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Citation Codes
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2024 PHHC 49512
Equivalent Citations
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Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT 2002
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 120-B of the IPC
  • Sections 1 120-B, 121-A, 145, 150, 151, 152, 153, 146, 121, 216 of the IPC
  • Section 121-A and Section 120-B IPC,
  • Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.,
  • Section 120-B IPC.
  • Section 120-B IPC: (i)
  • Section 154 of the Cr.P.C.,
  • Section 482 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 48 of the 2002 Act
  • provision in 2002 Act requiring Authority referred to in Section 48
  • 5 provisions of Section 157
  • Section 120-B IPC. 3. Submissions
  • Section 154 of the 1973 Code.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2024 PHHC 49512
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT 2002
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 120-B of the IPC
  • Sections 1 120-B, 121-A, 145, 150, 151, 152, 153, 146, 121, 216 of the IPC
  • Section 121-A and Section 120-B IPC,
  • Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.,
  • Section 120-B IPC.
  • Section 120-B IPC: (i)
  • Section 154 of the Cr.P.C.,
  • Section 482 Cr.P.C.
  • Section 48 of the 2002 Act
  • provision in 2002 Act requiring Authority referred to in Section 48
  • 5 provisions of Section 157
  • Section 120-B IPC. 3. Submissions
  • Section 154 of the 1973 Code.
Smart Summary

High Court of Punjab & Haryana — CRM-M No.6378 of 2023 (Pawan Insaa v. Directorate of Enforcement)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Pawan Insaa, challenged the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR/01/CDZO/2018 dated 05.02.2018) seeking its quashing as illegal and an abuse of process. The ECIR identified scheduled offences including Sections 121-A and 120-B IPC, arising from FIR No.345 dated 27.08.2017 (Police Station Sector 5, Panchkula) which listed offences under Sections 120-B, 121-A, 145, 150, 151, 152, 153, 146, 121 and 216 IPC. The petitioner had been implicated in that FIR and was discharged by the trial Court, Panchkula, of offences under Sections 121 and 121-A IPC by order dated 02.11.2019. The petitioner relied on Supreme Court authorities (including Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Parvathi Kollur) to contend that, having been discharged of predicate offences, continuation of proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) is impermissible. The Directorate of Enforcement (ED) resisted the petition on preliminary maintainability grounds, contending that an ECIR is an internal administrative document distinct from an FIR and not amenable to quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C.; the ED also contended that the petitioner had not been discharged under s.120-B IPC. The High Court heard arguments and addressed the preliminary question of whether an ECIR can be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) can be quashed by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  2. Whether the discharge of the petitioner by the trial Court of the predicate scheduled offences (specifically Sections 121 and 121-A IPC) precludes continuation of proceedings under the PMLA (as contended by the petitioner relying on Supreme Court authorities).
  3. Whether an offence under Section 120-B IPC, standing alone, can operate as a scheduled offence for purposes of invoking PMLA proceedings (as addressed in submissions relying on Pavana Dibbur).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The ECIR identifies scheduled offences (notably Sections 121-A and 120-B IPC) based on FIR No.345/2017, and the petitioner had been implicated in that FIR.
  • The petitioner was discharged by the trial Court on 02.11.2019 of offences under Sections 121 and 121-A IPC; reliance was placed upon Supreme Court decisions (Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Parvathi Kollur) to submit that where the accused is finally discharged or acquitted of the scheduled offence, or the criminal case is quashed by a competent Court, PMLA offences would not subsist and continuation of PMLA proceedings would be an abuse of process.
  • Relying on Pavana Dibbur, it was submitted that Section 120-B IPC is not a standalone scheduled offence for PMLA purposes unless the alleged conspiracy relates to an offence included in the schedule; therefore proceedings under PMLA cannot persist solely on the basis of Section 120-B.
  • The ECIR causes penal consequences and is registered by the ED (an investigating agency for PMLA offences); therefore, the petitioner argued that the petition to quash the ECIR is maintainable under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process and protect the accused's rights, contending that technicalities should not preclude the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

