a immovable property in Belagavi, Karnataka.

The appellant–complainant (Sadiq B. Hanchinmani) filed a civil suit, O.S. No.43/2009, before the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Belagavi, seeking:

  • A declaration that he is the owner in possession of the suit property on the basis of an alleged oral gift from his father, Bashirahmad; and
  • A declaration that a registered sale deed dated 03.02.2009 executed by his father in favour of accused no.1 (Veena) is illegal, void, and not binding on him.

The father, Bashirahmad, remained ex parte and did not contest the suit. By judgment dated 28.03.2013, the civil court dismissed the suit and upheld the sale deed in favour of accused no.1.

The appellant filed a first appeal, R.F.A. No.4095/2013, before the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, challenging the dismissal. In that appeal, he sought a stay of operation of the judgment and decree under Order XLI Rule 5 read with Section 151 CPC. By order dated 03.06.2013, the High Court directed maintenance of status quo regarding title and possession of the suit property. This interim order was continued during the pendency of the appeal and was later vacated by order dated 28.03.2016, when the keys of the premises were handed over to accused no.1. Ultimately, R.F.A. No.4095/2013 was decided in favour of the private respondents.

During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant claims that on 18.06.2015, accused no.1 (Veena) and her husband, along with others, broke open the lock of the suit property, trespassed, and started renovation/construction without permission, notwithstanding the subsisting status quo order. On receiving a notice from the appellant, the work was stopped. The appellant later came to know that on 18.10.2015, accused nos.1 and 2 and others again broke open the lock and recommenced work.

The appellant then filed I.A. No.1/2015 under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC in R.F.A. No.4095/2013 before the High Court, seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against accused nos.1 and 4 for breach of the status quo order. In reply to this application, accused no.1 produced a document described as a Rent/Lease Agreement dated 20.05.2013, printed on an E-Stamp Paper bearing No.IN-KA82473995873571L dated 20.05.2013, allegedly showing that she had already let out the suit property to accused no.2 on 20.05.2013 (i.e., before the status quo order of 03.06.2013) at a rent of Rs.3,000 per month, along with rent receipts.

The appellant approached the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps, Bengaluru, under the Right to Information Act to verify the E-Stamp Paper. On obtaining certified copies of the stamp paper bearing the same serial number and date, he discovered that this E-Stamp had in fact been used for a sale agreement between one J.D. Duradundi and one S.B. Janagouda, completely unconnected with the alleged Rent Agreement between accused nos.1 and 2. The appellant claimed that this demonstrated that the Rent Agreement and accompanying rent receipts were forged, fabricated, and ante-dated to circumvent the High Court’s status quo order and to justify possession.

The appellant also lodged a complaint with Khade Bazar Police Station, Belagavi, regarding the alleged forgery and fabrication of the Rent Agreement, but no action was taken.

Subsequently, the appellant filed a private criminal complaint, PCR No.1/2018, before the Judicial Magistrate First Class-III, Belagavi (JMFC), against the private respondents for offences under Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 IPC. By order dated 18.01.2018, the JMFC held that the matter required investigation and referred the case to Khade Bazar Police Station under Section 156(3) CrPC. The JMFC noted that the complainant had complied with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Priyanka Shrivastava v. State of UP, (2015) 6 SCC 287. Pursuant to this referral, FIR Crime No.12/2018 was registered against accused nos.1 to 7, and investigation commenced.

The accused challenged the referral and FIR before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC:

  • In CRLP No.100549/2018 (First Impugned Order dated 24.07.2019), the High Court quashed the proceedings against accused nos.1 and 3, holding that the JMFC had ordered “further investigation” without application of mind and without there being any legal basis for “further investigation” at that stage.
  • In CRLP No.100651/2018 (Second Impugned Order dated 18.11.2021), the High Court extended similar reasoning and quashed the proceedings against accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7, observing, inter alia, that their role in any alleged forgery or fabrication had not been clearly specified and that, in any event, the civil court had held that the registered sale deed in favour of accused no.1 conveyed valid title.

