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Smart Summary

High Court of Kerala — CRL.MC No. 5167 of 2023 (Order dated 25.08.2023)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are arrayed as accused Nos. 1 and 2 in Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 dated 06.09.2022) registered by the Enforcement Directorate (ED). The ECIR was registered in connection with a scheduled offence said to arise from FIR Crime No. 376/2022 registered at the Valappad Police Station for an alleged offence under Section 420 IPC, filed at the instance of a person named P.K. Sagar.

Shortly after registration of the FIR, the petitioners and the complainant reached an alleged amicable settlement. The petitioners earlier approached this Court in Crl.M.C. No. 4436/2022 seeking quashing of the predicate proceedings; the Court, invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C., quashed Crime No. 376/2022 (Annexure-A10 judgment dated 15.6.2023). Following that quashing, the petitioners filed the present petition seeking to quash the ECIR and all further proceedings pursuant to it.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 (Annexure-A1) and all consequential proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) must be quashed where the predicate FIR (Crime No. 376/2022) has been quashed by this Court.
  2. Whether an ECIR is an internal document immune from judicial review under Section 482 Cr.P.C., or whether it can be quashed where the predicate scheduled offence ceases to subsist.
  3. Whether the ED's power under Section 66 (specifically sub‑section (2)) of the PMLA to disclose information to other authorities permits the ECIR (and consequent PMLA proceedings) to survive the quashing of the predicate FIR.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as reported in the opinion)

  • The continuation of proceedings based on ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 is an abuse of process because the predicate offence (Crime No. 376/2022) has already been quashed by this Court (Annexure-A10).
  • Reliance on the Apex Court decision in Vijay Madan Lal Chaudhary v. Union of India: if the crime/predicate offence is quashed, actions under the PMLA lack a valid foundation and cannot be sustained; paragraph 467 (v)(d) of that judgment was specifically invoked. Petitioners also relied on J. Sekar Alias Sekar Reddy v. Directorate of Enforcement.
  • Reference was made to the earlier order of the Single Judge quashing the predicate proceedings which recorded that the complainant had no direct knowledge of the facts and lacked evidence, and had filed an affidavit expressing disinterest in pursuing the case.

Respondents' / Central Government (ED) Arguments (as reported in the opinion)