Respondent's (Enforcement Directorate) Arguments

  • A preliminary objection on maintainability: the ECIR is an internal administrative document of the ED and cannot be equated with an FIR; consequently, the provisions of the Cr.P.C. (and inherent jurisdiction under Section 482) do not apply to an ECIR. The appropriate remedy, ED submitted, would be to seek relief by way of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  • The ED relied upon case law (including Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, N. Dhanraj Kochar, and Jitender Nath Patnaik) to support the contention that ECIR is not a Cr.P.C. document and is not mandatorily required to be recorded or supplied like an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C.
  • On the merits of scheduled offences, the ED contended that the petitioner had not been discharged under Section 120-B IPC; therefore one of the alleged scheduled offences still subsists, permitting continuation of proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and others v. Union of India and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1048 Held that ECIR is an internal/administrative document of the ED, not equivalent to an FIR recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C.; there is no statutory obligation to record or supply ECIR; ECIR precedes civil action for attachment/confiscation and is not a Cr.P.C. document. The Court reproduced observations from this decision at length and relied on them to conclude that an ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR and, being an internal document that precedes criminal prosecution, falls outside the scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C.; the petition to quash the ECIR under Section 482 was therefore held not maintainable.
Parvathi Kollur and another v. State by Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 688 Cited by the petitioner for the principle that if the accused is finally discharged/acquitted of scheduled offences, offences under the PMLA would not subsist. Noted in the petitioner's submissions. The Court recorded that the petitioner relied on this authority but the Court's decision on maintainability primarily proceeded by reference to Vijay Madanlal's observations; the opinion does not indicate that this precedent was the decisive basis for the Court's conclusion on maintainability.
Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No.2779 of 2023 Authority for the proposition that an offence under Section 120-B IPC becomes a scheduled offence only if the alleged conspiracy relates to committing an offence included in the schedule. This principle was advanced in the petitioner's submissions. The Court recorded the submission but the reasoning and final order focussed on the nature of the ECIR (relying on Vijay Madanlal) and dismissed the petition on maintainability grounds; the judgment does not indicate that Pavana Dibbur determined the outcome.
N. Dhanraj Kochar and others v. Enforcement Directorate, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 8794 Cited by the respondent to support the proposition that ECIR is not akin to an FIR and that Cr.P.C. provisions may not apply to ECIR; used to argue that Section 482 is not the appropriate remedy to quash ECIR. Relied upon by the ED in submissions. The High Court's conclusion that ECIR is an internal document outside the scope of Section 482 is consonant with the position advanced by the ED and with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Vijay Madanlal; the Court did not primarily base its decision on this Madras decision but recorded that ED placed reliance on it.
Jitender Nath Patnaik v. Enforcement Directorate, CRLMC No.2891 of 2023 (decided 02.09.2023) Cited by the respondent to support the maintainability argument and remedies available against ED action. Referenced by the ED in submissions. The Court noted the reliance but its decision on maintainability was grounded in the Supreme Court observations (Vijay Madanlal) reproduced in the judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the preliminary issue as one of maintainability: whether an ECIR can be quashed under the inherent jurisdiction conferred by Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court conducted an inquiry into the nature, scope and import of an ECIR and relied principally upon the Supreme Court's observations in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary.

The Court reproduced key observations from the Supreme Court which describe the ECIR as an internal document prepared by ED officers for inquiry/investigation under the PMLA, not as a statutory registration under the Cr.P.C. Unlike an FIR recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C., there is no provision in the PMLA requiring authorities to record an ECIR or to supply a copy to the accused. The Supreme Court's observations, as reproduced, emphasize that making disclosure of ECIR mandatory could frustrate the PMLA's objectives (for example, attachment of proceeds of crime) and that non-supply of an ECIR does not necessarily amount to violation of constitutional rights.

On a close reading of those observations, the High Court concluded that an ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR, and being an administrative document which precedes formal criminal prosecution, it falls outside the ambit of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court identified the limits of Section 482: that the power may be exercised only to give effect to orders under the Cr.P.C., to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or to secure the ends of justice in relation to a criminal proceeding. Because an ECIR is not a Cr.P.C. document initiating a criminal proceeding, the Court held that a petition under Section 482 seeking quashing of the ECIR would exceed the Court's jurisdiction.

The Court therefore did not delve into the merits of the petition (for example, the effect of the trial Court's discharge of the petitioner of certain scheduled offences or the contention concerning Section 120-B) because the petition failed on the threshold ground of maintainability. The Court expressly recorded that anything observed in its order should not be treated as an expression of opinion on the merits.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the ECIR is not maintainable and is DISMISSED on the ground that an ECIR is an internal administrative document which precedes prosecution and therefore falls outside the scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petition to quash the ECIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed for want of maintainability; the ECIR therefore stands and was not quashed by this Court in the present proceeding.
  • On remedies: The Court's reasoning endorses the position that ECIRs are not equivalent to FIRs and indicates that a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not the appropriate vehicle to seek quashing of an ECIR; the ED and its reliance on alternative remedies (such as writ jurisdiction) were recorded in submissions. (The Court did not convert or adjudicate any alternative remedy in this order.)
  • Precedential effect: The decision dismisses the petition on maintainability and does not express a determination on the substantive merits of the petitioner's contentions regarding discharge of predicate offences or applicability of Section 120-B IPC for PMLA; the Court expressly stated that its observations are not to be construed as an opinion on merits. No new substantive legal principle beyond the application of existing Supreme Court observations (notably Vijay Madanlal) was laid down by the Court in this order.

