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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 107/150/133 of Cr.P.C.
  • Section 482 and Section 397(2) of the Code.
  • sub-section (3) of Section 397,
  • Section 111 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 107/150/133 of Cr.P.C.
  • Section 482 and Section 397(2) of the Code.
  • sub-section (3) of Section 397,
  • Section 111 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code.
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    HANS RAJ v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

    2024:HHC:9551

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

    Cr. MMO No.925 of 2024

    Reserved on 19.09.2024

    Cr.MMO No.937 of 2024

    Reserved on 23.09.2024

    Decided on. 04.10.2024

    1. Hans Raj ……...Petitioner Versus

    State of H.P. and Ors. …....Respondent For the Petitioner : Mr. Vijay Kumar Arora, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General for respondents

    No.1 and 2/State.

    2. Kamal ……...Petitioner Versus

    State of H.P. and Ors. …....Respondent For the Petitioner : Mr. Vijay Kumar Arora, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 and

    2/State.

    Coram

    Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1No

    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

    The petitioners have filed the present petitions against the order dated 12.09.2024 passed by learned Additional Sessions

    1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

    1

    2

    Judge (I), District Solan, H.P. in Revision Petition No.33-S/10 of 2024 titled Hans Raj Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh; vide which the revision against the order dated 10.04.2024 passed by learned Sub- Divisional Magistrate (SDM), Solan was dismissed and the order dated 10.04.2024 was upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

    2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petitions are that the police filed a complaint under Section 107/150/133 of Cr.P.C. stating that Kamal and some other persons started constructing an Iron fence, when the informant objected, they threatened him. The informant made a complaint to Police Post City, Solan. The police visited the spot and asked them not to carry out the construction. Hans Raj also came on the spot. He threatened to break the head of the person who would enter the land owned by him. The police also asked him to maintain the peace and not to quarrel, but he picked up a quarrel with the informant. A Civil Suit was filed by the informant and he obtained a stay. Hans Raj had quarrelled with the informant on 22.06.2022, 24.06.2022 and 27.02.2024. There was an apprehension that Hans

    3

    Raj would indulge in similar activities. There was an apprehension of a breach of peace due to the dispute between the parties. Hence, the matter was placed before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

    3. The learned SDM went through the complaint and the documents. He concluded that the petitioners had abused and threatened the informant. They created a nuisance by breach of peace and disturbed the public tranquillity. Learned SDM ordered issuance of show cause notice as to why the respondents be not called upon to execute the bonds in the sum of ₹10,000/- each. Since the Civil Court was seized of the matter, therefore the proceedings under Section 133 of Cr.PC were not justified.

    4. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the learned SDM, the respondents approached the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan (learned Revisional Court). Learned Revisional Court held that the order passed under Section 111 of Cr.PC was purely interlocutory and a Revision Petition does not lie against such an order. Even otherwise, the order mentions the substance of information, the amount of bonds to be executed, the term for which they were to remain in force and the number of the sureties. This order complied with the requirements of Section 111 of Cr. PC.

    4

    There was no reason to interfere with the order; hence, the Revision Petition was dismissed.

    5. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the learned Revisional Court, the respondents have filed the present petitions asserting that the substance of the information was not reflected in the order and the notices served upon the respondents. A copy of the order passed under Section 111 Cr.P.C. was not received along with the notices as required under Section 114 of Cr. PC. Learned Revisional Court erred in dismissing the revision. The proceedings initiated by the learned SDM are viod ab initio. No offence was committed by the respondents. The dispute between the parties is civil and learned SDM, Solan had no jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. The respondents are being harassed and humiliated by the proceedings initiated before the learned SDM. Learned Revisional Court had wrongly held that the Revision Petition is not maintainable. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

    6. I have heard Mr. Vijay Kumar Arora, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Jitender Kumar Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents No.1 and 2/State.

    5

    7. Mr Vijay Kumar Arora, learned counsel for the petitioners (original respondents before the learned SDM) submitted that the learned SDM had not passed the order as per the law. The substance of the information was not reduced to writing. The order was not served upon the respondents. The dispute between the parties was civil as is apparent from the fact that the informant had taken recourse to the Civil Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the order passed by the learned SDM as affirmed by the learned Revisional Court be set aside.

    8. Mr Jitender Kumar Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No.1 and 2/State submitted that there is no infirmity in the orders passed by learned Courts below. Learned SDM had reproduced the substance of information received by him in the order passed by him and it cannot be said that the order does not contain the substance of information. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.

    9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

    6

    10. In the present case, the respondents have approached the Revisional Court and their petition was dismissed. Section 397

    (3) bars the person filing a revision from filing a second revision. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnan Vs. Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241 that the bar under Section 397 (3) of CrPC cannot be circumvented by filing a petition under Section 482 of CrPC. However, the High Court can intervene under Section 482 of CrPC when there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:

    "10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person — accused/complainant — cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High

    7

    Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of a criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when trial is conducted expeditiously.