The complainant–appellant approached the Supreme Court through Special Leave Petitions (Criminal) Nos.11336 of 2022 and Diary No.39619 of 2022 (later converted to criminal appeals) challenging both High Court orders. Delay was condoned and leave was granted in both petitions. The Supreme Court’s judgment dated 04.11.2025 disposes of these criminal appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the direction for investigation issued by the JMFC under Section 156(3) CrPC, which had led to registration of FIR Crime No.12/2018 and was subsequently quashed by the High Court, was justified on the facts and circumstances of the case.
  2. Whether there was sufficient material before the JMFC to justify referring the matter for police investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, resulting in the institution of the FIR.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Rent/Lease Agreement produced by Chandrumal M. Parchani (accused/respondent) on E-Stamp Paper, purportedly dated 20.05.2013, is a fake document.
  • The Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps, Karnataka, on the basis of reports from the Area Manager (E-Stamping) and the authorized signatory of Karnataka State Souharda Federal Co-operative Ltd., Bengaluru, addressed a letter to the Registrar, High Court of Karnataka, stating that, prima facie, the E-Stamp used for the Rent Agreement was fake.
  • The District Registrar, Belagavi, directed that a police complaint be filed against Chandrumal M. Parchani (purchaser of the E-Stamp Paper) and Sri Gajanana Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit, Danegalli, Shahapur, Belagavi (the entity that sold the alleged fake E-Stamp Paper), and a separate complaint was filed against that entity.
  • When the appellant sought a certified copy of the Rent Agreement from the Department of Stamps and Registration, he found that the E-Stamp Paper number and date corresponded to an entirely different sale agreement between third parties. The certified copy did not tally with the E-Stamp Paper produced before the High Court, confirming that the E-Stamp Paper used for the Rent Agreement was forged.
  • All private respondents in both appeals acted in collusion to concoct, forge, fabricate and manufacture the Rent/Lease Agreement and rent receipts, with the mala fide intent of obtaining a favourable order in the civil appeal and securing possession of the suit property. They thereby played fraud upon the Court and obstructed the administration of justice.
  • There is a strong possibility of a criminal conspiracy among the accused, supported by prima facie material indicating that the E-Stamp Paper and the Rent Agreement were forged.
  • The appellant wrote to various authorities, including the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Secretary to the Chief Justice, by letter dated 14.09.2017, directed follow-up on the investigation regarding the purchaser of the alleged fake E-Stamp and the issuing society, demonstrating institutional concern about the forgery.
  • The High Court failed to properly apply the law laid down in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, which holds that criminal proceedings should generally not be interdicted at the threshold when an FIR discloses prima facie material, and the police should be allowed to complete the investigation and submit a final report.
  • The conduct of Veena (accused no.1), who had earlier filed Special Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos.1667–1668 of 2016 (Meena M. Dongare v. Sadiq S/o Bashirahmad Hanchanmani) against an interim order dated 07.12.2015 in the R.F.A., but withdrew them on the first date with liberty to move the High Court, was relied upon to show concealment and lack of candour.
  • The High Court, in the Impugned Orders, ignored manifest discrepancies in the E-Stamp Paper (including party names and stamp duty details) and turned a “blind eye” to the apparent forgery.
  • The investigation was at a nascent stage and the accused were on anticipatory bail; allowing the investigation to continue would not have caused any prejudice. Instead of quashing the proceedings, the High Court ought to have let the investigation proceed to its logical conclusion.
  • The disputed document was first produced before the High Court in R.F.A. No.4095/2013, and only then did the appellant learn of its existence. After obtaining copies from the concerned department and reports from Karnataka State Souharda Federal Co-operative Ltd., it became evident that accused no.2 had forged the E-Stamp and the Rent/Lease Agreement. Hence, an in-depth police investigation was necessary.

Respondent No.1 – State of Karnataka

  • Counsel for the State broadly reiterated several submissions made by the appellant, while adding clarifications.
  • In the proceedings culminating in the Second Impugned Order, respondents nos.2 to 5 (accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7) argued before the High Court that, since the earlier petition by accused nos.1 and 3 (CRLP No.100549/2018) had resulted in quashing of proceedings against them, parity required that similar relief be extended to accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7.
  • The State contended that the allegations against accused nos.1 and 3 were materially different from those against accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7, and therefore, the plea of parity was misconceived and should not have been accepted.
  • The State submitted that even if the JMFC’s referral order dated 18.01.2018 suffered from any defect in form or wording, it was at best an irregularity falling under Section 460 CrPC, which deals with irregularities that do not vitiate proceedings. Such an irregularity was curable and did not justify quashing the proceedings.
  • It was argued that the High Court, instead of quashing the FIR, should have remanded the matter to the JMFC to cure any technical defect in the order of referral.
  • The State pointed out that, contrary to the High Court’s observation that the role of accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7 was unclear, the documents on record showed that the forged E-Stamp Paper was purchased by accused no.2, thus providing concrete material warranting investigation.
  • The State prayed that appropriate orders be passed, taking into account these submissions.

