AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • SECTION 33 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955
  • Rule 36 of the Rules of 1957
  • Section 83(1) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 read with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961
  • Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 and the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961
  • Rule 36 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Rules, 1957 (for short the Rules of 1957)
  • section 17 of W.J. Act
  • jurisdiction.15. Rule 36 of the Rules of 1957
  • sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the WJ Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • SECTION 33 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955
  • Rule 36 of the Rules of 1957
  • Section 83(1) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 read with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961
  • Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 and the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961
  • Rule 36 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Rules, 1957 (for short the Rules of 1957)
  • section 17 of W.J. Act
  • jurisdiction.15. Rule 36 of the Rules of 1957
  • sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the WJ Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sujoy Paul, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are review petitions arising out of a common order dated 18.07.2019 in WP-17859-2016 & WP-18489-2016. The matters concern proceedings under the Working Journalists and Other Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (the "WJ Act"). The petitioners challenge the impugned order on several grounds: (i) that the applications filed by the workmen did not constitute a "dispute" such as to invoke Section 17(2) of the WJ Act; (ii) that Rule 36 of the Working Journalists Rules, 1957 prescribes a mandatory Form "C" and the employees' applications were not in that prescribed statutory form; and (iii) that there was an error of classification (a dispute whether petitioners fall in category 7 or category 1) which, the petitioners say, should have been considered by the authority. The petitioners also relied on a chart (Annexure-A) alleging that amounts paid to employees exceeded amounts claimed, and thus the applications were not maintainable.

The respondents (private respondents) countered that written submissions relied on by the petitioners were filed on 20.09.2016, after the authority had passed its order dated 19.09.2016, and therefore those submissions could not assist the petitioners. The respondents also argued that Annexure-A was not part of the writ petition and that review cannot be used to re-argue points already adjudicated on merits.

The court heard the parties, considered the record and the question whether the review jurisdiction could be exercised to revisit findings made in the order dated 18.07.2019 (in particular Para-14 and Para-17 of that order).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the existence of a "dispute" is a pre-condition to invoke Section 17(2) of the WJ Act and, relatedly, whether the employees' applications in the instant matters fell within the ambit of a "dispute".
  2. Whether Rule 36 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Rules, 1957, which uses the word "shall" and prescribes Form "C", makes filing strictly in Form "C" mandatory so as to render applications filed in other formats invalid.
  3. Whether the review petitions disclose any error apparent on the face of the record (factual or legal) justifying exercise of the court's review jurisdiction to reopen aspects already considered in the order dated 18.07.2019 (including alleged misclassification and new material such as Annexure-A or written submissions filed after the authority's order).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as summarized from the opinion)

  • Section 17(2) of the WJ Act provides a statutory procedure for adjudication of a "dispute" and existence of a "dispute" is a pre-condition to invoke Section 17(2); in these matters, the workmen's applications did not constitute such a "dispute".
  • Rule 36 of the 1957 Rules prescribes Form "C" and uses the word "shall", which, they argued, is mandatory; therefore applications not in Form "C" are not entertainable.
  • There was an error of classification: the written submission before the authority showed a dispute whether petitioners fall in category 7 or category 1; without examining this the proceedings were not maintainable. The petitioners relied on Kasturi & Sons (AIR 1958 SC 507) to support this contention.
  • The Annexure-A chart (filed as Annexure-A at page 31) showed that the CTC amount and amounts received by employees exceeded the amounts claimed, demonstrating that employees received a more favourable benefit and that the application under Section 17 was not maintainable.
  • On these bases, the petitioners contended that the impugned order contained factual and apparent legal errors warranting review.

Respondents' Arguments (as summarized from the opinion)