  • The ED conducted a detailed enquiry after registration of the ECIR and discovered discrepancies which are necessary to be placed before concerned Government Departments.
  • Section 66(2) of the PMLA allows the ED to notify or share information with other officers or authorities where, in the ED's opinion, such disclosure is necessary for those authorities to perform functions under law. The ECIR is argued to be necessary to enable enforcement authorities to take appropriate action on contraventions found by the ED.
  • A Division Bench of the Madras High Court (in O.P.(Crl) No. 46376/2021) was relied upon for the proposition that registration of an ECIR by ED officers cannot be the subject matter of judicial review under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
  • Reliance on conclusions in Vijay Madanlal was also advanced to argue that ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR under Cr.P.C. and is an internal document; and that absence of a recorded FIR in respect of a scheduled offence does not prevent authorities under Section 48 of the PMLA from initiating inquiries or provisional attachments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Vijay Madan Lal Chaudhary v. Union of India (Apex Court) The court's reasoning that "proceeds of crime" must be derived from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence which is already accomplished; authorities under the PMLA cannot act on assumptions unless a scheduled offence is registered with jurisdictional police or is the subject matter of a pending inquiry/complaint. If the scheduled offence is quashed, money‑laundering action in relation to property linked to that offence cannot be sustained (para 253 and para 467). The Court relied substantially on this principle to hold that once the FIR (predicate offence) was quashed, there can be no offence of money‑laundering against the petitioners in respect of property linked to that quashed offence, and therefore ECIR cannot survive.
J. Sekar Alias Sekar Reddy v. Directorate of Enforcement Referenced by petitioners as supportive authority for the proposition that PMLA action should fail if the predicate offence is quashed. The opinion records that petitioners relied on this decision; it forms part of the body of case law considered supportive of the proposition that ECIR/proceedings cannot survive the quashing of the predicate offence.
Harish Fabiani and Ors. v. Enforcement Directorate and Ors. (Delhi High Court) The Delhi High Court applied Vijay Madanlal and other authorities and held that where predicate proceedings cease to subsist, ECIR can be quashed; the decision explained that Section 66 PMLA permits disclosure but disclosure alone does not crystallize a scheduled offence. The High Court relied on Fabiani as directly persuasive—Fabiani quashed the ECIR on identical factual scenario, and its reasoning (quoted at paragraph 22) was followed to support quashing the ECIR in the present case.
State of Punjab v. Davindar Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770 Cited among authorities (as referenced in the opinion) in the context of legal principles relied upon by petitioners in related litigation. The judgment is listed among cases invoked by counsel (as part of the cluster of authorities relied on in related decisions); the Court's consideration of the body of precedent included this citation in assessing the legal position.
Nik Nish Retail Ltd. & Another v. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Govt. of India and Ors. (Calcutta High Court) Calcutta High Court proceeded to quash the ECIR where the predicate proceedings which led to registration of the ECIR had ceased. The opinion notes that this decision proceeded to quash ECIR in view of cessation of predicate proceedings and the present Court treated it as authority supportive of quashing the ECIR here.
Crl. A. Nos. 391-392/2018 (Apex Court) Referenced in the opinion for the position that where the accused had been acquitted of the predicate offence the Apex Court quashed the ECIR. The opinion observes that the Apex Court had quashed ECIR in those appeals and treats that outcome as supportive of the conclusion that ECIR may be quashed where the predicate offence no longer subsists.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in these principal steps (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Fact‑finding: the ECIR was registered in connection with a scheduled offence under Section 420 IPC as per Crime No. 376/2022 at Valappad Police Station, and the FIR that gave rise to the ECIR was quashed by this Court by Annexure‑A10 judgment dated 15.6.2023 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Annexure‑A10 order recorded that the investigating officer reported the complainant had no firsthand knowledge, lacked evidence, and had filed an affidavit expressing disinterest in pursuing the case.
  2. Legal principle from Vijay Madanlal: the Court set out and relied on the Apex Court's principle that "proceeds of crime" must be directly or indirectly derived from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence and that action under the PMLA cannot be taken absent a registered scheduled offence or pending inquiry/complaint. The Court quoted para 253 and para 467 to show that, according to the Apex Court, if the scheduled offence is quashed, money‑laundering action relating to that offence cannot be sustained.
  3. Application of that principle to the present facts: because the ECIR (Annexure‑A1) derives its information material from FIR No. 376/2022 (the Court observed that the source for the ECIR was the FIR), and since that FIR had been quashed, the Court concluded that there could be no offence of money‑laundering against the petitioners (or anyone claiming property through them) in relation to property linked to that quashed offence.
  4. Consideration of Section 66 PMLA (disclosure provision): the Court examined Section 66(1) and (2) as reproduced in the order and concluded that Section 66 permits information sharing with specified government entities but such disclosure does not, by itself, crystallize a scheduled offence. Disclosure remains an accusation/assumption until a formal registration with police or an inquiry pursuant to a complaint is made. The Court therefore rejected the submission that an ECIR survives solely because the ED may disclose information under Section 66.
  5. Precedents and comparative decisions: the Court relied on the reasoning in Harish Fabiani (Delhi High Court) and Nik Nish (Calcutta High Court), which had quashed ECIRs where the predicate proceedings had ceased, and noted that the Apex Court in certain matters (Crl. A. Nos. 391‑392/2018) had quashed ECIRs when the accused had been acquitted. The Court disagreed with the contention (attributed to a Madras High Court decision) that registration of an ECIR is immune from judicial review under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
  6. Conclusion: balancing these findings and authorities, the Court found the petitioners entitled to succeed and quashed Annexure‑A1 ECIR (ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 dated 06.09.2022) and all further proceedings arising therefrom, while making clear that if the predicate offence is revived in future, the ED would be at liberty to revive PMLA proceedings as well.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's core ruling was that Annexure‑A1 (ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 dated 06.09.2022) and all further proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the ECIR identified as Annexure‑A1 and all consequential proceedings under the PMLA founded on that ECIR are terminated insofar as they are predicated on the quashed FIR (Crime No. 376/2022).
  • Revival: the Court expressly left open the possibility that the ED may revive PMLA proceedings in the event the predicate offence is revived at a later stage.
  • Broader precedent: the Court's order relies on and applies established principles from the Apex Court's decision in Vijay Madanlal and on earlier High Court authorities; the opinion does not record the creation of a novel legal principle beyond applying those authorities to the facts before it. The practical implication emphasized by the Court is that an ECIR, which is sourced from a now‑quashed FIR, cannot survive as a foundation for money‑laundering proceedings unless the predicate scheduled offence subsists in proper form (registered or pending inquiry/complaint).

Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in that text.

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    V.P. NANDAKUMAR v. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

    PRESENT

    THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V

    FRIDAY, THE 25TH

    DAY OF AUGUST 2023 / 3RD BHADRA, 1945

    CRL.MC NO. 5167 OF 2023

    PETITIONERS/ACCUSED NOS.1 & 2

    :

    1 V.P. NANDAKUMAR, AGED 69 YEARS, S/O. PADMANABHAN, MANAGING DIRECTOR & CEO, MANAPPURAM FINANCE LIMITED,

    MANAPPURAM HOUSE, VALAPAD, THRISSUR DISTRICT,

    PIN - 680702.

    2 BINDU. A.L, W/O. BENNY VL, VETTIYADAN HOUSE, ANNANAD PO, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680309.

    BY ADVS.

    SHARAN SHAHIER

    TERRY V.JAMES

    T.R.TARIN

    RAKHY BABY

    EDWIN JOSEPH

    AGNA JOY

    RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT & STATE:

    1 THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,

    COCHIN ZONAL OFFICE, AK SESHADRI ROAD, COCHIN,

    PIN - 682011.

    2 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,

    HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682031.

    BY ADVS.

    SRI.JAISHANKAR V NAIR

    SMT NEEMA T V, SR. PP

    THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING COME UP FOR

    ADMISSION ON 25.08.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED

    THE FOLLOWING:

    1

    "CR"

    ORDER

    The petitioners herein have been arrayed as accused Nos.1 and 2 in the Enforcement Case Information Report ('ECIR' for the sake of brevity) registered by the Enforcement Directorate ('ED' for the sake of brevity) as ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 dated 06.09.2022. They have approached this Court seeking to quash the ECIR and all further proceedings pursuant thereto.

    2. The petitioner asserts that the aforementioned ECIR arose following the registration of Crime No.376/2022 at the Valappad Police Station, which pertains to an alleged offence under Section 420 of the IPC. It was consequent to the registration of the FIR at the instance of a certain P.K. Sagar that ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 dated 06.09.2022 was drawn up, invoking the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA,

    2002).

    3. The petitioners contend that immediately after the registration of the FIR, both the petitioners and the complainant arrived at an amicable settlement and decided to resolve the issues. The petitioners approached this

    2

    Court and instituted Crl.M.C.No. 4436/2022, seeking to quash all further proceedings. This Court, after getting the response from the complainant and the State, wielding its authority under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., quashed all further proceedings in Crime No. 376/2022 at the Valappad Police Station.

    4. The petitioners, relying on the observations and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madan Lal Chaudhary v. Union of India1, articulate that since this Court has quashed the crime and all further proceedings, any subsequent action under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA, 2002) lack a valid foundation. They contend that these actions under the PMLA, 2002 are therefore liable to fail. Anchored by these assertions, the petitioners have filed this petition, seeking the following reliefs:

    For these and other grounds which may be permitted to be urged at the time of the hearing, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to quash Annexure-A1 Enforcement Case Information Report numbered as ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 dated 6.9.2022 and all the further proceedings arising therefrom, in the interest of justice.

    [2022 SCC OnLine SC 929]

    1

    5. Sri. Mahesh Jethmalani, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, as instructed by Sri. Sharan Shahier, the learned counsel, advanced the following contentions:

    a) The continuation of proceedings in relation to ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 is a clear abuse of process, particularly when the predicate offense, which has its basis in Crime No. 376/2022, stands quashed by this Court by Anneuxure-A10 judgment.

    b) Reliance is placed on paragraph No. 467 (v)(d) of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Vijay Madan Lal Chaudhary (supra), and it is urged in the event of the Crime involving the predicate offense being quashed by this court, there can be no offence of money laundering. To substantiate the above point, reliance is also placed on J. Sekar Alias Sekar Reddy v. Directorate Of Enforcement . of Enforcement2.

    c) Attention of this Court is drawn to the order passed by the learned Single Judge quashing the proceedings, and it is pointed out that this Court had referred to the affidavit filed by the wherein he had stated in clear terms that he had no direct knowledge about the

    [(2022) 7 SCC 370]

    2

    facts in the complaint and he does not have any evidence to prove the allegations.