Private Respondents' Arguments

  • Counsel for the accused–private respondents entered appearance but did not file any counter-affidavit in the Supreme Court.
  • They supported the Impugned Orders of the High Court and submitted that no valid grounds had been made out to interfere with the quashing of the proceedings.
  • It was submitted that, by order dated 28.03.2016 in I.A. No.3/2016, the High Court in R.F.A. No.4095/2013 vacated the earlier status quo order dated 03.06.2013 in respect of the suit property, and the keys of the premises were handed over to accused no.1 while the appeal was still pending.
  • The appellant was alleged to be harbouring ulterior motives against the private respondents, and the institution of the private complaint, PCR No.1/2018, was portrayed as a product of such malice.
  • Since R.F.A. No.4095/2013 relating to the suit property was ultimately decided in favour of the private respondents, it was argued that no criminal liability could be cast upon them in respect of events connected with the same property.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Priyanka Shrivastava v. State of UP, (2015) 6 SCC 287 The judgment contains directions regarding the filing of applications/complaints leading to orders under Section 156(3) CrPC. The JMFC’s order dated 18.01.2018 expressly recorded that the complainant had complied with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in this case, thus supporting the propriety of entertaining the private complaint and referring it for investigation.
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 High Court’s power to quash or stay investigation under Section 482 CrPC; need for circumspection, especially at an initial stage when FIR discloses cognizable offences; balance between preventing abuse of process and allowing genuine investigations. The appellant relied on this decision to argue that the High Court should not have stifled the investigation at the threshold. The Supreme Court quoted paragraphs emphasising that, where facts are hazy and investigation has just begun, the High Court must usually permit investigation to proceed and, when faced with a quashing request, should limit itself to examining whether the FIR discloses a cognizable offence. These principles were applied to hold that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing FIR Crime No.12/2018.
Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan, (1998) 7 SCC 59 Consequences of breach of an injunction or interim order: even if an injunction order is later set aside, a prior violation committed while it was in force can still attract consequences for the violator. The Supreme Court invoked this principle to emphasise that any violation of the High Court’s status quo order dated 03.06.2013 during its subsistence (e.g., alleged renovations/trespass on 18.10.2015) could still have consequences, notwithstanding that the status quo order was subsequently vacated on 28.03.2016.
Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 499 Reiteration of the legal position stated in Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan regarding consequences for breach of an injunction order even if later set aside. Referenced in a footnote to show that the principle from Samee Khan has been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court (with one of the present coram, P. Mithal, J., being a party), lending contemporary support to applying that principle to the present facts.
Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615 Scope of a Magistrate’s discretion on receiving a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence; power to forward the complaint to police under Section 156(3) CrPC before taking cognizance; inability to revert to Section 156(3) once cognizance is taken and proceedings under Chapter XV CrPC are begun. The Supreme Court quoted paragraph 18 to underscore that a Magistrate, upon receiving a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence, may justifiably forward it to the police under Section 156(3) if that course is conducive to justice and conserves judicial time, provided it is done at the pre-cognizance stage. This supported the view that the JMFC’s referral order dated 18.01.2018, made at the pre-cognizance stage, was in accordance with law.
Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439 Parameters for exercise of powers under Sections 156(3) and 202 CrPC; distinction between pre-cognizance direction for investigation under Section 156(3) and post-cognizance inquiry/investigation under Section 202; necessity of application of mind before issuing a Section 156(3) direction. The Court extensively quoted this decision to affirm that:
  • Section 156(3) is invoked before cognizance, when the Magistrate, after applying his mind, finds it appropriate to direct immediate police investigation; and
  • Section 202 applies post-cognizance when the Magistrate is still assessing whether there is sufficient ground to proceed.
Applying these principles, the Court held that the JMFC had rightly used Section 156(3) to refer the private complaint for investigation, and that the High Court erred in treating the referral as an unjustified or improper “further investigation”.
Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1; (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 Categorisation of cases and circumstances in which preliminary inquiry may precede registration of an FIR, as discussed in para 120.6 of the judgment. Referred to within the quotation from Ramdev Food Products to illustrate that certain categories of cases (those mentioned in para 120.6 of Lalita Kumari) may appropriately be dealt with under Section 202 CrPC. The reference helped clarify the demarcation between cases suited for direct investigation under Section 156(3) and those where a Section 202 inquiry is more appropriate.
Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, (1976) 3 SCC 252; 1976 SCC (Cri) 380 Interpretation of Sections 156(3) and 202 CrPC; characterisation of Section 156(3) as a pre-cognizance power; description of a Section 156(3) order as a reminder to police to use their plenary investigative powers. Within the passage from Ramdev Food Products, this case was cited for the proposition that Section 156(3) empowers a Magistrate, prior to taking cognizance, to direct police to investigate, and that this direction triggers the police’s full investigative remit culminating in a report under Section 173 CrPC. This underpinned the conclusion that the JMFC’s referral order was a valid exercise of pre-cognizance power.
National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz, (2013) 2 SCC 488; (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 731 Part of the line of authority explaining the scheme and distinct purposes of Sections 156(3) and 202 CrPC. Referenced via Ramdev Food Products as one of the decisions elaborating the difference between pre-cognizance investigation under Section 156(3) and post-cognizance inquiry/investigation under Section 202. It contributed to the legal framework used to validate the JMFC’s resort to Section 156(3).
Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 185; (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 801 Further elucidation of the distinction between Sections 156(3) and 202 CrPC and the stages at which each provision operates. Cited, again through Ramdev Food Products, as part of the consistent jurisprudence recognizing that Section 156(3) is a pre-cognizance power to direct full police investigation, while Section 202 is confined to post-cognizance inquiry intended only to guide the Magistrate on whether there is sufficient ground to proceed. The Court adopted this framework in evaluating the JMFC’s order.
Cardinal Mar George Alencherry v. State of Kerala, (2023) 18 SCC 730 Recognition and application of the principles stated in Ramdev Food Products regarding Sections 156(3) and 202 CrPC. The Court noted that Ramdev Food Products had been noticed in this decision, reinforcing the continued relevance of the principles governing the exercise of power under Sections 156(3) and 202 CrPC. This supported the Court’s reliance on those principles in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court began by restating the undisputed factual matrix. During the pendency of R.F.A. No.4095/2013, a status quo order regarding title and possession of the suit property was operative from 03.06.2013 until it was vacated on 28.03.2016. Notwithstanding this, accused no.1 and others allegedly broke open the lock and undertook renovation/construction on 18.06.2015 and again on 18.10.2015. In response to a contempt application (I.A. No.1/2015 under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A read with Section 151 CPC), accused no.1 produced an alleged Rent/Lease Agreement dated 20.05.2013, executed in favour of accused no.2 on E-Stamp Paper No.IN-KA82473995873571L dated 20.05.2013, together with rent receipts.

The appellant, by obtaining information from the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps, discovered that this same E-Stamp Paper number and date corresponded to a sale agreement between J.D. Duradundi and S.B. Janagouda. Thus, the E-Stamp Paper purportedly underpinning the Rent Agreement between accused nos.1 and 2 had already been used for a different transaction unrelated to them. From this, the Court inferred that the Rent Agreement document produced before the High Court had been placed on an E-Stamp Paper which, in reality, related to another transaction, thereby indicating forgery.

The Court also examined the terms of the Rent/Lease Agreement as produced by accused no.1 herself. It contained a clause that accused no.2 (the tenant) would not change the nature of the premises or carry out any repairs without accused no.1’s written consent. However, in her defence, accused no.1 suggested that accused no.2 might have renovated and cleaned the property on 18.10.2015. The Court noted that it was not accused no.1’s case that accused no.2 had obtained any written consent. Even if, for the sake of argument, accused no.2 had independently undertaken renovations, accused no.1 could not thereby escape responsibility under the subsisting status quo order. As landlord and beneficiary of the interim order, she remained accountable for ensuring compliance. Her failure to take corrective action against an alleged breach by her tenant reinforced her responsibility for any violation of the order.

To clarify the legal consequences of such violations, the Court referred to Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan, which held that even if an injunction is later set aside, a breach committed during its subsistence can still be visited with consequences. This position had been recently reiterated in Lavanya C v. Vittal Gurudas Pai. Thus, the subsequent vacation of the status quo order on 28.03.2016 did not erase the potential liability for actions taken in breach of that order while it remained in force.