  • The authority under the WJ Act had passed the order dated 19.09.2016 which was challenged; the written submissions relied on by petitioners were filed on 20.09.2016 (Annexure-P/11) and therefore were filed after the final order and are of no assistance in review.
  • The Revenue Recovery Certificate (RRC) was issued on 19.09.2020; additional returns or submissions filed after a final order cannot be a ground for review.
  • Relying on an order of the Indore Bench in WA-193-2019 and dismissal of RP-1429-2019 by the Rajasthan Patrika/petitioner, respondents argued that review cannot be used to re-argue matters or raise points already decided on merits.
  • Substantively, respondents contended that employees' application (Annexure-P/4) when compared with Form "C" showed that in substance the prescribed details were present, and therefore the applicants should not be non-suited on a technical ground.
  • Annexure-A was not part of the writ petition and therefore could not be introduced in review to raise new factual matters.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kasturi & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Shri N. Salivateeswaran, AIR 1958 SC 507 Invoked by petitioners to contend that the authority's procedure ran contrary to Section 17 of the WJ Act and was analogous to Section 33 of the ID Act. The Court noted the citation was relied upon by petitioners but observed that Kasturi & Sons had been considered in later judgments and that the earlier order (18.07.2019) had given a reasoned finding; the Court refused to re-open the issue in review.
Inderchand Jain (dead) through LRs v. Motilal (dead) through LRs, (2009) 14 SCC 663 Scope of review is limited; review cannot be used to re-argue matters on merits unless an error apparent on the face of record is shown. The Court relied upon this principle to limit the review jurisdiction and to refuse re-argument of merits.
S. Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission, (2009) 10 SCC 464 Also cited for the limited scope of review and the prohibition on re-arguing merits in review proceedings. Applied as authority for the limited ambit of review and to refuse the petitioners' attempt to revisit settled findings.
Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai, (1976) 3 SCC 832 Procedure in industrial disputes should be informal and liberal; substance prevails over formal defects; procedural prescriptions are handmaids, not mistresses, of justice. The Court invoked this principle to hold that the WJ Act (a beneficent statute) should not be read hyper-technically and to support the view that substantive details suffice even if prescribed form is not used.
Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy, (2012) 7 SCC 788 Where statute or rule uses "shall" for a format, the format is not necessarily a matter of substance; the crucial issue is whether averments are testified on oath even if in a different form. Used to support the proposition that absence of the exact prescribed form does not automatically cause prejudice and that substance overrides form.
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 A code of procedure is designed to facilitate justice, not to trip people up; too technical a construction of procedural sections should be guarded against. Relied upon to justify a liberal, non-hyper-technical interpretation of procedural provisions under the WJ Act.
Sushil Kumar Sen v. State Of Bihar, (1975) 1 SCC 774 Procedure should not overpower substantive rights; judges may act to prevent procedural law defeating substantial justice. Invoked to emphasize that procedural requirements must not be applied in a manner that extinguishes substantive justice under the WJ Act.
State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719 Processual law is not to be a tyrant; procedural prescriptions are the handmaid of justice. Applied to support the liberal approach to procedural form requirements under the WJ Act.
Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, (1984) 3 SCC 46 Adjective/procedural law should be interpreted to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than defeat it. Cited to reinforce that procedural formalities should not defeat substantive claims under benevolent statutes like the WJ Act.
Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480 Provisions of procedural codes should not be construed in a manner that leaves the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. Used to support the proposition that technical non-compliance with prescribed forms should not automatically invalidate substantive claims.
Smt. Gomti Bai Tamrakar v. State of M.P., (2008) 4 MP LJ 536; Nagda Municipality v. ITC Ltd., (2007) 3 MPHT 309 (DB) Local precedents cited for the proposition that silence in reply or pleading on a question of fact means no dispute can be taken on that fact. Relied upon in the reasoning reproduced in Para-14 to find that the employer had not denied quantification of the employee's claim and therefore no "dispute" existed in law on that point.
Avishek Raja (citation referenced as "supra" in the opinion) Referenced for the proposition (as summarized in the court's Para-14) that by invoking Clause 20(j), lesser wages than those flowing from the WJ Act cannot be granted, and that if no dispute exists Section 17(1) can be invoked. The court relied on the distilled proposition from Avishek Raja as part of its reasoning that the alleged dispute raised by employer was not a dispute in law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in a sequence of legal and factual assessments:

  1. Scope of review: The court began by reiterating the limited scope of review jurisdiction. Citing authorities (Inderchand Jain and S. Bagirathi Ammal), it emphasized that review cannot be used to re-argue the merits unless an error apparent on the face of the record is shown.
  2. Section 17 applicability: The court stated that the argument on applicability of Section 17 had been dealt with in detail in the order dated 18.07.2019, particularly Para-14 of that order, and that Para-14 (reproduced in the present order) fully answered the petitioners' submissions on this point. No reason was made out to revisit that aspect in review jurisdiction.
  3. Rule 36 and Form "C" — substance over form: Although Rule 36 uses the word "shall" and prescribes Form "C", the court rejected the petitioners' argument that this required a hyper-technical mandatory compliance that would invalidate applications not filed in that exact form. The court explained that the intention of the lawmakers is to enable litigants to file in the prescribed form to ensure necessary details are supplied, but if those details are available by other means, the application should not be thrown out merely for lack of the prescribed form. The court emphasized that "substance" determines entertainability, not mere "form".
  4. Beneficent character of WJ Act and liberal interpretation: The court described the WJ Act as a beneficent piece of legislation and held that it should not be interpreted in a hyper-technical manner to defeat litigants. The court relied on a line of Supreme Court authority (including Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Ponnala Lakshmaiah, Sangram Singh, Sushil Kumar Sen, State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, Ghanshyam Dass, Kailash v. Nanhku) to support a liberal, substance-over-form approach to procedural requirements.
  5. No prejudice shown: The court observed that employees could not show any prejudice by virtue of their applications not being in the prescribed Form "C". In that light, the technical objection was found devoid of substance.
  6. No error apparent on face of record: With respect to the alleged classification error and the contention that written submissions raised a dispute as to categorization, the court referred to Para-14 of the order under review. That paragraph (reproduced in the present order) explained that if a fact is pleaded in the claim, the same must be denied with accuracy and precision in the reply; where the reply/pleadings are silent on quantification of the amount claimed, no dispute exists. The court found that the employer had failed to raise any actual dispute while filing the reply before the Deputy Labour Commissioner; thus no dispute existed as a matter of law and the petitioners' attempt to re-agitate these matters in review was not sustainable.
  7. New material and timing: The court accepted the respondents' contention that written submissions relied upon by the petitioners were filed on 20.09.2016 after the authority's final order of 19.09.2016, and therefore such submissions could not be a basis for review. The court also noted that Annexure-A was not part of the writ petition and could not be used to raise new factual matters in review.
  8. Conclusion on reviewability: Taking the above points together, the court found no error apparent on the face of the record requiring intervention in review jurisdiction and declined to reopen the issues decided in the order dated 18.07.2019.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Review petitions fail and are hereby dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The review petitions are dismissed and the impugned order dated 18.07.2019 (in WP-17859-2016 & WP-18489-2016) stands as decided; the petitioners are not granted review relief.
  • On procedural/formal compliance under Rule 36: The Court affirmed a principle applied to the facts — that Rule 36's prescription of Form "C" is not to be read so hyper-technically as to invalidate an application where the substantive details required by the form are otherwise available. The Court emphasised "substance" over "form" for the WJ Act, treated as a beneficent statute.
  • Review jurisdiction: The order reiterates the limited scope of review and the requirement of an error apparent on the face of the record to justify reopening earlier adjudication; absent such an error, review will not be permitted to re-argue merits or introduce new factual material filed after the decision being reviewed.
  • Broader precedent: The court applied established appellate and Supreme Court principles about liberal interpretation of procedural requirements and limited review scope. The opinion did not purport to create a novel legal rule beyond applying settled principles to the facts; its immediate consequence is the dismissal of these specific review petitions.

End of summary — prepared strictly from the provided opinion text. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

    Rajasthan Patrika Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of M.P. And Others

    Sujoy Paul, J.:— These review petitions are arising out of a common order dated 18.07.2019, passed in WP-17859-2016 & WP-18489-2016. The petitioners submit that the matter is related to “Working Journalists and Other Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955” (in short the “WJ Act”).

    2. By taking this Court to Section 17(2), Shri Jain, learned senior counsel urged that a statutory procedure is prescribed for adjudication of a “dispute”. If there exists a “dispute”, the mechanism is prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the WJ Act. Thus existence of a “dispute” is a pre-condition to invoke Section 17(2) of the WJ Act.

    3. In the instant matters, the applications filed by the workmen does not fall within the ambit of “dispute” and, therefore, the very basis on the strength of which proceedings could be started before the authority was not available. The next contention is that Rule 36 of the “Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Rules, 1957” (for short the “Rules of 1957”) prescribes a statutory Form “C”. Referring to the language employed in Rule 36, Shri Jain argued that the law makers have chosen to use the word “shall” which leaves no room for any doubt that the provision is mandatory. Thus, the application can be entertained only when it is filed in statutory Form “C”. If the applications preferred by the employees are examined on the anvil of statutory From (sic : Form) “C”, it will be clear that same are not in the prescribed form. The law is well settled that if a thing is prescribed to be done in a particular manner by a statute, it has to be done in the same manner and other methods are forbidden.

    4. The error of classification is apparent on the face of the record. If the written submission filed before the authority by the petitioners is seen, it will be clear that there existed a dispute whether the petitioners fall within the category 7 or category 1. Without examining this, the proceedings were not maintainable. The reference is made to AIR 1958 SC 507, [Kasturi & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Shri N. Salivateeswaran] to bolster the contention that as per this Constitution Bench judgment relating to the WJ Act, it is clear that the procedure adopted by the authority runs contrary to Section 17 of the WJ Act which is analogous/akin to Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

    5. Shri Jain has taken us to Para-17 of the order under review and urged that the findings given in this para are factually incorrect and legally improper. In absence of existence of a “dispute”, the question of invoking section 17 of W.J. Act did not arise.