    11. In Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra . [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] a three-judge Bench was to consider the scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 and Section 397(2) of the Code. This Court held that the bar on the power of revision was put to facilitate expedient disposal of the cases but in Section 482 it is provided that nothing in the Code, which would include Section 397(2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. On a harmonious construction of the said two provisions on this behalf, it was held that though the High Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order, still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provision for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In that case, when allegations of defamatory statements were published in the newspapers against the Law Minister, the State Government decided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under Section 500 IPC. After obtaining the sanction, on a complaint made by the public

    8

    prosecutor, cognizance of the commission of the offence by the appellant was taken to trial in the Sessions Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed the charges under Section 406. The Order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court. On a preliminary objection raised on maintainability, this Court held that the power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section 397 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code.

    12. In V.C Shukla v. State Through C.B.I . [1980 Supp SCC 92: 1980 SCC (Cri) 695: (1980) 2 SCR 380] (SCR at p.

    393) a four-judge Bench per majority had held that sub-section (3) of Section 397, however, does not limit at all the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Court under Section 397(1) of the Code. In Rajan Kumar Machananda case [1990 Supp SCC 132: 1990 SCC (Cri) 537] the case related to the release of a truck from attachment, obviously on the filing of an interlocutory application. It was contended that there was a prohibition on the revision by operation of Section 397(2) of the Code. In that context, it was held that it was not revisable under Section 482 in the exercise of inherent powers by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by provisions contained in Section 397(3), the revision is not maintainable. In the Dharampal case [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333] which related to the exercise of power to issue an order of attachment under Section 146 of the Code, it was held that the inherent power under Section 482 was

    9

    prohibited. On the facts, in that case, it could be said that the learned Judges would be justified in holding that it was not revisable since it was a prohibitory interim order of attachment covered under Section 397(2) of the Code but the observations of the learned Judges that the High Court had no power under Section 482 of the Code were not correct in view of the ratio of this Court in Madhu Limaye case [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] as upheld in V.C. Shukla case [1980 Supp SCC 92: 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : (1980) 2 SCR 380] and also in view of our observations stated earlier. The ratio in the Deepti case [(1995) 5 SCC 751: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1020] is also not apposite to the facts in the present case. To the contrary, in that case, an application for discharge of the accused was filed in the Court of the Magistrate for an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The learned Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dismissed the petition. In the revision at the instance of the accused, on a wrong concession made by the counsel appearing for the State that the record did not contain allegations constituting the offence under Section 498- A, the High Court without applying its mind had discharged the accused. On appeal, this Court after going through the record noted that the concession made by the counsel was wrong. The record did contain the allegations to prove the charge under Section 498- A IPC. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, had committed an error of law in discharging the accused leading to the miscarriage of justice. In that context, this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code. In view of the fact that the order of the High Court had led to the miscarriage of justice, this Court had set aside the order of the High Court and confirmed that of the Magistrate.

    10

    13. The ratio of Simrikhia case [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] has no application to the facts in this case. Therein, on a private complaint filed under Sections 452 and 323 IPC the Judicial Magistrate, First Class had taken cognizance of the offence. He transferred the case for inquiry under Section 202 of the Code to the Second-Class Magistrate who after examining the witnesses issued a process to the accused. The High Court exercising the power under Section 482 dismissed the revision. But subsequently, on an application filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court corrected it. The question was whether the High Court was right in reviewing its order. In that factual backdrop, this Court held that the High Court could not exercise inherent power for the second time. The ratio therein, as stated above, has no application to the facts in this case.

    14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that though the revision before the High Court under sub-section

    (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the courts below. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for a decision on merits after consideration of the evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case. Since the High Court has left the matter to be considered by the Magistrate, it would be inappropriate at this stage to go into that question. We have only considered the issue of power and jurisdiction of the High Court in the context of the revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section

    11

    397(3) and the inherent powers. We do not find any justification warranting interference in the appeal."

    11. This position was reiterated in Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir, (2001) 8 SCC 522, wherein it was held:

    "…though the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is very wide, yet the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously, particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. It was further held, "Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code."

    12. A similar view was taken in Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation, (2005) 2 SCC 571, and it was held:

    "5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan . [(1999) 6 SCC 326: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118] said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or

    12

    the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is a serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of the law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court."

    13. This position was reiterated in Shakuntala Devi v. Chamru Mahto, (2009) 3 SCC 310: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 8: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 292, wherein it was observed: -

    "24. It is well settled that the object of the introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 397 was to prevent a second revision to avoid frivolous litigation, but, at the same time, the doors to the High Court to a litigant who had lost before the Sessions Judge were not completely closed and in special cases, the bar under Section 397(3) could be lifted. In other words, the power of the High Court to entertain a petition under Section 482, was not subject to the prohibition under sub-section

    (3) of Section 397 of the Code and was capable of being invoked in appropriate cases. Mr Sanyal's contention that there was a complete bar under Section 397(3) of the Code debarring the High Court from entertaining an application under Section 482 thereof does not, therefore, commend itself to us.