Turning to the core procedural question, the Court examined when a Magistrate may resort to Section 156(3) CrPC. By citing and relying on Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, the Court emphasised that when a Magistrate receives a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence, he is not bound to straightaway take cognizance. Instead, he has the discretion to forward the complaint to the police under Section 156(3) if, in his view, doing so would be conducive to justice and save his time from being spent on matters primarily within the investigative remit of the police. Crucially, this power is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage; once cognizance is taken and the Magistrate embarks on the Chapter XV procedure, he cannot revert to the pre-cognizance stage and invoke Section 156(3).

The Court then drew upon the detailed analysis in Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, which synthesised earlier decisions. It reiterated that:

  • A direction under Section 156(3) must follow application of mind and is appropriate where the Magistrate, without taking cognizance or postponing process, finds that the credibility of the information or the interests of justice warrant immediate police investigation.
  • By contrast, Section 202 applies where cognizance has been taken but the Magistrate postpones issuance of process and orders limited investigation or inquiry merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground to proceed.
  • Section 156(3) functions as a pre-emptory reminder to the police to exercise their plenary power of investigation from Section 156 through to submission of a final report or chargesheet under Section 173, whereas Section 202 is confined to assisting the Magistrate in deciding whether to issue process.

Relying on this framework, and the supporting cases cited within Ramdev (including Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy, National Bank of Oman, and Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau), the Supreme Court concluded that the JMFC’s order dated 18.01.2018 was a classic exercise of pre-cognizance power under Section 156(3). The JMFC explicitly noted that, upon perusal of the private complaint, the matter “needs to be further investigated by the police” and then directed referral under Section 156(3) to Khade Bazar Police Station. The Court observed that the word “further” in this context simply indicated that the matter required police investigation; it did not refer to “further investigation” within the meaning of Section 173(8) CrPC, which presupposes an earlier investigation and filing of a final report.

The High Court, in the First Impugned Order, had criticised the JMFC for ordering “further investigation” in a situation where no prior investigation or final report existed, and held that the Magistrate had failed to apply his mind. The Supreme Court found this reasoning unsustainable. The JMFC’s usage of the term “further” was plainly descriptive, not a legal invocation of Section 173(8). Properly construed, the JMFC had simply exercised the power under Section 156(3) to direct investigation on a private complaint disclosing cognizable offences.

On the factual plane, the Court found “enough material” to justify a full-fledged police investigation. The apparent forgery of the E-Stamp Paper, the alleged ante-dating of the Rent Agreement to predate the status quo order, and the conduct surrounding the possession and renovation of the suit property all amount, on their face, to material indicating possible commission of cognizable offences such as forgery, cheating, and conspiracy. Accordingly, the JMFC’s decision to refer the matter for investigation could not be faulted.

The Court then applied the principles from Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra. It reproduced passages emphasising that, although in exceptional cases the High Court may stay or quash investigations (e.g., when a complaint is manifestly frivolous, barred by law, or discloses no cognizable offence), it must exercise such powers sparingly and with reasons. Where facts are still hazy and investigation has barely begun, the High Court should generally allow the police to discharge their statutory duty. Furthermore, when hearing a petition for quashing an FIR under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court’s inquiry is confined to whether the FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence; it is not to weigh evidence or adjudicate on the merits.

Applying this to the case at hand, the Supreme Court held that the material in the complaint and accompanying documents clearly disclosed possible cognizable offences and warranted police investigation. The High Court, instead of confining itself to the threshold test, had ventured into issues that properly fall within the investigative domain and had quashed the FIR and proceedings by mischaracterising the JMFC’s order and minimising the significance of the material indicating forgery. Such interference at the nascent stage of investigation was inconsistent with the discipline mandated by Neeharika.

On this “overall circumspection” of facts, material, and legal principles, the Supreme Court concluded that both the First and Second Impugned Orders of the High Court could not stand and required to be set aside. The FIR had to be restored and investigation allowed to proceed, while preserving the rights of the accused to put forward their defence during investigation and trial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court ALLOWED the appeals. It set aside the High Court’s First Impugned Order dated 24.07.2019 in CRLP No.100549/2018 and Second Impugned Order dated 18.11.2021 in CRLP No.100651/2018. FIR Crime No.12/2018 of Khade Bazar Police Station, Belagavi, for offences under Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 IPC stands RESTORED. The Court directed the police to investigate the case expeditiously in accordance with law. It clarified that the private parties are at liberty to produce material indicating their respective defences or positions both during investigation and before the competent court at the appropriate stage.

The Court further directed that the observations in its judgment are confined to the questions before it and shall neither prejudice nor aid any party in other proceedings pending inter se. The appeals were allowed with no order as to costs, and all pending applications were closed.

Implications: The immediate effect of the decision is that the criminal investigation into the alleged forgery and fabrication of the Rent/Lease Agreement and related documents will proceed on the basis of FIR Crime No.12/2018, subject to ordinary safeguards and the rights of the accused. The judgment does not finally decide on the guilt or innocence of any party.

More broadly, within the confines of the material on record, the decision reaffirms that:

  • A Magistrate, at the pre-cognizance stage, may validly invoke Section 156(3) CrPC on a private complaint disclosing cognizable offences, especially where the allegations warrant a full police investigation.
  • High Courts must exercise their inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC with circumspection and ordinarily should not quash FIRs or halt investigations at an early stage when the complaint discloses cognizable offences and the facts are yet to be fully investigated.
  • Subsequent vacation of an interim order (such as a status quo or injunction order) does not wipe out liability for breaches committed while the order was in force.

The judgment operates primarily on the direct dispute between the parties and, as stated by the Court, does not purport to set out new doctrine beyond the application of existing principles to the facts before it.