    6. Lastly, Shri Jain relied on a chart which is filed as Annexure-A (at Page No. 31). He submits that if CTC amount and the amount claimed by employees are examined in juxtaposition, it will be clear like noon day that what employees have received is much higher than what they claimed in the instant application. Since a more favourable benefit is received by them, their application under Section 17 was not maintainable.

    7. On the basis of aforesaid contentions, learned senior counsel submits that the order under review contains factual as well as apparent legal error which can be corrected in exercise of review jurisdiction.

    8. Countering the aforesaid, Shri Arjaria, learned counsel for the private respondnets (sic : respondents) submits that the authority under the W.J. Act passed the order dated 19.09.2016 which became subject matter of challenge. The written submissions on which learned senior counsel have placed reliance were filed on 20.09.2016 (Annexure-P/11). The written submission filed after final order is passed, is of no assistance to the petitioners. The Revenue Recovery Certificate (RRC) was also issued on 19.09.2020. The additional return or submission filed subsequent to the final order cannot be a ground for review. In support of this contention reliance is placed on Para- 5.13 of the petition.

    9. Shri Arjaria placed heavy reliance on the order passed by Indore Bench in WA-193-2019. The Rajasthan Patrika/petitioner unsuccessfully filed RP-1429-2019, which was dismissed on 05.11.2019. Under the garb of review petition, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-argue the matter or raise the same points which have already been adjudicated on merits. Lastly, it is urged that if employees' application (Annexure-P/4) is examined in juxtaposition to prescribed Form “C”, it will be clear that in substance it is same and pregnant with necessary details. Thus, on technical ground, employees cannot be non-suited. The chart Annexure-A was not part of the writ petition, submits Shri Arjaria and, therefore, new factual matter cannot be a reason to entertain a review petition.

    10. In rejoinder submission, Shri Jain urged that Rule 36 uses the word “shall” which means that application of employee must be strictly in the statutory Form “C”. If edifice/foundation of application is incorrect, the entire building of proceedings founded upon it must collapse. Shri Choudhary advanced the arguments in similar lines.

    11. No other point is pressed by counsel for the parties.

    12. We have heard the parties at length and perused the record.

    13. This is trite that scope of review is very limited. Under the garb of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-argue the matter on merits (unless an error apparent on the face of record is pointed out). No long drawn arguments can be entertained to fish out such error. (See : (2009) 14 SCC 663. [Inderchand Jain (dead) through LRs v. Motilal (dead) through LRs] & (2009) 10 SCC 464, [S. Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission .]).

    14. The argument advanced by Shri Jain, learned senior counsel relating to applicability of Section 17 was dealt with in great detail in order dated 18.07.2019. Para-14 of the order under review (reproduced in Para-18 of this order) is the complete answer to this argument. No case is made out to revisit the said aspect in this review jurisdiction.

    15. Rule 36 of the Rules of 1957 reads as under:

    “36. Application under section 17 of the Act - An application under section 17 of the Act shall be made in Form C to the Government of the State, where the Central Office or the Branch Office of the newspaper establishment in which the newspaper employee is employed, is situated.”

    True it is that Rule 36 of the Rules of 1957 is pregnant with the word “shall”. The question is whether the rule can be read in the manner suggested by Shri Jain and Shri Choudhary. We are unable to persuade ourselves with the line of argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners. The intention of law makers is to enable and encourage the litigant to file their application in the prescribed form so that the necessary details are spelled out. If such details are otherwise available, although in a different manner, merely because such application was not filed in the prescribed form, the application cannot be thrown to winds. It is the “substance” which will decide the entertainability of application and not the “form”.

    16. The WJ Act, in our considered opinion, is a beneficent piece of legislation. It cannot be read in a hyper technical manner to strangulate a litigant. While dealing with another beneficent provision, namely, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Krishna Iyer, J in (1976) 3 SCC 832, [The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai] opined as under:

    “7….…. The substance of the matter is obvious and formal defects, in such circumstances, fade away. We are not dealing with a civil litigation governed by the Civil Procedure Code but with an industrial dispute where the process of conflict resolution is informal, rough-and-ready and invites a liberal approach. Procedural prescriptions are hand-maids, not mistresses, of justice and failure of fair play is the spirit in which courts must view processual deviances. Our adjectival branch of jurisprudence, by and large, deals not with sophisticated litigants but the rural poor, the urban lay and the weaker societal segments for whom law will be an added terror if technical misdescriptions and deficiencies in drafting pleadings and setting out the cause title create a secret weapon to nonsuit a party. Where foul play is absent, and fairness is not faulted, latitude is a grace of processual justice………….…”