    6. In response, Sri. Jayasankar, the learned Central Government Counsel, advanced the following submissions:

    a) After the registration of the ECIR, a detailed enquiry was carried out by the ED, and several discrepancies were noticed. These aspects are to be brought to the notice of the concerned Government Departments.

    b) Placing reliance on Section 66 (2) of Act 15 of 2003, it is submitted that the said provision permits the ED or any authority specified by them to notify any other officer or authority or body of any information received or obtained by the ED which in the opinion of the ED is necessary for that authority to perform its functions under law. The ECIR is necessary to enable the enforcement authorities to ensure that the appropriate authorities take action on the contraventions that have been found by the ED.

    c) Reliance is placed on the observations made by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in O.P.(Crl) No. 46376/2021, wherein it was held that the registration of an ECIR by the officers of the

    5

    Enforcement Directorate cannot be the subject matter of a judicial review under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

    d) Reliance is placed on the conclusions in Vijay Madanlal and it is urged that in view of the special mechanism envisaged by the 2002 Act, ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR under the 1973 Code.

    e) ECIR is an internal document of the ED and the fact that FIR in respect of scheduled offence has not been recorded does not come in the way of the Authorities referred to in Section 48 to commence inquiry/investigation for initiating "civil action" of "provisional attachment" of the property being proceeds of crime.

    7. In response to the contentions advanced by Sri. Jayasankar, Mr. Jethmalani, the learned Senior counsel, submitted that a Bench of the Delhi High Court in the matter of Harish Fabiani and Ors. v. Enforcement Directorate and Ors.3

    on identical facts scenario relied on the law laid down in Vijay Madanlal (supra), State of Punjab v. Davindir Pal Singh Bhullar4

    and the orders passed by the Apex Court in Crl. A. Nos.

    3 91-3 92/2018 and submitted that there is no impediment in quashing the

    4

    [(2011) 14 SCC 770]

    [(2022) SCC OnLine Delhi 3121]

    3

    proceedings. It is stated that once the predicate proceedings stand quashed, all consequential steps emanating therefrom will also terminate.

    8. I have considered the submissions advanced and have carefully gone through the entire records.

    9. In the instant case, it is clear and uncontested that the ECIR was registered in connection to a scheduled offence under Section 420 of the IPC, as detailed in Crime No. 376/2022 at the Valappad Police Station. Further, there is no dispute that the FIR, which led to the registration of the ECIR, stands quashed as per Annexure-A10 judgment dated 15.6.2023, invoking the authority vested under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. A perusal of Annexure A-10 order would show that this Court considered the report provided by the Deputy Superintendent of Police from the Kodungallur Sub Division, who led the investigation. The report elucidated that the investigating officer had taken the complainant's statement and that he had stated clearly and categorically that he possessed no firsthand knowledge of the facts presented and lacked any evidence to support the allegations. Furthermore, he submitted an affidavit expressing his disinterest in pursuing the case. It was after reckoning all these aspects that the proceedings

    7

    stemming from Crime No.376/2022 at the Valappad Police Station were duly quashed.

    10. In Vijay Madanlal (supra), the Apex Court was called upon to deal with the pleas concerning the validity and interpretation of certain provisions of the PMLA Act, 2002, and the procedure followed by the Enforcement Directorate while enquiring into / investigating offences under the PMLA. In paragraph No. 253 of the judgment, the Apex Court had occasion to observe as under:

    Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression "derived or obtained" is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money-laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions

    8

    of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of definition clause "proceeds of crime", as it obtains as of now.

    11. The Apex Court clarified that only property directly or indirectly arising from a criminal activity connected to a scheduled offence qualifies as "proceeds of crime." Authorities under the 2002 Act are not empowered to act against someone for money laundering based merely on assumptions. The Actions taken by them must stem from a registered crime or an ongoing formal complaint. If a person implicated in a scheduled offence is cleared by a competent court, no money-laundering charges can be made against them or anyone associated with them regarding the property tied to that offence. It was held that the reasoning provided above is based on specific sections of the 2002 Act, namely Section 2(1)(u) coupled with Section 3. If one were to adopt a different interpretation, it would mean misrepresenting or altering the Act's intended meaning, especially the definition of "proceeds of crime" as it currently stands.

    12. The Apex Court has also reiterated the conclusions in paragraph No. 467 of the judgment. The relevant portion is 467 (v)(a)(d), wherein it was held as under:

    9

    (d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the process or activity connected with such property, which constitutes the offence of money-laundering. The Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. If the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-laundering against him or any one claiming such property being the property linked to stated scheduled offence through him.