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    SADIQ B. HANCHINMANI v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

    2025 INSC 1282

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

    [@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.11336 OF 2022]

    SADIQ B. HANCHINMANI ...APPELLANT

    VERSUS

    THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS

    R1: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

    R2: CHNDRUMAL

    R3: SANJAY

    R4: NANDKUMAR

    R5: VIJAY

    WITH

    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

    [@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. _____ OF 2025] [@DIARY NO.39619 OF 2022]

    SADIQ B. HANCHINMANI ...APPELLANT

    VERSUS

    THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS

    R1: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

    R2: MRS. VEENA

    R3: MADHAV

    1

    J U D G M E N T

    AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

    Delay condoned.

    2. Leave granted in both petitions.

    3. The instant criminal appeals, at the instance of the complainant, seek to assail the Final Judgments and Orders dated 18.11.2021 in CRLP No.100651/2018 [2021:KHC-D:90] (hereinafter referred to as the 'Second Impugned Order') and dated 24.07.2019 in CRLP No.100549/2018 [2019:KHC-D:5908] (hereinafter referred to as the 'First Impugned Order') passed by two learned Single Judges of the High Court of Karnataka, Bench at Dharwad (hereinafter referred to as the 'High Court'), whereby the High Court allowed the accused-private respondents' petitions under Section 4821of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'), consequently quashing the Order dated 18.01.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-III Court, Belagavi (hereinafter referred to as the

    1 '482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.'

    2

    'JMFC'), insofar as it related to the respective accused-private respondents.

    BRIEF FACTS:

    4. The appellant-complainant lodged a private complaint viz. PCR No.1/2018 before the JMFC against the private respondents under Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC').

    5. The appellant-complainant had filed a suit being O.S. No.43/2009 before the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Belagavi, seeking a declaration that he is the owner in possession of the suit property as per oral gift by his father and also to declare the Sale Deed dated 03.02.2009 executed by his father Bashirahmad in favour of accused no.1 as illegal, void and not binding on him. It is relevant to note that Bashirahmad remained ex-parte since he did not contest the suit. The matter was heard and the suit came to be dismissed on 28.03.2013. Consequently, the appellant preferred an appeal being R.F.A. No.4095/2013 before the High Court. An interim application under Order

    3

    XLI Rule 52read with Section 1513of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'CPC') was filed seeking stay of the operation of the Judgment and Decree dated 28.03.2013. Vide Order dated 03.06.2013, the High Court passed an interim order to maintain status quo regarding title and possession of the suit property, which was extended during the pendency of the appeal, but was subsequently vacated.

    6. During the pendency of the afore-noted appeal, the appellant came to know that on 18.06.2015, Veena, (accused no.1) though in the F.I.R. her name is mentioned as Meena and her husband, along with others, broke open the lock put to the suit property without permission

    2 '5. Stay by Appellate Court.—(1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree. Explanation.—An order by the Appellate Court for the stay of execution of the decree shall be effective from the date of the communication of such order to the Court of first instance, but an affidavit sworn by the appellant, based on his personal knowledge, stating that an order for the stay of execution of the decree has been made by the Appellate Court shall, pending the receipt from the Appellate Court of the order for the stay of execution or any order to the contrary, be acted upon by the Court of first instance. (2) Stay by Court which passed the decree.—Where an application is made for stay of execution of an appealable decree before the expiration of the time allowed for appealing therefrom, the Court which passed the decree may on sufficient cause being shown order the execution to be stayed. (3) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court making it is satisfied— (a) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is made; (b) that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and (c) that security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him. (4) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3), the Court may make an ex parte order for stay of execution pending the hearing of the application. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, the Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the decree.'

    3 '151. Saving of inherent powers of Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.'

    4

    and trespassed into the same and started renovation/construction in the suit property. The appellant issued a Notice calling upon them to stop the renovation/construction work. The renovation/construction work was stopped. The appellant later came to know that, on 18.10.2015, accused nos.1 and 2 and others again broke open the lock put to the property and re-started the work. The appellant then filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A4read with Section 151 of the CPC, being I.A.No.1/2015 in R.F.A. No.4095/2013, seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against accused nos.1 and 4. Accused no.1 filed a reply to I.A.No.1 of 2015 and produced a document embossed as an E-Stamp Paper dated 20.05.2013, styled as a Rent Agreement and some rent receipts. The said Rent Agreement was executed by accused no.1 in favour of accused no.2.

    7. The appellant filed an application before the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps, Bengaluru, Department of Stamps and Registration, Government of Karnataka, for getting a certified copy of the document, which was produced by the

    4 '2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction.—(1) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, of the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.'

    5

    contemnor/accused no.1 before the Court in the first appeal, styled as a Rent Agreement. The appellant came to know that the said E-Stamp Paper was fake, as he obtained certified copy(ies) of the Stamp Paper bearing same serial number, which did not tally with the Stamp Paper that was produced before the High Court.

    8. The Rent Agreement was executed by accused no.1 in favour of accused no.2, and the appellant alleges that it was ante-dated to show that it came into existence prior to the date of the status quo Order passed by the High Court.

    9. It is contended that all the accused, in collusion with one another, created and produced the forged, fabricated and manufactured document to obtain a favourable order and to obtain the possession of the suit property and have also concocted the rent receipts to justify their possession over the property. A complaint was also lodged with Khade Bazar Police Station, Belagavi to enquire about the forgery and concoction of the document. Still, no steps were taken by the police on the said complaint.