    [Emphasis Supplied]

    17. The reference may be made to (2012) 7 SCC 788, [Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy] wherein the election petitioner urged that Section 83(1) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 read with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 shows that the word used in the statute is “shall”, which make it mandatory/obligatory for the petitioner to support the averments by an affidavit filed in a prescribed form. The Apex Court repelled the said argument by holding thus:

    “28…….…. The format of the affidavit is at any rate not a matter of substance. What is important and at the heart of the requirement is whether the election petitioner has made averments which are testified by him on oath, no matter in a form other than the one that is stipulated in the Rules. The absence of an affidavit or an affidavit in a form other than the one stipulated by the Rules does not by itself cause any prejudice.…”

    [Emphasis Supplied]

    18. In view of scheme and object of WJ Act, the liberal interpretation should be given to the provisions in order to advance the cause of justice. This is settled law that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The Apex Court in AIR 1955 SC 425. Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah opined that A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is “procedure”, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends : not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against. The Apex Court in (1975) 1 SCC 774, Sushil Kumar Sen v. State Of Bihar . opined that the mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence-processual, as much as substantive. In (1976) 1 SCC 719, State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, the Apex Court held that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. In (1984) 3 SCC 46, Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India the Apex Court reiterated the need for interpreting a part of the adjective law dealing with procedure alone in such a manner as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it as all the laws of procedure are based on this principle. In (2005) 4 SCC 480, Kailash v. Nanhku the Apex Court held that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice.

    19. The Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 and the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 are more technical in nature if compared with ID Act or WJ Act. Despite that, the Apex Court was not impressed with the hyper technical argument based on “form” and insisted on “substance”. In the instant matters employees could not show any prejudice being caused to them if applications were not filed in the prescribed form. Thus, this argument advanced by the petitioners is devoid of substance.

    20. The judgment of Supreme Court in Kasturi & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra) was considered in later judgments. While deciding the writ petition, this Court has given finding by passing a reasoned order. The petitioners cannot be permitted to reagitate the said issue in the review. We do not find any error apparent on the face of record which requires review of Para-17 of the order. It is common ground raised by Shri Jain, learned senior counsel and Mr. Choudhary that petitioners filed written submissions before the final order could be passed by the authority below. Thus, the ground so raised in the written submission ought to have been considered by the authority.

    21. In our view, this Court has dealt with this aspect in Para-14 of the order under review, which reads as under:

    “(14) This is settled in law that if something is pleaded in the claim application, the same must be denied with accuracy and precision while filing the reply. If reply is pregnant with relevant pleadings, necessary arguments can be advanced based thereupon either orally or by way of filing written submission. In the main reply, there is no denial of quantification of amount claimed by the employee. In absence thereto, it cannot be said that there exists a dispute on the question of claim (to the tune of Rs. 9,06,108/-). In other words, a party can say that there exists a dispute when a claim preferred is categorically denied by the other side while filing reply. In (2008) 4 MP LJ 536, [Smt. Gomti Bai Tamrakar v. State of M.P.] and (2007) 3 MPHT 309 (DB), [Nagda Municipality v. ITC Ltd.], the Courts opined that if reply or pleading are silent on a question of fact no amount of argument can be advanced and accepted. For this reason, we are unable to hold that present petitioners disputed the claim of the petitioner. The alleged dispute raised was founded upon Clause 20(j) of the Majithia Wage Board award. At the cost of repetition, in our opinion, in Para-26 of the judgment of Avishek Raja (supra), the Apex Court made it clear that by invoking clause 20(j), lesser wages than the wages flowing from W.J. Act cannot be granted. Thus, dispute in this regard raised by the employer is no dispute in the eves of law. So far the orders of Labour Court Jaipur are concerned, the said orders were neither placed before the authority below nor before this court. Accordingly, this dispute also does not exist in the eyes of law. In Avishek Raja (supra), it is made clear that if there exists no dispute, Section 17(1) can be invoked. In the instant case, as analyzed, the employer has failed to raise any actual dispute while filing the reply before the Deputy Labour Commissioner.”

    [Emphasis Supplied]

    Thus, this aspect cannot be permitted to be reagitated in these review petitions.

    22. For the reasons stated above, no case is made out to exercise review jurisdiction. Review petitions fails and are hereby dismissed.

    Petition dismissed

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    Rajasthan Patrika Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of M.P. And Others
    (Dec 18, 2020)