    13. What has been reiterated by the Apex Court is that for the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 of the 2002 Act to occur, a person must unlawfully obtain property from specific types of criminal activities, referred to as "scheduled offences." The 'Act' sets clear limits on the Directorate's ability to charge someone with the offence of money laundering. Mere suspicion or hunches that some individual may have perpetrated a scheduled offense is not enough to initiate proceedings for money laundering as defined under the Act. The alleged scheduled offence must first be reported to the police, and it should fructify into an FIR, and it should either be under investigation or awaiting trial. Only with an official

    10

    record or a pending case can the authorities then consider charges for money laundering. In the event of the accused not being found guilty of the scheduled offence or if the case against them is quashed by a competent court, then the initiation of the proceeding under the PMLA Act will have to cease.

    14. In the case on hand, a perusal of Annexure-A1 ECIR would reveal that the source from which the information material was received is FIR No 376 of 2022. As the FIR stands quashed by this Court, there can be no offense of money laundering against the petitioners or anyone claiming such property being the property linked to stated offense through him. In that view of the matter, I find it difficult to accept the submission of the Central Government Counsel that the ECIR will survive even if the life-giving FIR is no more.

    15. In this context , a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in

    Harish Fabiani (supra) had occasion to observe as under in paragraph 22 of the judgment:

    22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has been clear and categorical in its reasoning as evident from the para extracted above. The undeniable sequitur of the above reasoning is that firstly, authorities under the PMLA cannot resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an

    11

    assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed; secondly, the scheduled offence must be registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum; thirdly, in the event there is already a registered scheduled offence but the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or quashing of the criminal case of the scheduled offence, there can be no action for money laundering against not only such a person but also any person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. In other words no action under PMLA can be resorted to unless there is a substratum of a scheduled offence for the same, which substratum should legally exist in the form of a subsisting (not quashed) criminal complaint/inquiry or if it did exist the accused has since been discharged or acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

    16. Holding so, their Lordships proceeded to quash the ECIR in Fabiani.

    17. The learned Central Government Counsel has relied on Section 66(2) of the Act, and it was argued that the ECIR is necessary to enable the enforcement authorities to ensure that the appropriate authorities take action on the contraventions that have been found by the ED. I am afraid the said contention cannot be accepted. Section 66 of the Act reads as under:

    12

    66. Disclosure of information.—131[(1)] The Director or any other authority specified by him by a general or special order in this behalf may furnish or cause to be furnished to—

    (i) any officer, authority or body performing any functions under any law relating to imposition of any tax, duty or cess or to dealings in foreign exchange, or prevention of illicit traffic in the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985); or

    (ii) such other officer, authority or body performing functions under any other law as the Central Government may, if in its opinion it is necessary so to do in the public interest, specify, by notification in the Official Gazette, in this behalf, any information received or obtained by such Director or any other authority, specified by him in the performance of their functions under this Act, as may, in the opinion of the Director or the other authority, so specified by him, be necessary for the purpose of the officer, authority or body specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) to perform his or its functions under that law.

    [(2) If the Director or other authority specified under sub-section (1) is of the opinion, on the basis of information or material in his possession, that the provisions of any other law for the time being in force are contravened, then the Director or such other authority shall share the information with the concerned agency for necessary action.]

    18. Section 66(1) of the PMLA prescribes the obligations of the Enforcement Directorate (ED) to provide or facilitate the provision of

    13

    pertinent information to designated government entities when such information is deemed essential for the discharge of their functions under relevant legislation. This provision permits information-sharing exclusively with Government Departments mentioned therein. These encompass officers, authorities, or bodies responsible for executing any functions under laws related to the levying of taxes, duties, or cess; those concerned with foreign exchange dealings; or those involved in the Prevention of Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances as governed by the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Further, the right of the Government to promulgate a gazette notification, thereby enabling additional Departments to access such information in the public interest, is also reserved. It is crucial to note that even if the ED has disseminated such information to a governmental entity, the receiving agency is mandated to undertake its independent investigation. It would have to critically analyze the received data, evaluate all related case records, and arrive at an informed decision concerning the initiation of relevant proceedings. The disclosure by the Enforcement Directorate would not exempt the notified governmental agencies from undertaking an independent evaluation to ascertain whether the accused has contravened any statutory provisions. The

    14

    act of disclosure in and of itself would not categorically render the information as constituting a "scheduled offence." Such information remains in the realm of an accusation and is to be construed as an "assumption" until such time as it is formally registered with the appropriate jurisdictional police or is subjected to an inquiry pursuant to a complaint filed before a competent forum.