    10. The appellant later filed a private complaint before the JMFC. The JMFC vide Order dated 18.01.2018 felt that the matter was to be

    6

    referred for investigation under Section 156(3)5of the Code. The JMFC referred the case for investigation to the Khade Bazar Police Station. Accordingly, a First Information Report was registered against accused nos.1 to 7 as Crime No.12/2018 (hereinafter referred to as the 'FIR') for offences punishable under Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 of the IPC, and investigation was undertaken. The learned JMFC in the Order dated 18.01.2018 recorded 'The complainant has complied with the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Shrivastava vs. State of UP in (2015) 6 SCC 287.' (sic)

    11. The High Court, in the First Impugned Order, observed as under, inter alia:

    '10. … Without mentioning anything the learned

    Magistrate has passed the order for further

    investigation though no law contemplated the learned Magistrate to go for further investigation. If at all any further investigation has to be made that will be only after if any final report is filed by the investigating agency and if there are any deficiencies and if any request is made by the police under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C, then under such circumstances the Court can exercise. But when the private complaint has been filed and directly the court has passed for further investigation without any justifiable reasons in that light, the said order itself appears to be not justifiable

    5 '15 6.Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case.— (1)… (2)… (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.'

    7

    since the court has not applied its mind and it is not sustainable in the eye of law.'

    (emphasis supplied)

    12. The High Court, in the Second Impugned Order, recorded, inter alia, as below:

    '24. … Even though, respondent No.2 filed a suit before the civil court seeking declaration of his right over the property claiming to be the owner of the property on the basis of the oral gift deed and that the registered sale deed executed by his father in favour of accused No.1 is not binding on him, admittedly, the said suit filed in O.S.No.43/2009 came to be dismissed and it is held that registered sale deed is executed by the father of respondent No.2 conveying the title over the property in favour of accused Nos.1, and respondent No.2 is not entitled for the declaration as sought for. Challenging the said judgment and decree, RFA No.4095/2013 is filed before this court, which is still pending for consideration. Even though status-quo order was passed in respect of the title and possession of the property, it is made clear by this court that it is only to protect the title and possession of accused No.1, who is held to be in possession over the schedule property. Even though the said finding given by the trial court is under challenge before this court, the fact remains that there are no prima facie materials to contend that the possession of the property was handed over in favour of respondent No.2 by his father at any time. …

    xxx

    27. It is also pertinent to note that accused No.2 and 5 to 7 who are petitioners herein, are not parties either in O.S.No.43/2009 or in RFA No.4095/2013 before this court. Under such circumstances, respondent No.2 should have made clear about the role played by these petitioners in concocting the document as contented by him and producing the same before the court to take advantage of the same in the first information.'

    8

    (emphasis supplied)

    THE APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS:

    13. The primary contention of the appellant is that the Rent Agreement produced by Chandrumal M. Parchani-respondent in collusion with other respondents on an E-Stamp Paper is fake.

    14. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that even the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps, addressed a letter to the Registrar, High Court of Karnataka, stating that on perusal of the reports submitted by the Area Manager (E- Stamping) and the authorized signatory of the Karnataka State Souharda Federal Co-operative Ltd., Bengaluru, prima facie, the E- Stamp purchased by Chandrumal M. Parchani-respondent and used for the Rent Agreement is a fake E-Stamp.

    15. The learned counsel further stated that the District Registrar, Belagavi, has directed that a police complaint be filed against Chandrumal M. Parchani-respondent, the purchaser of the E-Stamp Paper and Sri Gajanana Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit, Danegalli, Shahapur, Belagavi which sold the fake E-Stamp Paper and a

    9

    separate complaint has been filed qua the said Sri Gajanana Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit.

    16. The learned counsel emphasised that when the appellant filed an application before the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps, Department of Stamps and Registration, Government of Karnataka, for obtaining a Certified Copy of the document, which was produced before the High Court styled as a Rent Agreement, the appellant came to know that the said E-Stamp Paper was fake, as he obtained cerified copy(ies) of Stamp Paper bearing a same serial number, which did not tally with the Stamp Paper that was produced before the High Court.

    17. Learned counsel urged that it is conspicuous from the facts of the case that all the private respondents, in both appeals, in collusion with each other, concocted, forged, fabricated and manufactured the document and produced the same before the High Court with mala fide intention to obtain a favourable order and gain possession of the suit property. It was advanced that the private respondents played fraud upon the Court and also caused obstacles in the stream of the justice delivery system.

    10

    18. In addition, learned counsel canvassed that the possibility of a conspiracy hatched by the accused cannot be ruled out since there is prima facie material that substantiates the appellant's claim that the E- Stamp Paper is a forged document.

    19. It is further submitted that the appellant wrote a letter to various authorities, including the learned Chief Justice of the High Court. In turn, the Secretary to the learned Chief Justice, vide Letter dated 14.09.2017, instructed to follow-up with the investigation on the complaint filed against the purchaser of the fake E-Stamp Paper and the Sri Gajanana Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit, the issuer of the fake E-Stamp Paper.

    20. Learned counsel contended that the High Court overlooked

    Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, holding that criminal proceedings should not be thwarted at the initial stage and the police should be allowed to investigate into the matter and to submit a Final Report, when there are prima facie materials against the accused.

    21. Learned counsel pointed towards the conduct of Veena- respondent. It is stated that she has deliberately and intentionally

    11

    concealed facts regarding the filing of Special Leave Petitions (Civil) No.1667-1668/2016 titled 'Meena M. Dongare v Sadiq S/O Bashirahmad Hanchanmani' against the Order dated 07.12.2015 in IA No.1/2023 passed by the High Court. The same was taken up on 01.02.2016, but withdrawn on the first date of listing as under:

    'Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the Special Leave Petitions with liberty to approach the High Court. In view thereof, the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court by filing appropriate application for appropriate relief.'

    22. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High Court, through the Impugned Orders, has turned a blind eye to the fake E- Stamp Paper, despite discrepancies such as party names and the amount of stamp duty.

    23. The learned counsel wrapped up submissions by pointing out that the investigation at the relevant point was at a nascent stage, and the persons involved were on anticipatory bail, and no harm would have been caused if the investigation was allowed to be completed.