Order dated: April 10, 2024. The Court's dismissal was on maintainability grounds and the judgment was reported as speaking/reasoned and reportable.

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    PAWAN INSAA v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT GOVT OF INDIA

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA

    AT CHANDIGARH

    2024:PHHC:049512

    CRM-M No.6378 of 2023 Reserved on: April 1st, 2024 Pronounced on: April 10th, 2024 Pawan Insaa

    .....Petitioner

    Versus

    Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Chandigarh Zonal Office, Chandigarh .....Respondent

    CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANJARI NEHRU KAUL Argued by: Mr. Bipan Ghai, Senior Advocate with Mr. Nikhil Ghai, Advocate

    for the petitioner.

    Mr. Arvind Moudgil, Senior Counsel, Government of India with Mr. Sahil Rangra and Mr. Naveen Kumar, Advocates for the respondent.

    MANJARI NEHRU KAUL, J.

    Petitioner is seeking the quashing of Enforcement Case Information Report i.e. ECIR/01/CDZO/2018 dated 05.02.2018 being illegal and abuse of process of law in view of the judgment passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and others Versus Union of India and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1048, and Parvathi Kollur and another Versus State by Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 688, since the petitioner has already been discharged of the predicate offences.

    2. Submissions made by learned senior counsel for the petitioner:

    2A. Scheduled offences as the basis of ECIR:-

    (i) That the impugned ECIR (Annexure P-2) lists the scheduled offences as Section 121-A and Section 120-B IPC, stemming from FIR No.345 dated 27.08.2017 (Annexure P-3) under Sections

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    120-B, 121-A, 145, 150, 151, 152, 153, 146, 121, 216 of the IPC registered at Police Station Sector 5, Panchkula, where the petitioner had also been implicated.

    2B. Discharge in scheduled offences by trial Court:-

    (i) That notably, the learned trial Court, Panchkula, vide its order dated 02.11.2019 (Annexure P-4), discharged the petitioner of the offences under Sections 121 and 121-A IPC. Therefore, given the discharge of the petitioner of the predicate offence, the continuance of proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'PMLA'), which were initiated on the strength of the predicate offence, would be against the settled law and an abuse of the legal process. In support learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon the judgments passed in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and others Versus Union of India and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1048, and Parvathi Kollur and another Versus State by Directorate of Enforcement, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 688, wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court held that if the accused is finally discharged or acquitted of the scheduled offence, or if the criminal case against the accused is quashed by a competent Court, the offences of PMLA would not subsist.

    2C. The offence under Section 120-B of the IPC is not a standalone offence:-

    (i) That it has been settled by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.2779 of 2023 titled as Pavana Dibbur Versus The Directorate of Enforcement that an offence under Section 120-B of the IPC becomes a scheduled offence only if the alleged conspiracy is in relation to committing an offence included in the schedule. However, in

    2

    the instant case, as already highlighted earlier, the petitioner has already been discharged of the scheduled offence. Consequently, the proceedings under PMLA cannot persist solely on the basis of an offence under Section 120-B IPC.

    3. Submissions made by learned counsel for respondent- Directorate of Enforcement (for short 'ED'):

    3A. Preliminary objections on maintainability of the petition:

    (i). That the instant petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. seeking the quashing of ECIR is not tenable, as it is an internal administrative document of the ED. It cannot be kept at par with an FIR, much less equated with it. Consequently, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.) are not applicable to the ECIR. In such circumstances, this Court cannot exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the ECIR. The appropriate remedy available to the petitioner would be to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support, learned counsel has placed reliance upon Vijay Madanlal Choudhary's case (supra), N. Dhanraj Kochar and others Versus Enforcement Directorate 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 8794 and Jitender Nath Patnaik Versus ED, CRLMC No.2891 of 2023, decided on 02.09.2023.

    3B. Survival of scheduled offence under Section 120-B IPC:

    (i) That the petitioner has not yet been discharged under Section 120-B IPC. Since one of the alleged scheduled offences still subsists, there is no impediment in proceeding against the petitioner.