    19. This aspect was considered in Fabiani (supra), and the law was lucidly explained as under in paragraph No 23 of the judgment. As regards the contention of the learned ASG for the ED that Section 66 PMLA permits the Respondents to activate any authority by disclosure of a scheduled offence, this Court is of the considered view that an ECIR or a proceeding under the PMLA cannot be triggered merely on that assumption alone, as noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the para 253 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). Section 66(2) which was being pressed by the Respondents for this purpose merely encapsulates the power of the Director or any other authority to disclose/share any information it may have regarding contravention of any other law by a person/entity "for necessary action". The provision itself enables disclosure and sharing of information inter se authorities, however mere disclosure does not crystallize a scheduled offence. It is merely an "assumption" till it precipitates as being "registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum" (per the Hon'ble Supreme Court).

    15

    20. Though it was vehemently argued by the learned CGC relying on the law laid down by the Madras High Court in Crl.O.P. No SR 46376 of 2021 that registration of ECIR by the officers of the Enforcement Directorate cannot be subject matter of judicial review, I am not able to agree with the above submission. The Delhi High Court in Harish Fabiani (supra), the Calcutta High Court in Nik Nish Retail Ltd. and Another v. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Govt. of India and Ors.5

    have proceeded to quash the ECIR in view of the cessation of the proceedings which led to the registration of the predicate offense. Furthermore in Crl Appeal Nos 391-392/2018, The Apex Court, after recording the submissions of the Learned Solicitor General that the accused had been acquitted of the predicate offense, had quashed the ECIR. In view of the discussion above, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioners are entitled to succeed. Annexure-A1 Enforcement Case Information Report numbered ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 dated 6.9.2022, and all further proceedings are quashed. However, it is made clear that in the event of the predicate offence getting revived, it would always be open for the ED

    2022 SCC Online Cal 4044.

    5

    to revive the proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 as well.

    Sd/-

    RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V,

    JUDGE

    PS

    17

    APPENDIX OF CRL.MC 5167/2023

    PETITIONER ANNEXURES

    Annexure A1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ENFORCEMENT CASE

    INFORMATION REPORT NUMBERED AS

    ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 DATED 6/9/2022. Annexure A2 A TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN CRIME NO. 376 OF

    2022 OF VALAPAD POLICE STATION DATED

    24/5/2022.

    Annexure A3 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT DATED 11/5/2022 FILED BEFORE THE JUDICIAL FIRST-CLASS

    MAGISTRATE COURT, KODUNGALLUR.

    Annexure A4 THE TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 18/8/2017

    OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT IN CRL MC NO. 764 OF

    2014.

    Annexure A5 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGEMENT DATED 19/10/2017

    IN CRL MC NO. 733 OF 2014 OF THIS HONORABLE

    COURT.

    Annexure A6 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN WPC NO. 12387 OF 2021 DATED 14/2/2023.

    Annexure A7 A TRUE COPY OF THE REFER REPORT DATED 19/1/2023 SUBMITTED BEFORE THE JUDICIAL FIRST

    CLASS MAGISTRATE , KODUNGALLUR.

    Annexure A8 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THIS

    HONOURABLE COURT IN CRL.MC NO. 3429 OF 2023.

    Annexure A9 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 17/5/2023 IN CRL. MP NO. 548 OF 2023 IN RC NO. 34 OF 2023 IN CRIME NO. 376 OF 2022 OF VALAPAD POLICE STATION, PASSED BY THE JUDICIAL FIRST-CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT, KODUNGALLUR.

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    Annexure A10 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 15/6/2023

    IN CRL.MC.NO.4436 OF 2022 OF THIS HONOURABLE

    COURT

    Annexure A11 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN WPC NO. 35024 OF 2019 DATED 8/1/2021.

    Annexure A12 A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 12/5/2023 IN WPC NO. 15651 OF 2023.

    Annexure A13 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER MODIFYING THE

    ANNEXURE A 12 INTERIM ORDER DATED 25/5/2023.

    RESPONDENT ANNEXURES

    Annexure R1(a) A true copy of the communication dated 06.07.2023 issued by the Directorate of Enforcement addressed to the Director General of Police.

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    V.P. NANDAKUMAR v. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
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