    24. Learned counsel submitted that the disputed document was first produced before the High Court in R.F.A. No.4095 of 2013, and only

    12

    then did the existence of such document come to the knowledge of the appellant. After obtaining a copy of the said document from the department concerned and also after obtaining reports from the Karnataka State Souharda Federal Co-Operative Ltd., Bengaluru, it is evident that it was accused no.2 who had forged the E-Stamp Paper and the document styled as a Lease/Rent Agreement before the High Court. As such, an in-depth investigation was required. It was prayed to allow the appeals.

    SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.1-THE STATE OF

    KARNATAKA:

    25. The counsel for the State reiterated some submissions made by the appellant but clarified and supplemented the same infra.

    26. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that the main ground urged by respondents no.2 to 5 (accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7) in Criminal Appeal No. of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) No.11336 of 2022 as reflected in the Second Impugned Order before the High Court was that earlier, accused nos.1 and 3, against whom criminal proceedings were initiated, had approached the High Court by filing CRLP No.100549/2018 seeking the quashing of proceedings initiated against them. The High

    13

    Court, therein, concluded that the JMFC, without application of judicial mind, had referred the matter for investigation. Therefore, Criminal Petition No.100549/2018 was allowed and proceedings against respondents no. 2 and 3 (accused nos.1 and 3) in Criminal Appeal No. . of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) No. of 2025 @ Diary No.39619 of 2022 were quashed vide the First Impugned Order.

    27. Learned counsel argued that accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7 claimed parity as they contended that they were also on similar footing. But allegations against accused nos.1 and 3 are different from those against accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7. Therefore, parity should not be extended to them.

    28. Learned counsel submitted that applying the same principles, the Second Impugned Order followed, but the learned Single Judges ought to have remanded the matter as the JMFC's Order dated 18.01.2018 referring the matter for investigation to the police was a curable defect,

    14

    hit by Section 4606of the Code, as it would fall under irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.

    29. Learned counsel submitted that the Second Impugned Order opined that the appellant had not made clear the role played by the accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7 in concocting and forging the document and concluded that their role, against anybody, including the Court, was unclear, but based on the documents on record, it was evident that the forged E-stamp Paper was purchased by accused no.2. Prayer was made to pass appropriate Order/Judgment, factoring in the submissions noted supra.

    SUBMISSIONS BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS:

    30. It is pertinent to note that learned counsel for the accused-private respondents entered appearance but the private respondents did not file

    6 '46 0. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.—If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely:— (a) to issue a search-warrant under Section 94; (b) to order, under Section 155, the police to investigate an offence; (c) to hold an inquest under Section 176; (d) to issue process under Section 187, for the apprehension of a person within his local jurisdiction who has committed an offence outside the limits of such jurisdiction; (e) to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190; (f) to make over a case under sub-section (2) of Section 192; (g) to tender a pardon under Section 306; (h) to recall a case and try it himself under Section 410; or (i) to sell property under Section 458 or Section 459, erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered.'

    15

    any Counter-Affidavit. Learned counsel supported the Impugned Orders and urged that no good ground was made out to upset the views taken therein.

    31. Learned counsel submitted that vide Order dated 28.03.2016 in I.A. No.3/2016, the High Court vacated the status quo Order dated 03.06.2013, qua the suit property and the keys of premises were handed over to accused no.1 during the pendency of R.F.A. No.4095/2013.

    32. It was also submitted that the appellant harboured ulterior motive against the private respondents, which is why he had chosen to register the private complaint i.e., PCR No.1/2018.

    33. Learned counsel argued that as R.F.A. No.4095/2013, concerning the suit property, was decided ultimately in favour of the private respondents concerned, therefore, no criminal liability could be hoisted on them.

    ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

    34. The questions for consideration may be summed up as: (i) whether the direction for investigation to the police issued by the JMFC under

    16

    Section 156(3) of the Code, which was quashed by the Impugned Orders, is justified based on the facts and circumstances of the cases, and; (ii) whether the JMFC had sufficient material before it so as to justify the course of action of referring the matter for investigation to the police invoking power under Section 156(3) of the Code, resulting in the institution of the FIR.

    35. The relevant and undisputed facts are that in R.F.A. No.4095/2013 before the High Court, an interim application under Order XLI Rule 5 read with Section 151 of the CPC was filed seeking stay of the operation of the Judgment and Decree dated 28.03.2013. Vide Order dated 03.06.2013, the High Court passed an interim order to maintain status quo regarding title and possession of the suit property, which was extended during the pendency of the appeal, but was subsequently vacated. During the pendency of R.F.A. No.4095/2013, the appellant came to know that on 18.06.2015, accused no.1 and her husband, along with others, had broken open the lock put to the suit property without permission and trespassed into the same and started renovation/construction in the suit property. The appellant issued a Notice calling upon them to stop the renovation/construction work. The renovation/construction work was stopped. The appellant later came to know that, on 18.10.2015, accused nos.1 and 2 and others again broke

    17

    open the lock put to the property and re-started the work. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A read with Section 151 of the CPC i.e. I.A.No.1/2015 in R.F.A. No.4095/2013, seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against accused nos.1 and 4. Accused no.1 filed a reply to I.A.No.1 of 2015 and produced a document embossed as an E-Stamp Paper dated 20.05.2013, styled as a Rent Agreement and some rent receipts. This Rent Agreement was executed by accused no.1 in favour of accused no.2. The defence taken in the reply to I.A.No.1 of 2015 was that prior to the passing of the status quo order on 03.06.2013, the suit property had already been let out to accused no.2 on 20.05.2013 on rent basis, with a copy of the Rent Agreement also annexed therewith. Further, rent receipts for a monthly rental of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees Three Thousand) were also enclosed. We may pause here since this will be a turning point in the present cases. The Rent Agreement by accused no.1 in favour of accused no.2 is said to have been executed on 20.05.2013. However, the Rent Agreement which was produced shows it was executed on E-Stamp Paper bearing no.IN-KA82473995873571L dated 20.05.2013. This document upon verification by the appellant, under the Right to Information Act, 2005 from the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of Stamps, Bengaluru, Department of Stamps and Registration, Government of Karnataka reveals that the said E-Stamp Paper Number

    18

    with the same date of registration related to a Sale Agreement between one J.D. Duradundi and one S.B. Janagouda. Thus, it is clear that the Rent Agreement produced before the High Court was shown on the E- Stamp Paper was used by the aforesaid persons for a Sale Agreement, unconnected to accused nos.1 and 2 or to any Rent Agreement.