    4. Rebuttal by learned senior counsel for the petitioner:

    (i) Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has contended that

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    ECIR is registered by the ED, which is an investigating agency specializing in investigating the criminal offences under the PMLA. Consequently, since there are allegations of commission of criminal offences under the PMLA, and the fact that the registration of an ECIR results in penal consequences, the present petition would indeed be maintainable under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Moreover, it has been emphasized that the broad scope and spirit of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which aims to prevent abuse of process of the Court, should not be constrained by overly technical interpretations.

    5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant material on record.

    6. Without delving into the merits of the case, this Court at the outset would have to first address the preliminary objections raised by learned counsel for ED, wherein challenge has been laid to the maintainability of the instant petition. The primary question which has arisen for the consideration is whether the ECIR can be quashed in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by this Court. This necessitates an inquiry into the nature, scope and import of an ECIR. In this regard, it would be most relevant to reproduce the following observations made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary's case (supra).

    "457. Suffice it to observe that being a special legislation providing for special mechanism regarding inquiry/investigation of offence of money-laundering, analogy cannot be drawn from the provisions of 1973 Code, in regard to registration of offence of money- laundering and more so being a complaint procedure prescribed under the 2002 Act. Further, the authorities referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act alone are competent to file such complaint. It is a different matter that the materials/evidence collected by the

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    same authorities for the purpose of civil action of attachment of proceeds of crime and confiscation thereof may be used to prosecute the person involved in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime for offence of money-laundering. Considering the mechanism of inquiry/investigation for proceeding against the property (being proceeds of crime) under this Act by way of civil action (attachment and confiscation), there is no need to formally register an ECIR, unlike registration of an FIR by the jurisdictional police in respect of cognizable offence under the ordinary law. There is force in the stand taken by the ED that ECIR is an internal document created by the department before initiating penal action or prosecution against the person involved with process or activity connected with proceeds of crime. Thus, ECIR is not a statutory document, nor there is any provision in 2002 Act requiring Authority referred to in Section 48 to record ECIR or to furnish copy thereof to the accused unlike Section 154 of the 1973 Code. The fact that such ECIR has not been recorded, does not come in the way of the authorities referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act to commence

    inquiry/investigation for initiating civil action of attachment of property being proceeds of crime by following prescribed procedure in that regard.

    459. …..Suffice it to observe that ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR which is mandatorily required to be recorded and supplied to the accused as per the provisions of 1973 Code. Revealing a copy of an ECIR, if made mandatory, may defeat the purpose sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act including frustrating the attachment of property (proceeds of crime). Non-supply of ECIR, which is essentially an internal document of ED, cannot be cited as violation of constitutional right….."

    On a minute perusal of the above reproduced observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it can be safely culled that an ECIR cannot be kept at the same pedestal as an FIR. It is crucial to note that an ECIR is not registered under the Cr.P.C., unlike a First Information Report (FIR), which is mandatorily registered under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., and subsequently forwarded to the Illaqa Magistrate as per the

    5

    provisions of Section 157 of the Cr.P.C.. Additionally, there exists no legal obligation to provide a copy of the ECIR to an accused, and the absence of such provision does not in any manner impinge upon any constitutional or statutory rights of a person. Thus, an ECIR is an administrative document prepared by the officers of the ED. It precedes the commencement of the prosecution against individuals involved in the offence of money laundering, which in turn is governed by special statute i.e. PMLA.

    7. This Court unhesitatingly concurs with the contentions made by the learned counsel for the respondent-ED that the ECIR is an internal administrative document of the ED. Consequently, in the considered opinion of this Court, since the ECIR precedes the stage of criminal prosecution and proceedings, it thus falls outside the purview of the inherent jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, the prayer of the petitioner for quashing of the ECIR under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be entertained.

    8. Though the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has emphatically argued that mere technicalities should not come in the way of entertaining the instant petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. keeping in view the amplitude of the powers conferred upon this Court, however, it cannot be over-emphasized that the powers of this Court are not unbridled and can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only to give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C.; or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; or to secure the ends of justice in relation to a criminal proceeding. Since the ECIR is not a statutory document under the Cr.P.C. and thus, cannot be equated to initiation of any criminal proceeding, aforementioned argument advanced by the learned senior

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    counsel cannot be accepted as it would result in this Court exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

    9. As a sequel to the above discussion, without delving into the merits of the case, the present petition fails on grounds of maintainability itself, and is dismissed as such.

    10. However, it is made clear that anything observed hereinabove shall not be construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

    April 10th, 2024 (MANJARI NEHRU KAUL)

    Puneet JUDGE

    Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes

    Whether reportable : Yes

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    PAWAN INSAA v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT GOVT OF INDIA
    (Apr 10, 2024)