    25. On the factual aspect, the Magistrate came to a finding that the appellants were entitled to possession of the disputed plot. It is true that while making such declaration under Section 145(4) of the Code, the

    13

    Magistrate could have also directed that the appellants be put in possession of the same.

    26. The question which is now required to be considered is whether the High Court was right in quashing the order passed by the Magistrate, which was confirmed by the Sessions Judge, on the ground that the application made by the appellants under Section 145(6) of the Code was barred firstly by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and also by virtue of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,

    1963.

    14. Delhi High Court also took a similar view in Surender Kumar Jain v. State & Anr., ILR (2012) 3 Del 99 and held: —

    "5. The issue regarding the filing of a petition before the High Court after having availed the first revision petition before the Court of Sessions has come up before the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly. While laying that section 397(3) Cr. P.C. laid the statutory bar of the second revision petition, the courts have held that the High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 82 (sic) Cr. P.C. as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. But, that power was to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, particularly, when the person approaching the High Court has already availed remedy of first revision in the Sessions Court. This was not that in every case the person aggrieved of the order of the first revision court would have the right to be heard by the High Court to assail the same order which was the subject matter of the revision before Sessions Court. It all depends not only on the facts and circumstances of each case but as on whether the impugned order brought about a situation that is an abuse of the process of the court,

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    there was a serious miscarriage of justice or the mandatory provisions of law were not complied with. The power could also be exercised by this Court if there was an apparent mistake committed by the revisional court. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limave v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551, State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwal, (1979) 2 SCC 305: AIR 1979 SC 87, Rai Kapoor v. State (Delhi

    Administration) 1980 Cri LJ 202,

    Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation (2005) 2 SCC 571."

    15. It was submitted that the learned Revisional Court erred in holding that the revision was not maintainable. The learned Revisional Court had not dismissed the revision on the ground of maintainability, but on the ground that there was no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Therefore, this point has become academic and needs no decision in the present proceedings.

    16. It was submitted that the dispute between the parties was civil which is apparent from the fact that the informant had taken recourse to the Civil Court and had obtained an injunction order in his favour. This submission will not assist the petitioners. Learned SDM had noticed that the dispute regarding the passage was pending before the Civil Court and exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. was unnecessary. However, the

    15

    allegations against the respondents were serious that they were quarrelling with the informant and committing a breach of peace in the locality. Breach of peace is quite distinct from the civil dispute pending between the parties. Hence, the submission that the learned SDM had no jurisdiction to hear and entertain the present petition cannot be accepted.

    17. It was submitted that the substance of the information was not considered by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. This is not correct. Learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate had passed a detailed order running into two pages. He had reproduced the information contained in the complaint filed before him with particulars of the incidents. He had also held that it was revealed from the perusal of the complaint that the respondents had committed a breach of peace and disturbed the public tranquillity. There were sufficient reasons to proceed against them and a show cause notice was to be issued to the respondents as to why they be not directed to execute bonds in the sum of ₹10,000/- each for keeping peace in the area for six months with one surety in the like amount. Learned Revisional Court had rightly noticed that it was sufficient compliance with Section 111 of

    16

    Cr.PC. The learned SDM had reproduced the contents of the information and his satisfaction with the information He had also mentioned the amount of the bonds required, the number of sureties and the period for which the bonds were to be executed. These are the only requirements under Section 111 of CrPC and the submission that there was insufficient compliance with Section 111 of Cr.PC is not acceptable.

    18. It was submitted that the copy of the order was not served upon the respondents as is required under Section 114 of Cr.PC. This cannot be accepted as a copy of the order passed under Section 111 of Cr.PC was served upon the respondents in which the substance of information was given. It was mentioned that the respondents had to show cause as to why they should not be ordered to execute the bonds in the sum of ₹10,000/- each for keeping peace in the area for six months with one surety each of the like amount. Therefore, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 114 of Cr. PC.

    19. A heavy reliance was placed upon the judgments passed by this Court in Narender Pal and others Vs. State of H.P 2022 Shimla Law cases 1408 and Kamla Devi Vs. State of H.P., 2022 3

    17

    Himachal Law Reporter Cases, 1845. Both these judgments do not apply to the present case, because it was found by this Court in the cited cases that the order under Section 111 of Cr.PC was not passed which was considered necessary. Since an order under Section 111 of CrPC has been passed in the present case; therefore, no advantage can be derived from the judgments cited on behalf of the respondents.

    20. Therefore, there is no jurisdictional error in the orders passed by the learned Courts below and no interference is required with them while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. PC.

    21. Consequently, the present petitions fail and the same are dismissed.

    22. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petitions and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

    4thOctober, 2024 (Rakesh Kainthla)

    (manish) Judge

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    HANS RAJ v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS
    (Oct 4, 2024)