    36. The accused no.1 has also stated that the tenant i.e., accused no.2 might have renovated and cleaned the suit property on 18.10.2015. This is where the Court finds the truth coming out. In the copy of the Rent/Lease Agreement which has been brought on record before the High Court by accused no.1 herself, it is clearly stipulated that accused no.2 will not change the nature of the premises and should not carry out any repairs to the said premises without the written consent of accused no.1. It is not the case of accused no.1 that accused no.2 had sought any permission. Arguendo, assuming that accused no.2 might have made some renovations, the same by itself would not serve to absolve accused no.1 of the responsibility cast by the Order dated 03.06.2013 to maintain status quo; further, if she was aware that accused no.2 was violating the terms of the Rent/Lease Agreement, inaction on her part to take appropriate action or steps against/in respect of accused no.2 would make her responsible for any violation of the Order dated 03.06.2013, which she concedes might have been done by accused

    19

    no.2 on 18.10.2015, i.e., during the period of subsistence of the Order dated 03.06.2013, as the status quo came to be vacated only on 28.03.2016. Examined, additionally, from another lens, even if an injunction order is subsequently set aside, consequences for breach/violation of the same when it subsisted, could still befall upon the violator, as held in Samee Khan v Bindu Khan, (1998) 7 SCC 59.7

    37. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the position of law enunciated in Madhao v State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615, wherein it was held that:

    '18. When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence itself. As said earlier, in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). However, if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back to the pre- cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3).' (emphasis supplied)

    7 This position of law was recently reiterated in Lavanya C v Vittal Gurudas Pai, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 499, where one of us (P. Mithal, J.) was part of the coram.

    20

    38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC's Order dated 18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a prima facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material that was available with the JMFC. In Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439, three learned Judges of this Court opined:

    '13. We may first deal with the question as to whether the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3) or was justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and what are the parameters for exercise of power under the two provisions.

    xxx

    22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:

    22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone the issuance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued.

    22.2. The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed". Category of cases falling under para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] may fall under Section 202.

    21

    22.3. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case.

    xxx

    38. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy [(1976) 3 SCC 252: 1976 SCC (Cri) 380], National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz [(2013) 2 SCC 488: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 731], Madhao v. State of Maharashtra [(2013) 5 SCC 615: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 141], Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 4 SCC 185: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 801], the scheme of Sections 156(3) and 202 has been discussed. It was observed that power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before taking cognizance and was in the nature of pre- emptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation beginning with Section 156 and ending with report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 applies at post-cognizance stage and the direction for investigation was for the purpose of deciding whether there was sufficient ground to proceed.' (emphasis supplied)

    39. Ramdev (supra) was noticed in Cardinal Mar George Alencherry v. State of Kerala, (2023) 18 SCC 730. The High Court, especially vide the First Impugned Order, seems to have been unduly swayed by the usage of the term 'further' by the JMFC. The relevant extract from the First Impugned Order has already been quoted hereinabove. It would be in the fitness of things to note the JMFC's Order dated 18.01.2018:

    '…

    On perusal of the private complaint, it is noticed that the aforesaid case needs to be further investigated by

    22

    the police. Hence, this Court feels that the aforesaid case needs to be referred under Sec.156(3) of Cr.P.C. Hence, the above matter is referred to Khade Bazar P.S. for investigation under Sec.156(3) of Cr.P.C. …'

    (emphasis supplied)

    40. The afore-extract leaves no room of doubt that the JMFC had referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the usage of 'further' was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over. The case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material showing the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of it, which would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the Impugned Orders is necessitated.

    41. This Court in a composition of three learned Judges observed in

    Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. (supra) as follows:

    '16. In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High Court may stay the further investigation. However, at the same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating agency has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable

    23

    offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and those innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions of the Code. Even in such a case the High Court has to give/assign brief reasons why at this stage the further investigation is required to be stayed. The High Court must appreciate that speedy investigation is the requirement in the criminal administration of justice.'

    42. It was further highlighted:

    '33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.' (emphasis supplied)

    43. Thus, on an overall circumspection of the facts and circumstances of the case, the material on record and the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, the First and Second Impugned Orders dated 24.07.2019 and 18.11.2021 are set aside. FIR Crime No.12 of

    24

    2018, Khade Bazar Police Station stands restored. The police is directed to investigate the case expeditiously in accordance with law. It goes without saying that the private parties shall be at liberty to produce material to indicate their defence(s)/position during the police investigation as also before the Court concerned, in accordance with law, at the appropriate stage.

    44. Before parting, it is made clear that the observations made in this Judgment are only for the purposes of considering the issue(s) before us and shall neither prejudice nor aid the parties in any proceedings pending inter-se. The appeals stand allowed as indicated above. Pending applications stand closed. In the circumstances, however, we propose no order as to costs.

    …………………......................J.

    [PANKAJ MITHAL]

    …………………......................J.

    [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

    NEW DELHI

    NOVEMBER 04, 2025

    25

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    SADIQ B. HANCHINMANI v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
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